

Families and Individuals affected by Terrorist attacks

(Case study)

Introduction

The basic assumption of our study is that the mutual violence and the difficulties in daily life arising from the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict cause both sides to develop and maintain mutually negative perceptions. These perceptions undermine trust between the parties and thwart any possibility of progress towards a peace agreement.

This document, which focuses on cases of families and individuals injured or killed in Palestinian terrorist attacks, is intended to examine our basic research assumption. This examination will deepen our insights from the comprehensive surveys conducted as part of the study during 2020, as well as from the surveys conducted according to the three case studies, as well as from personal interviews and focus groups on the same subjects. We have also added data and information from other sources: media reports, other studies, and other documents.

The case studies, as part of the research, were defined as an activity that describes selected high costs of the conflict, that should show the greatest link to distrust. The reactions and attitudes among the (12) interviewees were compared referring to their different levels of stress and hardships they were exposed to. Due to the coronavirus, all interviews were conducted by telephone, using in-depth interview technique, according to a pre-prepared questionnaire. The interviews were conducted between December 2020 and February 2021. All interviewees were recruited through various databases lists, personal connections and media news archives.

Israeli suffering as a result of Palestinian terrorist attacks

A short time after the end of the 48' War, in 1949, sporadic terrorist activity began against Israeli territory and population, mainly in areas along the border with Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip with unofficial support from Egypt and Jordan. This activity, called "Fedayun" (Arabic: "Those who are willing to give their souls"), was carried out mostly by the Palestinian refugees who fled the country in 1948 and initially tried to infiltrate into Israel, in order to return to their homes or save something from their property, but their innocent actions quickly turned to violent acts, which included the murder of residents in the areas near the border.

The most notable act of terrorism during this period was the Ma'aleh Scorpions massacre in the Negev on March 17, 1954, in which 11 Israeli bus passengers were murdered. Following terrorist attacks came strong Israeli reprisals in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, in which hundreds of Egyptian soldiers were killed. After one of these reprisals, Operation "Black Arrow", conducted in Gaza on February 28, 1955, following the murder of an Israeli resident of Rehovot, Fedayun was adopted by Egypt and became part of the Egyptian army, which increased its operations. A total of 340 Israelis were killed in terrorist attacks in the eight years between 1949 and 1956.

Fedayun's activity was the main cause of Operation "Kadesh" (56' War), and its activity was almost completely halted after most of its operatives were killed in the operation. A total of 125 Israelis were killed in terrorist attacks in the eleven years between 1957 and 1967.

I asked him when, and why, he had decided to volunteer for martyrdom¹. "In the spring of 1993, I began to pester our military leaders to let me do an operation," he said. "It was around the time of the Oslo accords, and it was quiet, too quiet. I wanted to do an operation that would incite others to do the same. Finally, I was given the green light to leave Gaza for an operation inside Israel".—Nasra Hassan

¹ **Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence**, Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, 2002

Palestinian terrorism continued to strike in the 1970's and 1980's.

The most serious events were the massacre at Lod Airport in which 25 people were murdered, and the massacre of athletes at the Munich Olympics (both in 1972), in which 11 Israeli hostages were killed in a failed rescue operation by the German security forces.

Beginning in the mid-1970's, the Palestinian terrorist organizations focused on removing terrorist attacks from the territory they had taken over in south Lebanon, under the auspices of the Syrian army that entered the country in the civil war, which Israel called the "Fatahland". The largest of these was the Maalot disaster (1974), in which 22 children and 3 adults were killed during a failed rescue operation by a IDF special unit.



The children who are killed in Maalot (1972)

One of the most serious attacks in the 1970's was the 1978 coastal road attack ("The Bloody Bus") in which terrorists from Lebanon hijacked two buses and killed 35 civilians, families and children, who were on their way back from a trip on Saturday.



"The Bloody Bus", The bus that was attacked on the coastal road, 1978. 35 people were killed in the attack.

On March 1979, after about a year and a half of negotiations, the peace agreement with Egypt was signed. This agreement was reached after four wars – the last was the traumatic Yom Kippur War – with the Arab state considered Israel's greatest enemy.

The peace Agreement with Egypt also included the Autonomy Agreement with the Palestinians, which was the basis for the Oslo Accords fourteen years later. It should be noted that despite the history of mutual bloodshed, the peace agreement with Egypt was enthusiastically accepted by the Israeli public.

It should be assumed that the trust between the parties and the support for the peace agreement stemmed from the involvement and commitment of the leaders of the two nations - Anwar A-Sadat and Menachem Begin - to the peace agreement and the possibility of a better future.

The 80's and the First Intifada

Following the terrorist attacks and the increasing artillery fire by the Palestinians on the northern settlements, and after the assassination of Israeli Ambassador to London Shlomo Argov, Israel launched the "First Lebanon War" ("Peace for the Galilee") during which the IDF (with the assistance of the Christian Phalanges) expelled PLO forces from Beirut and south Lebanon. In

order to avoid the occupation of Beirut, the IDF reached an agreement with the PLO on the evacuation of their people to Tunisia. Some of the Palestinian leadership fled north (to Tripoli) and was eventually expelled by Syria. The IDF maintained a security strip along the border, and as a result of its activity, terrorist attacks on northern Israel declined considerably.

In the decade from 1978 to December 1987, the date of the outbreak of the first intifada, 114 Jews were killed in Palestinian terrorist attacks.

If until the intifada, secular organizations affiliated with the PLO carried out the bulk of terrorism, at the beginning of the intifada, the Hamas movement was established, followed by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad as religious Islamic organizations not sponsored by the PLO. In the five years of the first intifada, between 1987 and 1992, 155 Israelis were murdered in terrorist attacks.

The 90's

In the early 1990's, many terrorist attacks were carried out, including the killing of three IDF soldiers in Ramot Menashe, the murder of a 15 year-old girl, Helena Rapp in Bat Yam, and the abduction and murder of the policeman Nissim Toledano, which led to the deportation of 415 Hamas members to Lebanon.

On February 4 1990, nine Israelis were murdered near Ismailia, Egypt, a terrorist unit from Abu Nidal's organization, in the so-called 1990 Egyptian bus attack. On August 4 1990, two youths from Jerusalem were abducted and murdered by three terrorists, their bodies found in the wadi between Beit Hanina and Ramot.

In April 1993, Hamas carried out the attack at the Mehula junction, which was the first suicide bombing attack in a series of suicide bombing attacks that Hamas tried to carry out, often unsuccessfully, mainly against soldiers and civilians in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, but also in a bus in Jerusalem.

After the Oslo Accords

Despite decades of terrorism, in 1993 Israel and the Palestinians reached a principles agreement that was supposed to pave the way for a peace

agreement. On September 13, 1993, after secret negotiations between Israel and PLO the Oslo Accords was signed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. The main attainment of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) is the mutual recognition between Israel and PLO. Despite widespread public support on both sides, the agreement has provoked public and political outrage in both Israel and the Palestinian public. In the months following the signing of the agreements, there were numerous terrorist attacks in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and in Israel.

The Massacre in the Cave of the Patriarchs (al-Haram al-Ibrahimi) was a shooting attack on February 25, 1994 (the middle of Ramadan), in which 29 Muslim worshippers were murdered by Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish physician from Kiryat Arba. This is the first mass attack after the signing of the Oslo Accords, and the largest terrorist attack by a Jew since the establishment of the State of Israel. The attack led to harsh reactions from the Palestinian public and a series of revenge attacks by Hamas. The attack was strongly criticized by the Israeli public and it was followed by the establishment of the Shamgar Committee.

On April 6, 1994, following the Massacre of the Cave of the Patriarchs, Hamas carried out the car bomb attack in Afula, the first mass-casualty suicide bombing attack that opened a series of suicide bombing attacks that included attacks in Hadera and Tel Aviv. In January 1995, a double attack occurred at the Beit Lid Junction, killing 22 people, most of them IDF soldiers. During the two years between September 1993 and September 1995 (Oslo B) 164 people were murdered in terrorist attacks and hundreds more were injured.

On January 5, 1996 the "Engineer" Yahya Ayash a Hamas member responsible for the deaths of dozens of Israelis, was killed by a booby-trapped cellphone. The radical Islamic movements such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah in Lebanon announced their intention to avenge Ayash's death in large-scale attacks.

Inside Israel, there were constant demonstrations against the Oslo Accords, and they were mainly directed against Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister, who signed the agreement. The demonstrations and incitement were from the

Israeli right wing and the settlers in the occupied territories, and were encouraged by rabbis among religious Zionism.

On November 4, 1995, at the end of a mass rally in support of the peace process, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a far-right Jew, Yigal Amir.

1996 elections and Netanyahu's rise to power

The elections for the 14-th Knesset and Prime Minister were held on May 29, 1996. Shimon Peres, who has served as prime minister since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, faced Benjamin Netanyahu, who headed the Likud. Netanyahu's target audience was diverse. On the one hand, he turned to the right wing and the religious parties, which wanted to leave behind the period of leftist rule. But to win, he had to appeal to Moderate Political Center public that was debating between the right and the left, which at the time saw the Oslo Accords as a political necessity and wanted to implement them. Netanyahu promised that upon coming to power he would not cancel the agreements and meet Israel's political commitments, but the negotiations under his administration would be firmer, based on the principle of reciprocity, and would achieve better results than Peres could achieve.

Netanyahu won the elections with the promise to continue the peace process with the Palestinians, which was still supported by a majority of the Israeli public, despite rampant terrorism.

On February 25, 1996, a wave of suicide bombing attacks began, killing dozens of civilians and wounding hundreds. On the same day, 27 people were killed in two suicide bombing attacks in Jerusalem and Ashkelon. About a week later, On March 3, another terrorist exploded in Jerusalem, killing 18 people².

On September 24, 1996, riots began in Judea and Samaria after Arafat called for a violent response to the opening of the Western Wall tunnel in Jerusalem

² All data from The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

to tourists. In three days of fighting in the West Bank cities (the events of the Western Wall Tunnel), 16 IDF soldiers were killed.

Since 1997, there has been a large decline in terrorist activity (with the exception of a double attack on the Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem), and during the year leading up to the second intifada, no one in Israel was killed in an act of terrorism (although there were a number of attacks against Israelis within the occupied territories).

1999 elections and Barak's rise to power

The elections for the 15-th Knesset (17 May 1999) and Barak's election as prime minister, as head of the left-wing bloc, raised hopes of accelerating the peace process towards a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Even at this point, after so much bloodshed caused by Palestinian terrorism, the Israeli public, for the most part, still continued to believe in the peace process.

Barak, who saw himself as Yitzhak Rabin's successor, had two election promises – The return of IDF forces from Lebanon and the renewal of the peace process for a permanent settlement with the Palestinians.

On May 24, 2000, in one day, IDF forces left Lebanese soil. The first election promise was fulfilled.

The second election promise was harder to fulfill.

The Camp David 2000 summit failure (and the "No Partner" narrative)

On July 11, 2000, the Camp David summit between Barak and Arafat began in order to achieve the permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, based on the previous agreements in Oslo B– the Interim Agreement. The summit ended on July 25, 2000, without achieving the long-awaited agreement, but the parties agreed to continue their discussions.

On his return to Israel, after the failure of the summit, Barak blamed Arafat for her failure. The person responsible for the enduring “no Palestinian partner” campaign was none other than Ehud Barak during his term as prime minister in

2000. At the time, after the Camp David summit, Barak said the much-quoted phrase, "There is apparently no partner for peace". The responsibility for the collapse of the Israeli left and for the "no partner" perception ingrained in Israeli minds is down to Barak. The most significant shift in Israeli public opinion in support of the peace process occurred at this point.


Hamas's terror attacks against Israel

Hamas's attacks against Israel have not been random. From 1993 to 2001, Hamas concentrated its violence around six major events: (1) the September 1993 signing of the Oslo I peace accord, (2) the May 1994 signing of the Cairo agreement, (3) the October 1994 signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, (4) the 1996 Palestinian and Israeli elections, (5) the October 1998 signing of the Wye agreement, and (6) the February 2001 Israeli elections.

Two of these attacks succeeded in convincing the Israeli government to suspend negotiations with the Palestinians. Hamas's sustained campaign of violence against Israel from February to April 1996 helped install Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud government in power, and meaningful negotiations with Arafat ended soon thereafter.

And a series of Hamas attacks from December 2000 onward helped remove Labor prime minister Ehud Barak from power in favor of the more hawkish Ariel Sharon, who proceeded to cut off talks with Arafat. Four other attacks, including those surrounding the signing of the 1993 Oslo accord, the 1994 Cairo agreement, the 1994 Israel–Jordan agreement, and the 1998 Wye accord, failed to have the desired effect.

Hamas Attacks on Israel 1993-2001



Timeline of individual terror attacks on Israel by Hamas³

As you can see, the acts of terrorism had a political intention – to stop the peace process. But the violence had no effect on the peace process. Arafat and Rabin continued to meet, and both sides began implementing the Oslo Accord soon after it was signed. Two factors appear to explain this. First, Rabin’s soft-line Labor party placed a high value on peace and was inclined to sustain the peace process even in the face of terrorist attacks. By 1992 the intifada and Israel’s inability to suppress it had convinced Rabin and a majority of Israelis that they could not hold the occupied territories indefinitely. A "land-for-peace" deal would have to be made and a deal with the more moderate and secular PLO with Arafat as head was preferable to one with a fundamentalist Muslim group that might reign over the Palestinians in the future. As one Israeli official explained, “Israelis wanted to get out of Gaza so much, they were willing to accept Arafat as long as he agreed to end the state of war and amend the [Palestine National Council] Charter.”⁴ Thus, Israel’s value for peace was high at this time, lowering the level of trust necessary for cooperation to occur in spite of terrorism. Second, although Arafat had promised that the PLO would try to prevent violence, most Israelis did not believe Arafat had the ability to suppress all terrorist activity even if he tried. A

³ **Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence**, Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, 2002

⁴ David Makovsky, **Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord**, Boulder, Colo. Westview Press, 1996

poll by the Guttman Institute immediately before the signing of the Oslo accord found that **“75 percent of Israelis expected violence to increase as a result of the accord, even though most of them supported [the accord]”**⁵. In addition, Israelis seemed to recognize that Arafat did not yet control the areas from which Hamas operated and could not, therefore, be expected to keep violence fully in check. The fact that Arafat was willing to arrest some Hamas terrorists seemed to satisfy Israelis, at least for the time being. Thus, terrorist attacks had less of an impact on Israel’s level of trust at this point in the peace process because Arafat was viewed as likely to be weak in his ability to police Hamas.

The Second Intifada

The first victim of the second intifada was IDF soldier David Biri, who was critically wounded in a bombing attack on September 27, 2000, near Netzarim in the Gaza Strip, and died a day later. The violence started on September 28, 2000, after Ariel Sharon made a highly provocative visit to the Temple Mount (al-Haram al-Sharif). The visit itself was peaceful, but, as anticipated, it sparked protests and riots which the Israeli police put down with rubber bullets and tear gas. The intifada continued until the end of 2004 – and during the four years 1,053 Israelis and 4,789 Palestinians were killed.

Of the several hundred terrorist attacks perpetrated against Jews during the Second Intifada, some 275 of them resulted in at least one murdered victim. In all, 1,053 Israelis were killed during this period and more than 8,300 were wounded⁶. The vast majority of all casualties – dead and injured – were non-combatant civilians. The ages of victims range from unborn babies in utero to the elderly; the scope of the killings varied from attacks on single individuals to massacres.

Attack methods employed by the terrorists ranged from stonings and stabbings to shootings, ambushes, lynchings, bombings, rockets and more. Below is a


⁵ Guttman Center for Surveys, Israel Democracy Institute

⁶ The Second Intifada: A look back at the Palestinian terror campaign 20 years after the fact, what attacks did Israel face? JERUSALEM POST STAFF, SEPTEMBER 17, 2020

very partial list in chronological order of some of the most macabre and heinous crimes of the extended murder spree:

- June 1, 2001: Dolphinarium discotheque suicide bombing in Tel Aviv – 21 dead, 120 wounded.
- August 9, 2001: Sbarro Restaurant suicide bombing in downtown Jerusalem – 15 dead, 130 wounded.
- December 1, 2001: Ben Yehuda Street bombing in downtown Jerusalem – 11 dead, 180 wounded.
- March 9, 2002: Café Moment bombing in Rehavia, Jerusalem – 11 dead, 54 wounded.
- March 27, 2002: Park Hotel Passover massacre in Netanya – 30 dead, 140 wounded.
- March 31, 2002: Matza Restaurant suicide bombing in Haifa – 16 dead, 40 wounded.
- April 12, 2002: Mahaneh Yehuda market bombing in Jerusalem – 6 dead, 104 wounded.
- June 18, 2002: Patt Junction bus bombing in Jerusalem – 19 dead, 74 wounded.
- July 31, 2002: Hebrew University student massacre in Jerusalem – 9 dead, 85 wounded.
- September 19, 2002: Allenby Street bus bombing in Tel Aviv – 6 dead, 70 wounded.
- November 15, 2002: Hebron ambush – 12 dead, 15 wounded.
- January 5, 2003: Tel Aviv Central Bus Station massacre – 23 dead, 120 wounded.
- June 11, 2003: Davidka Square bus bombing in downtown Jerusalem – 17 dead, 100 wounded.
- August 19, 2003: Shmuel HaNavi bus bombing in Jerusalem – 24 dead, 130 wounded.
- September 9, 2003: Café Hillel bombing in Jerusalem – 7 dead, 50 wounded.
- October 4, 2003: Maxim Restaurant suicide bombing in Haifa – 21 dead, 60 wounded.
- October 7, 2004: Sinai bombings in the Sinai Peninsula – 34 dead, 185 wounded.

Second Intifada deaths. Sept. 29, 2000 through April 30, 2008. The totals for each side are followed by their breakdown. Public-domain chart.



■ Israeli total ■ Palestinian total



The Dolphinarium Terror Attack in Tel Aviv 1.6.2001

Despite the difficult events, another attempt was made between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat - The Taba Summit.

The Taba Summit between Israel and the Palestinian Authority was held from 21 to 27 January 2001, at Taba in the Sinai peninsula. Israeli prime

minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat came closer to reaching a final settlement than any previous or subsequent peace talks yet ultimately failed to achieve their goals.

Ariel Sharon, at the time from the Likud party, ran against Ehud Barak (who resigned on December 2000 and headed a transitional government) from the Labour party. Sharon was elected Israeli Prime Minister 6 February 2001 in the 2001 special election to the Prime Ministership. Sharon refused to meet in person with Yasser Arafat.

The collapse of support for the peace process and mistrust between the parties

All peace initiatives over the past 20 years have failed, mainly due to the lack of support from the Israeli public. Support for the peace process collapsed as early as 2000, with Ehud Barak declaring "There is no partner for peace." Palestinian terrorism over the years has only deepened the Israeli public's lack of support for the peace process.

The two-state solution is still the consensus position among a majority of Israelis. However, the violence of the second intifada and the political success of Hamas have convinced many Israelis that peace and negotiation are not possible and a two-state system is not the answer. Hardliners believe that Israel should annex all Palestinian territory, or at least the C areas. Israelis view the peace process as hindered and near impossible due to terrorism on the part of Palestinians and do not trust Palestinian leadership to maintain control. A common theme throughout the peace process has been a feeling that the Palestinians give too little in their peace offers.

In fact, a crucial part of the Israeli public is pragmatic and refers to the peace process in concrete terms of a trade-off – security and recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people in exchange for recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to have agreed borders.

The feelings of distrust towards the Palestinians, which at their core do not stem from the difficult events in reality, including the events of terrorism, can change as a result of a historic turnaround of the leaderships of both sides, as

happened in 1977, when negotiations between Egypt and Israel began, led by Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin led to a peace agreement.

Families and Individuals affected by Terrorist attacks –

Main Findings (Survey Research Experiments, March, 1-10 2021)

- Prior to the terror attack, most of the participants believed that terror was part of Palestinian violence (24%). Another 24% saw the terror attacks as a "tangible expression of the murderous nature of the Palestinians".
- The most prominent answers regarding terror attacks, prior to the incident in which the attack occurred:
 - *'I perceived the terrorist incidents as part of the violence of the Palestinians (24%) ; (20% among young respondents; 30% among 30-50 years old; 17% among 51+ years old).*
 - *'I saw the terrorist incidents as a tangible expression of the murderous character of the Palestinians' (24%) ; (17% among young respondents; 26% among 30-50 years old; 50% among 51+ years old).*
- About 43% of respondents reported that they were close to a terror attacks in the past 20 years, in which people have been injured.
 - 15% - were personally affected by terror attack.
 - 36% - witness in person a terror attack.
 - 14% - family members were killed.
 - 9% - friends were killed.
 - 31% - family members were injured.
 - 22% - friends were injured.
- About half of those affected by terror attacks (47%) changed their attitudes towards terror attacks after they or their relatives were harmed by one.
 - 67% from those who respond that 'terror attacks are an inevitable part of the conflict'.
 - 36% - saw terror attacks as 'part of Palestinian violence (prior – 24%)'.
 - 36% - saw terror attacks as a tangible expression of the murderous nature of the Palestinians (prior – 24%)'.

- 33% - perceived the terror attacks as violent incidents by extremists on both sides (prior – 5%).
 - 33% - saw terror attacks as a reminder that it's time to reach an agreement (prior – 5%).
 - 50% - saw the terrorist attacks as a failure of security forces who were unable to prevent (prior – 10%).
- About half (53%) of those affected by terror attacks and changed their attitudes were young respondents (18-29 years old).
 - 35% among 30-50 years old changed their attitudes.
 - 67% among 50+ years old changed their attitudes.
- Only 41% of those affected by terror attacks were assisted by professional support services (psychologists, support groups, etc.).
 - 40% among young people (18-29); 47.5% among older people.
- A great majority of those who were injured in terror attacks (81%) did not join a support group or any organization helping victims of hostilities.
 - The most common feelings expressed by those injured in terrorist attacks were: Irritability (64%), a feeling of unrest (59%) and a feeling of stress (54%).
- About one third of the respondents (31%) were largely or to a great extent concerned that they or their family members will be harmed by a terror attack.
 - 72% - among young people; 63.5% - among old people.
 - 96% - among those who were affected directly from terror attack.
 - 52% - among those who were not affected from terror attack.
- The majority of the respondents (60%) were largely or to a great extent concerned about future waves of violence and terrorism.
 - Among young people, the concern from violence and terrorism is higher (72%); 38.5% - among old people.
 - 68% - among those who were affected directly from terror attack.
 - 42% - among those who were not affected from terror attack.

- About half of respondents (51%) are largely or to a great extent concerned that Israel will be involved in another war with the Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza.
 - 54% - among those who were affected from terror attack.
 - 42% - among those unaffected from terror attack.
 - 59% - among young people.
 - 41% - among old people.

- **Most** of the respondents (58%) believe that the terrorist attacks in recent years have influenced the majority of the Israeli public, who thinks that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will never be resolved. (note: The question was asked indirectly).
 - 54% - among those who were affected from terror attack.
 - 64% - among those unaffected from terror attack.
 - 50% - among young people.
 - 66% - among old people.

- 24% of the respondents believe that the terrorist attacks in recent years have not influenced the majority of the Israeli public regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

- About 10% of the respondents believe that an arrangement can be reached even without settling the conflict.

- About 33% of the respondents believe that an effort should be made, and an agreement must be reached, while 29% believe that there will never be peace with the Palestinians. (note: The question was asked directly).
 - 17% - There will not be peace with the Palestinians in the near future.
 - 16% - We need to continue with the status quo and suppress violence as much as possible.

- No significant differences were found between respondents affected by terrorist attacks (32%) and respondents who were not affected (35%) regarding the effort should be made to reach agreement.
 - 30% among respondents affected by terrorist attacks believe that never will be peace with the Palestinians (26% - among unaffected).

- 14% among respondents affected by terrorist attacks believe that peace with the Palestinians cannot be reached in the near future (23% - among unaffected).
- 19% among respondents affected by terrorist attacks believe that there is a need to continue with the status quo and suppress violence as much as possible (10% - unaffected).
- Half of the **young respondents** (50%) believe that a peace agreement with the Palestinians cannot be reached.
 - Some (17%) think the status quo must be maintained with an active plan to stop violence.
 - 26% believe that effort should be made and an agreement must be reached.
 - 13% among young respondents believe that an arrangement can be reached even without settling the conflict.
- 40% of the **older respondents** believed that an agreement with the Palestinians cannot be reached.
 - Some (14%) think the status quo must be maintained with an active plan to stop violence.
 - 40% believe that effort should be made and an agreement must be reached.
 - 5% among old respondents believe that an arrangement can be reached even without settling the conflict.
- **In conclusion**, we mostly can see small differences in attitudes between respondents who have experienced terrorist attacks and respondents who have not experienced terrorist attacks.

Focus Group Findings (April 8, 2001)

The goal of the focus groups is to evaluate and provide insights about the impact of exposure to daily hardships and violence on the degree of **trust** towards Palestinians and the **peace process**.

- Some of Participants report loss of trust towards Palestinians and low chances of reaching an agreement with them. At the same time, there is a feeling of loss of trust towards the Israeli leadership that is not doing enough to change the situation.
- Participants report a position of loss of trust is also reported towards the Palestinian leadership.
- However, the prevailing position is that the chances of an arrangement with the Palestinians, at least for the foreseeable future, are low.
- The main cause for these is the continuous tension between Israel and the Palestinians, especially Hamas, for which the responsibility lies with both sides.
- A significant position expressed is regarding the existing split within the Israeli public and its excess contribution to the non-promotion of a peace process.
- However, the variety of positions expressed explains the fact that the security situation and the life difficulties caused by it do not change the political depth positions among the Israeli public.
- Indeed, each violent incident temporarily reinforces distrust, but the key reason for it lies in the historic background and general atmosphere of life near Gaza and in close proximity to violence that can erupt at any given moment.
- One participant referred to the impact of terror attacks in general, at the national level, "when everyone lives in the shadow of terrorism", even so, "It is clear that the more significant experience is here in our communities".
- The danger is perceived on the physical and existential level, the danger of harm to the mind, family members and especially children.

Summary of the group's positions in their words:

- We're alert and afraid.
- We're not violent.
- We don't hate Palestinians or Arabs.
- We're pessimistic about the future.

Main topics of the focus group discussion:

- The general impact of exposure to terror attacks and violent incidents.
- Factors of influence: living in the area and/or the State of Israel, or specific events.
- Ways of impact: in what areas and stages of life (physical, political/ideological, personal/psychological/behavioral existence, attitudes and values, family and community ties and others).
- Possible effect on violent or aggressive behavior.
- Possible influence on attitudes towards "others" and relations of trust – Gaza, Arabs, Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, "others" in general society.
- Changes of attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Attitude and trust towards "Others"

- The participants noted clear feelings of loss of trust towards Palestinians, whether they are from Gaza or from the West Bank.
- A relatively older participant who was active and involved for many years in joint ventures to strengthen relations between Israelis and Palestinians, and even volunteered himself in humanitarian activities, expressed clear feelings of disappointment and loss of trust, alongside a sharp change in political positions and a shift from left to right: "Strong shift to the right".

- The participants noted a general decrease of trust both in Palestinian and Israeli leaderships, due to the lack of a solution, an ongoing negative situation, the lack of a dialog and so on. "Distrust of all" - systems and politicians.
- Attitudes are also generally influenced by the prevalence of events or the relative calm that exists today.
- There were no expressions of hatred towards the Palestinians in the group - "There is ignorance in hating". "Hate is not the discourse we want to have". These feelings exist alongside exposure to events and threats, with the understanding that "the Palestinians are suffering too" and that "hatred will lead nowhere". Even those who stated in the group that they shifted to the political right, expressed understanding of their plight, alongside the necessity to carry out a "targeted assassinations of terrorists" when it should be done, according to one participant.
- Regarding the attitude and trust towards "others" in non-Palestinian society, such as Israeli Arabs, no statement or negative feeling was made in the group – "I have nothing against The Arabs of Israel".

Chances for Reconciliation with the Palestinians

- There is unanimity and pessimism about the chances of the settlement of the conflict.
- The blame for the lack of change and the disability to reach a settlement rests with both parties and the relevant leaderships. "Other leadership is required". "Our government does not allow an agreement". "We have a bad situation and we do not see a solution".
- There were those who saw "Anarchy here and there, no dialog, no real attempt to reach an agreement, it is convenient to roll over and there is no courage to decide". "The divisions on the Israeli side contribute to the difficulty". "Peace is needed among ourselves first".
- There were those who made a distinction between the Israeli government/leadership and the Palestinian leadership - "We are more prudent, the Palestinian government is unclear and uncertain". "They, the Palestinians do not live in a democratic state".

S. 32 years old, married + 2 (Jerusalem)

S.'s sister, who is two and a half years older than her, was killed in a suicide bomber attack in Jerusalem during the second intifada, while returning home from school, when she was a high school student. S. has an academic education in the field of communications, her husband is a security guard for a public institution.

S. describes the incident in which her sister was killed as "traumatic" and **"what changed my family and me forever"; "We were a normal happy family and suddenly we became a bereaved family... My sister was the oldest daughter in the family... The first girl my parents loved... For me and my little brother, she was the big sister who took care of us... We were very connected... Suddenly it was all cut... There was a shock in the family... Great depression... We'll never be back to what we were... It accompanies us all like a giant shadow..."**

H. 60+, Married + 2 (Central Region)

H., who is about 60 years old, holds a senior academic position at one of the universities in Israel. Her father was killed in the Yom Kippur War. Years later, her sister with her two little children were killed in a terrorist attack. H. defines the events of war and terrorism in which her members of her family were killed as events that left her with **"deep scars forever..."**.

As a mature person, and especially at this time, she became a peace activist whose goal is promoting the conflict resolution and fighting against racism.

When she was asked if her political views and being a peace activist had anything to do with the tragic events of her past, she replied **"Maybe, it could be, unconsciously... These have always been my attitudes..."**. **"In the last few years, they've only been strengthened because of the whole situation that's developed here... Israeli society has become racist and militaristic and even worse... We have to get back to be a normal society... otherwise we don't have a future... I'm worried and that's what's driving me"**.

**Attitudes of the Israeli public
(Comprehensive Survey Findings, November 2020)**

The findings of the case study are very consistent with the findings of the comprehensive survey conducted in November 2020.

Table 1 shows that **trust and support for peace are highly related**; Meaning that the more trust exists among Israeli Jews, the more they support the peace process ($r=.63$). All the other correlations are either of very low magnitude or non-significant. The significant correlations explain at best only about 4% of the effect.


Table 1: Correlation Between Variables (Study 1- Jews)

	Support for peace	Trust	Experience of violence and conflict	Exposure to Palestinian Violence	Education in Israeli Schools	Education in Palestinian Schools	Fear of Harm by Palestinians	fear of Loosing Jewish Identity	Promoting Trust / Distrust
Support for peace	*	-0.63* (N=535)	0.1*	0.17*	0.015*	non-sig	0.15*	non-sig	-0.12* (N=491)
Trust		*	non-sig	-0.15*	-0.12*	non-sig	-0.21*	non-sig	non-sig
Experience of Violence and Conflict			*	0.15*	non-sig	non-sig	non-sig	non-sig	non-sig
Exposure to Palestinian Violence				*	non-sig	non-sig	0.18*	0.16*	non-sig
Education in Israeli Schools					*	0.22*	0.1*	0.1*	0.1*
Education in Palestinian Schools						*	non-sig	non-sig	non-sig
Fear of Harm by Palestinians							*	0.5*	non-sig
Fear of Loosing Jewish Identity								*	non-sig
Promoting Trust/Distrust									*

Political orientation⁷

The political orientation differed between Jews and Israeli Arabs (See Diagram 1). Among Jews, about 56% saw themselves as holders of right political views, about 30% saw themselves as centrist and only 13% classified themselves as leftists. Younger Jewish respondent's political orientation had a higher prevalence of rightist opinions (about 66% saw themselves as rightists) while only 8% supported leftist political views. Among Israeli Arabs, 61% defined themselves with as holders of leftist opinions and only 30% as holders of centrist views. Younger Israeli Arabs had a lower percentage of support to left wing opinions and prevailed commonness of center-oriented opinions, more common compared to the older Israeli Arabs.

Diagram 1: Political Affiliation of the Respondents by the Groups




Trust towards Palestinians

The results indicate a relative **low level of trust towards Palestinians** expressed within the Jewish sample. On a scale of 1-5 the mean Jewish

⁷Political orientation in Israel on the left-right dimension in this study refers only to the position one has towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The left-wing orientation expresses readiness to solve the conflict peacefully with the two-state solution, objects to occupation and Jewish settlement on the occupied territories and sees the Palestinian as partners to negotiate with. On the other hand, right wing opinions here represent: not seeing Palestinians as partners for negotiations, believing that they aim to destroy Israel, support Jewish settlement in the occupied territories and object to any withdrawal from the occupied territories.

respondent's answers is 2.25 points. On the other hand, Israeli Arabs rated their trust levels higher, and their mean answer stood on 3.25 points. Diagram 2 shows the means described above graphically.

Diagram 2: Mean Answers of Trust levels for All Groups



The results of the Jewish sample are shown below in Diagram 3. Most of the Jewish respondents (34.1%) attributed their lack of trust to the “Palestinian education system, which incites against Jews”. About 24% do not trust Palestinians because of “their leaders who cannot be trusted”. The older Jewish respondents did not differ by much in their answers, compared to the entire sample. The younger respondents attributed a higher importance to the following reason, for their lack of trust: the political aims of the Palestinians in the conflict (20%). (See Diagram 3 and 4).

Diagram 3: Reasons for Mistrust Towards Palestinians among Jewish Respondents





Diagram 4: Reasons for Mistrust Towards Palestinians among Younger Jewish respondents



Experience of violence

This variable included various items that referred to different kinds of direct personal experiences of violence. The results indicate that Jewish respondents

reported low levels of experiencing violence, so that the mean answer was between 2.12 (older segment) and 2.15 (younger segment) on a scale of 1-5, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Experience of Violence (Jews)

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	2.12 (0.91)
Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)	2.15 (0.87)

Exposure to violence and to the conflict

This variable is assembled by items that indicated indirect encounter with Palestinian violence, either by seeing or hearing.

The variable exposure to violence- through hearing or seeing it on media, shows a relative high level of exposure among Jewish respondents: above 3.5 points out of 5, that is without meaningful differences between older and younger Jewish responses. Among the Arab respondents, the exposure is at lower level, about 2.5 point (see Table 4).

Table 4: Exposure to Violence

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	3.78 (0.83)
Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)	3.76 (0.87)
Older Arab respondents (N=102)	2.70 (0.92)
Younger Arab respondents (N=79)	2.48 (1.08)

Influence of various sources on the views of the Palestinians

In general, respondents rated the different sources presented to them as having little influence on their views. The media was rated as the most influential source on respondents' views, and then were political leaders (aggregated views of the entire sample). Younger Jewish respondents seem to evaluate also friends and family as the very influential source on their views, compared to the rest of the sample (See Table 5).

Table 5: Sources of Influence on Respondents' Views of Palestinians (means and standard deviation)⁸

	Social Environment	Education	Media	Political leaders	Religious leaders	Israeli Leadership
Older Jews	2.32 (1.11)	2.05 (1.01)	3.11 (1.15)	2.81 (1.26)	2.25 (1.35)	2.44 (1.05)
Younger Jewish respondents	2.79 (1.20)	2.21 (1.10)	3.24 (1.23)	2.83 (1.36)	2.46 (1.42)	2.55 (1.08)
Older Arabs	2.47 (1.21)	2.21 (1.07)	2.93 (1.25)	2.73 (1.37)	2.35 (1.33)	2.19 (1.28)
Younger Arab respondents	2.43 (1.27)	2.39 (1.24)	2.96 (1.26)	2.63 (1.31)	2.42 (1.38)	1.99 (1.13)

The following eight items helped us assess influences on trust held among the four groups (older and younger Israeli Jews and older and younger Israeli Arabs). Respondents from the entire sample indicated that all of them had a small contribution to diminishing trust towards Palestinians. The means presented below in Table 6 indicate that the influence of these sources range from 2 (somewhat diminishing trust) to a maximum around 3 (neither diminish nor foster). The table and analyses show that while Jewish respondents think that various Palestinian related sources contribute more to diminish trust than

⁸ On a scale of 1-5. 1 representing low levels of reported influence, 5 representing high levels.

Israeli Arabs, Israeli Arabs think that the Israeli sources contribute more to diminish trust compared to Palestinian sources.

Table 6: Sources of Influence on Trust between Israelis and Palestinians
(means and standard deviations)⁹

	Palestinian Leadership	Israeli Media	Palestinian Media	Israeli Curricula	Palestinian Curricula	Israeli Social media	Palestinian Social media
Older Jews	1.80 (0.96)	2.63 (0.99)	1.79 (1.04)	2.97 (0.87)	1.69 (1.00)	2.62 (0.95)	1.87 (1.03)
Young Jews	1.88 (1.08)	2.49 (1.07)	1.85 (1.07)	2.84 (0.91)	1.39 (1.08)	2.51 (1.06)	1.85 (1.05)
Older Arabs	2.31 (1.23)	2.48 (1.16)	2.36 (1.20)	2.47 (1.27)	2.38 (1.25)	2.37 (1.27)	2.38 (1.25)
Young Arabs	2.43 (1.27)	2.38 (1.21)	2.43 (1.30)	2.30 (1.24)	2.43 (1.26)	2.27 (1.27)	2.34 (1.28)

Psychological variables

A set of psychological variables which pertains to the world view related to the conflict were also built on the basis of the questionnaire. Each variable consisted of different items, and structured separately, as follows:

There were two items which assessed **views about feelings regarding anti-Semitism and the Holocaust**. Both items were evaluated highly by Jewish respondents. **On the 5-point scale the mean was 4.28 for the older Jewish respondents and 4.26 for the younger respondents.**

Four items assessed **ethos of conflict**. The results showed that in general, Jews accept the premises of the ethos of conflict, on a 5-point scale the mean is 2.58 (2 indicates “agree” and 3 indicates “neither disagree nor agree”). Younger Jewish respondents adheres even more to the ethos of conflict

⁹ On a scale of 1-5. 1- greatly diminish trust to 5- greatly foster trust.

compared to older Jewish respondents (the means were 2.47 for younger Jewish respondents and 2.62 older respondents). The mean of Israeli Arab population resulted at 3.46.

Two items measured the **stereotypic perception** of Palestinians. The results revealed that in general, **Jews have a negative view of the Palestinians**. They rejected the perception that Palestinians are peaceful and non-violent. The general mean of Jewish responses was 2.16 (2 indicates “not true”, regarding the positive perceptions above). The younger and older Jewish respondents differ: **The younger Jewish respondents hold a somewhat more negative stereotypes regarding Palestinians** (Mean answers were 2.10 and 2.22 respectively).

Measuring of **delegitimization** has shown that **Jews tend to delegitimize Palestinians** (do not conceive them fully as human). Using a scale between 0 and 100 (0 indicating completely delegitimizing view) the mean score of conceiving them human was 49.81. In contrast, the mean of Israeli Arab's responses was 74.19. Furthermore, **younger Jewish respondents tend to delegitimize Palestinians even more, compared to older respondents** (their mean scores were 46.13 and 51.06 respectively).

The variable **Social distance** was assessed with one item and measured an individual's readiness to have a Palestinian friend or acquaintance. The mean score of the entire sample was 3.45, meaning that their feelings are between 3 - “neither want nor do not want” and 4 – “do not really want”). **Younger Jewish respondents were found slightly less interested in a contact with a Palestinian, compared to older respondents** (their mean scores were 3.64 and 3.39 respectively).

Another relevant item to this variable that was measured is **dichotomous**, by asking respondents: “Have you ever had a Palestinian friend or personal acquaintance now or in the past”, with only two responses available, yes or no. **Among Jewish respondents, we did not find a significant difference between older and younger respondents, only about 20% report having a Palestinian friend or personal acquaintance.**

Measuring negative emotions towards Palestinians revealed that **Jewish respondents hold neutral feelings** with a mean score of 3 on a 5-point scale, indicating that they feel negative emotions to a “neither small nor large extent”. In particular, younger Jewish respondents have expressed somewhat stronger negative emotions compared to older respondents, 3.35 and 2.96 respectively. Unlike the above, Israeli Arabs responses revealed that they barely feel negative emotions toward Palestinians, with a mean answer of 1.8.

When we measured **positive emotions** towards Palestinians, results show that **Jewish respondents feel such emotions only to a small extent**, with a mean answer of 2.4 on a 5-point scale. In accordance with the last variable presented, **Younger Jewish respondents feel positive emotions to a lower extent compared with older respondents** (2.20 and 2.48 respectively). **Surprisingly**, Israeli Arab respondents revealed a neutral extent of feeling positive emotions towards Palestinians, with a mean answer of 2.91.

Assessing the variable **malleability** has taught us that **to some extent, Jews tend to hold the belief that groups have a fixed nature of characteristics and cannot change**. On a scale from 1 to 5 (“certainly disagree” and “certainly agree” respectively with the belief indicating that groups have a fixed nature of characteristics) the mean answer was 3.34, no significant differences were found between older and younger Jewish responses. Israeli Arab respondents differ also in this variable, in comparison to the Jewish sample, with a mean rating of 2.69.

The assessment of the variable **openness** has shown that **Jews can be considered close minded rather than opened minded**. They express lack of readiness to get information from a Palestinian. The mean of their responses on a 5-points scale resulted at 2.98. (from 1 indicating “to no extent” and 5, “to a large extent”). similarly, to the distribution found with other variables, Younger Israeli Jewish respondents were found to be less open minded compared to older respondents (with the mean scores of 2.80 and 3.04 respectively). Israeli Arabs responses have shown that in general, they tend to have a more opened mind, with a mean score of 3.30 in this particular case.

The following part of the questionnaire included a few variables that were measured via one item only.

Concerns rising due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were measured by asking “Are you concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?”. Below, we can examine Table 7 which indicates that **neither Jewish nor Arab Israelis are very concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict**. The mean scores of the entire sample were 3.18, indicating that their concern is neither small nor large. In other words, **both populations do not deny its existence, but it does not preoccupy their thoughts too much**. We also found that there are no significant differences in levels of concern between the age groups, for both Jewish and Arab groups of the sample.

Table 7: Concern over the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	3.21 (1.03)
Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)	3.24 (1.15)
Older Arab respondents (N=102)	3.18 (1.43)
Younger Arab respondents (N=79)	3.11 (0.39)

Jewish and Arab Israelis’ answers differed considerably when asked **if they agree with the following statement: “only a powerful Israeli military can assure the existence of Israel”**. While the Jewish group mainly agreed with the above, the Arab respondents opposed it. On a 5-point scale (1 and 5 indicating “certainly disagree’ and “certainly agree”, respectively) the mean rating by Israeli Jews was 4.23 and 2.86 by Israeli Arabs. There is also a small variance between the ratings given by different generations, as the mean rating by older Israeli Jewish respondents was 4.27 compared to 4.11 rated by

the younger respondents. As for the Israeli Arab group, older respondents mean rating was 2.85, while the younger respondents felt even less sympathetic to the statement and their mean rating was 2.65.

Reportedly, Israeli Jews feel **worried about being harmed by the Palestinians**, to some extent. Measured on a scale of 5 points, from 1, indicating “never worried” to 5, indicating “very much worried”, Younger Jewish respondents worry more than the older respondents as mean ratings resulted at 3.70 and 3.17 respectively. On the other hand, Israeli Arabs expressed lower levels of concern as their mean score was 1.95.

Surprisingly, Jewish and Arab respondents, both agree with the statement: “Israel will have to choose between Apartheid state or losing its Jewish nature, if it will not choose the solution of two states to two nations”. Both groups disagree with it, meaning that Israel will not have to choose between Apartheid state or losing its Jewish nature by ruling out the two states solution. All different segments rated their level of agreement below 3 (neither disagree nor agree), as shown below in Table 8.

Table 8: Respondents’ Thoughts on Israel’s Character (Apartheid or Jewish) Regarding the “Two-State Solution”

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	2.50 (1.33)
Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)	2.33 (1.23)
Older Arab respondents (N=102)	2.59 (1.26)
Younger Arab respondents (N=79)	2.39 (1.28)

Table 9 shows that Israeli Jews tend to hold a neutral view, with regard to the notion of **supporting the two-state solution**, while Israeli Arabs have presented higher levels of supporting this solution, 2.6 and 3.77 respectively (there was a 5-point scale ranging from 1 “strongly oppose” to 5 “strongly support”). Additionally, younger Israeli Jewish respondents expressed stronger opposition compared to older respondents, as their mean rating were 2.26 and 2.85, respectively. As for the Israeli Arab groups, the different generations have shown a smaller difference, as their mean ratings resulted at 3.87 by older respondents and 3.58 by the younger ones.

Table 9: Respondents’ Position on the “Two-State Solution”

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	2.85 (1.34)
Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)	2.26 (1.22)
Older Arab respondents (N=102)	3.87 (1.19)
Younger Arab respondents (N=79)	3.58 (1.33)


The variable Hope was measured with the question: “When you think about your life as an Israeli, how many times do you feel that you lose hope for the better future?” On a 5-point scale ranging from 1 indicating “never”, through 3 indicating “sometimes” and 5 indicating “always”, the mean rating of the entire sample was 2.87. As Table 10 shows, it seems that Israeli Arabs are less hopeful regarding their future here, in comparison to Jewish respondents, as their mean ratings were 3.34 and 2.91, respectively. We also see that there is no significant difference between the generations.

Table 10: Frequency of “Loss of Hope” for a Better Future

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	2.83 (1.08)
Younger Jews (N=455)	2.91 (1.10)
Older Arab respondents (N=102)	3.43 (1.27)
Younger Arab respondents (N=79)	3.35 (1.27)

Diagram 5 shows the distribution of responses from all four groups, **about perceived aspirations of the Palestinians**. Older Israeli Jewish respondents attributed to the Palestinian Authorities moderate aspirations compared to younger Israeli Jewish respondents: about 28% % of the former believe that the Palestinians aspire either to “regain some of the territories conquered in the 1967 war”, or” regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war”, but only 16% think so among the younger Jewish respondents. About one third in both groups attribute either “conquest of the State of Israel and regain control over the pre 1948 Palestine” or “conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel”. Israeli Arabs differ in their attributions. Many of them did not respond to this question, especially among the younger Israeli Arabs. Among the older Israeli Arabs 34.3% thought that the Palestinian authority aspires “to regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war”.


Diagram 5: Respondents’ Attributions on the PA’s goals



The second question was: “Out of the following four possibilities which one do you think is **preferred mostly by the majority of Palestinians?**”

Diagram 6 shows similar views of the older and younger Israeli Jewish respondents. Over 40% of them think that the majority of Palestinians prefer “waging an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation”. Only 21.1% of the older Jewish respondents and 12.5% of the Younger Jewish respondents believe that they prefer “to reach a peace agreement with Israel”. In contrast, among Israeli Arabs, 52.94% believe that they prefer “to reach a peace agreement with Israel” and among the younger generation only 30.4% believe so. Less than 12% of the entire Arab sample believe that Palestinians prefer “waging an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation”.


Diagram 6: Respondents’ Attributions to Palestinians’ Preferred Course of Action with Israel



Two additional questions examine the **aspirations of Israelis**. The first one was: **“And what do you think is the long run aspiration of Israel?”**

Diagram 7 indicates that older Israeli Jewish respondents attribute a clear aspiration, namely 28.4% attribute at least “withdrawal from part of the territories it occupied after guaranteeing its security”. With that said, about 40% of the younger Jewish respondents choose a very militant aspiration- either “annexation of the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinian citizens” or “extending the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expelling its Arab citizens”. Most of the Israeli Arabs claimed that they do not know what the aspiration of Israelis is. While a smaller group, 27.8% of the younger generation and 23.5% of the older generation, believe that Israelis aspire to “extend the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens”.


Diagram 7: Respondents’ Attribution to Israel’ Preferred Course of Action



The second question was directly personal: **“Which of the following four possibilities is the most preferred to you, about what should be done now, regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations?”**

Diagram 8 exhibits the four choices and reveals a clear difference between older and younger Israeli Jewish respondents. **While 42.63% of the older respondents prefer to “reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians”, the younger respondents hold a different opinion: 23.3% prefer to maintain the status quo; 20.88% to “wage a definitive war against the Palestinians in which Israel destroys their military capabilities”, 18.68% to “reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians” and 14.07% prefer to “annex the territories or parts of the territories”.** In contrast to the above, about 50% of the entire Israeli Arab sample preferred to “reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians”

Diagram 8: Respondents' Preferred Course of Action by Israel Regarding the conflict



Relationships between the Variables

Looking at the specific results of the carried correlations we found the following:

- Examining the variables **“trust”** and **“experience of violence”** yielded significant correlation only in the younger Jewish and older Arab groups, (0.14) and (0.32) respectively, indicating that the more they experience violence, they feel less trust towards Palestinians.
- Examining **“trust”** and **“exposure to violence”** revealed that only among the young Israeli Jews (0.27) and older Jewish respondents (0.24) a significant correlation was found, indicating that the more they experienced exposure to violence, the less trust they felt toward Palestinians.
- Furthermore, a correlation was found between **“trust”** and **“Israeli leadership”** among all 6 groups (Israeli Jews, older Israeli Jews, younger Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, older Israeli Arabs and younger Israeli Arabs). This meant that the more the Israeli leadership diminish the trust, the less the respondents feel trust.
- **“Trust”** and **“Palestinian leadership and Palestinian social networks”** correlations were found only among Jewish respondents. They indicated

that the more these sources diminished trust, the less trust the respondents felt.

Distrust towards Palestinians

Israeli Jews

The analyses were used to find the impact different variables had on trust, held by Jews and Israeli Arabs towards Palestinians.

- **The results for the entire Israeli Jewish sample as well as for older and younger Israeli Jews separately showed unequivocally that socio-psychological variables that represent the socio-psychological repertoire of the participants determine the levels of trust to a large extent.**
- Specifically, the most important determinant of distrust is the **negative stereotyping** that Israeli Jews hold towards Palestinians. Thinking that Palestinians are violent and hostile leads to high levels of distrust.
- **The second most influencing variable on trust, is open mindedness.** That is, closed minded individuals who are not ready to expose themselves and to exchange information with Palestinians also tend to distrust them.
- **The next contributor to distrust is related to extreme negative stereotyping—i.e., delegitimization of Palestinians.** Meaning that many respondents mentally deny Palestinians of their humanity, viewing them as an excluded group.
- **The delegitimization** variable appeared as the third most dominant factor in determining distrust among the Israeli Jewish population and the younger Israeli Jewish population.
- Among the older Jewish population, the third strongest determinant of distrust is **political orientation**, meaning the more right-wing a person is, the less trust he/she has towards Palestinians.
- Among Israeli Jews in general, only after **political orientation** comes the variable of **exposure to violence and conflict**, indicating that the more a person was exposed to conflict violence the less trust he has towards Palestinians.

- Then comes the variable of perception of the **Palestinian educational system**, indicating that the more this system is perceived as presenting Israelis negatively, the less trust Jews have towards Palestinians.
- Finally, comes **ethos of conflict, age, and negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli teachers in the Israeli schools**- All significantly predict lack of trust.

Support of the Peace Process

The analyses present one unequivocal finding. **Trust** has been found as the most important predictor of **support for the peace process** among all groups of Jews and among the general sample of Israeli Arabs and the older sample of Israeli Arabs. Unsurprisingly, additional socio-psychological variables such as **ethos of conflict and stereotyping** indicating that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative are the held stereotypes of the Palestinians, the more he or she supports the peace process. Also, **political orientation** predicts support for peace, where as expected, the more leftist is the person, the more he or she supports the peace process.

Israeli Jews

Among Israeli Jews in general and younger Jews, in addition to the above presented variables, **exposure to violence** has a negative effect on Jewish support for peace. In addition, Jews' openness for peace is affected by the **Israeli leadership** and the perception of antisemitism and the Holocaust. Among younger Jews, it was also found that openness and experience of violence are significant predictors for support of the peace process.

Summarizing Notes

Although many civilians were personally exposed to terrorist attacks, for most of the public in Israel, the stress condition emerges from various factors. It can be said that over the years the Israeli public has become accustomed to

the situations of war and terrorism¹⁰. During the second intifada, the Israeli public could reasonably predict that after a certain terrorist attack, another event would follow. Deadly terrorism has become part of the country's civil way of life. But it was impossible to predict where the next attack would be, when it would occur and who would be harmed. This is a significant factor of stress and anxiety.

Unlike individual traumas such as robbery or rape, terrorist attacks are disasters that hit waves in the community and involve broad circles of the public with varying degrees of exposure and harm. Various institutions and agencies operate after such a disaster, and in addition to the rescue teams they involve several services such as social workers, doctors, psychologists, and religious and community leaders. Shortly after, the community is flooded with politicians and media, but the victims are usually left alone. Therefore, they feel abandonment, anger towards the 'enemy', and disappointment of the government that failed to prevent the attack. Therefore, we find that the victims tend to be helped and supported by their family and their immediate social surroundings and not by professional services.

Among all the victims of terrorist attacks we have heard a wide range of costs, such as emotional ,personal ,familial, and social costs: sadness and depression, post-traumatic stress, career delays, family life disorders and social loneliness.

They perceived their personal experience as an isolated event that stemmed from the conflict, but most did not transform it into a position of distrust towards the other side.

A similar conclusion was reached in a study conducted by the INSS ("Israel's National Resilience: The Influence of the Second Intifada on Israeli Society", Meir Elran, 2006): "The obvious conclusion from this analysis is that the Palestinian intifada despite its difficulties and length, hasn't broken normative patterns in the attitudes and behavior of the Israeli public, more than that, it

¹⁰ Tzipi Israeli, "National Security Index - Public Opinion Study", 2015- 2016 INSS, 2016

probably hasn't fractured the national consensus regarding dealing with the Palestinians".

Despite the above, the Israeli public has adopted right-wing positions over the past 20 years. The turning point were two major events and the framing they got by the Israeli leader and the media. The first one was the failure of the Camp David meeting that was supposed to bring peaceful settlement of the conflict by Ehud Barak, the leader of the left. It was Barak's statement after the failure of the Camp David summit in October 2000 - "Today, the picture that is emerging, is that there is apparently **no partner** for peace. This truth is a painful one, but it is the truth, and we must confront it with open eyes and draw the necessary conclusions"¹¹. The effect of this statement on the Israeli public and on the media was instantaneous and powerful. Many Israelis lost hope after years of exhausting attempts at negotiations for peace.

The "no partner" narrative was fixed in the Israeli public's consciousness, and the Israeli media repeatedly resided it over and over again¹². The second major event was the framing of the Second Intifada by Ehud Barak. He declared that the intifada was initiated by Arafat in order to annihilate Jews in Israel. Both statements were untrue but affected greatly the leftist and centrist sectors of the Jewish population who moved to the right.

At the same time as public opinion changed, the Israeli media has also become increasingly right-wing and plays a central role in shaping public opinion¹³. "Israel today", for example, the right-wing newspaper published in 2007 and since then, distributed free of charge, has become the most widely read newspaper in Israel.

¹¹ [Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs](https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2000/pages/statement%20by%20prime%20minister%20ehud%20barak%20-%202007-oct-20.aspx)

<https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2000/pages/statement%20by%20prime%20minister%20ehud%20barak%20-%202007-oct-20.aspx>

¹² Daniel Bar-Tal and Amiram Raviv, "The Comfort Zone of a Society in Conflict", Steimatzky, 2021 Page 120

¹³ Daniel Bar-Tal and Amiram Raviv, "The Comfort Zone of a Society in Conflict", Steimatzky, 2021 Page 201

Recommendations

We believe that after decades of violent struggle and mutual suffering, it is time to begin a real process of reconciliation that will allow the two peoples to live in peace, side by side, in their independent countries. This means restarting the peace process to implement the two-state solution. Despite past failures and anticipated difficulties, the peace process is the only option. The responsibility for this lies mainly with the leaderships on both sides. In order to realize this responsibility, the required threshold conditions must be created, especially creating the basic trust that will enable dialogue between the parties. Our humble contribution will be in a number of recommendations.

Israeli authorities

- Strengthening security coordination with the Palestinian Authority to prevent terrorist attacks on both sides.
- Reducing the motivation for terrorist attacks by providing an immediate response to problems at local friction points.
- Promoting a common policy and concrete moves in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority to reduce mutual incitement.
- Promoting joint and coordinated programs with the Palestinian Authority of Peace Education.
- Promoting a policy of condemnation and social isolation of extremist elements that support violence in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority.
- Changing the policy from 'conflict management' to a policy of progress towards a peace settlement.
- Leadership commitment to all of the above steps.

Palestinian authority

- Abandoning the ethos of armed struggle.
- Cessation of economic and social support for individual and organizational terrorist organizations.

- Strengthening security coordination with the Israeli authorities to prevent terrorist attacks on both sides.
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- Promoting a policy of condemnation and social isolation of extremist elements that support violence in cooperation with the Israeli authorities.
- Leadership commitment to all of the above steps.

Civil society organizations

- Integration of Jewish and Arab civil society organizations into peace education and incitement prevention programs.
- Recruitment and integration of Jewish and Arab opinion leaders in peace education and incitement prevention programs.

The international community

- Assistance from international organizations for peace education programs.
- Condemnation and sanctions by the international community for all manifestations of violence and terrorism.
- Renewal and initiation of informal channels of dialogue to promote a peaceful arrangement between the parties.



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