

# **Personal, National and Societal Attitudes of Israeli Youth**

**The 4<sup>th</sup> Youth Study of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung**

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## Preface

The joint research of the Macro Center for Political Economics and the Israel office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in 2016 is the fourth in a series of studies conducted every six years, beginning in 1998. The objectives of these studies are to try to present the personal, national and social views of Israel's young generation and how they have shifted over the years.

The aspect of long-term tracking existing in the study, starting in 1998, following the years 2004 and 2010 and ending in 2016, offers a unique perspective on how every young generation is different from its predecessors and how trends have changed over time.

The study conducted in **1998** revealed that Israeli youth shows signs of ambition, individualism, and suspicious attitude towards the major institutions of the decision making process. On the other hand, it was possible to find encouraging findings, e.g. the somewhat convergence of positions of the non-Jewish youth to those of the rest of Israeli society. The survey findings reinforced the prevailing view that it is necessary to equip the youth with education tools, especially democracy and participation in decision-making, in order to deal with the difficult issues on the agenda in the near future. However, one of the key insights that emerged from this study was that in order to solve the problem of alienation that has developed, perhaps an emphasis should be placed on changes in the structure of government.

The leading deviations in the responses of the Jewish and Arab youth in the study of **2004** were probably a result of the significant developments that have occurred in Israel since the end of 2000: the outbreak of the intifada and the economic crisis. These deviations were reflected in a decline of the value of democracy among Jewish youth and a slight increase among Arab youth, the decline in trust of Arab youth in state institutions, especially the police and military. The survey also reflected the intensity of the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Israel - most Jews have agreed to ban Arab Israeli citizens to vote and the conflict between the two nations was perceived as most dangerous to Israel. Other perilous deviations found are the increase in youth who support violent civil disobedience and the rate of youth who believe that another murder of an Israeli prime minister may occur. The decline in the value of democracy along with political events relevant to that period have again

raised the issue of violent resistance to the evacuation of settlements and the issue of the feasibility of another political assassination of a prime minister in Israel.

The findings of the study conducted in **2010** indicated that, given the complex and contradictory reality, teenagers and young people in Israel have developed a core pattern of "both" which does not give rise to the dissolution of inconsistencies in the perception of the reality among young people, but incorporates them into their own personal views. Basically, although they are in favor of peace with the Palestinians, many of them rejected any compromise in the peace process and favored the status quo. They perceive democracy as an important fundamental value, but about half would rather Arab Israeli citizens not have the right to be represented in the Knesset. The complex situation of their country did not cause them general fear or apathy, and with regard to their expectations about their personal future and happiness – relationships, family and profession – they showed clear positive attitudes.

Since that time until today, the State of Israel has experienced major events which inevitably influenced today's younger generation and the quality of life they experience. The current study of **2016** shows that treating the high cost of living and the widening social gaps in Israel is a priority for the Israeli youth, as the terror threat is perceived as a secondary threat. A possible reason is that over 60% of young people aged 21-24 in Israel are significantly economically supported by their parents when nearly a quarter are completely supported by their parents.

The level of optimism regarding the future of the country has shown a sharp drop among teenagers and young Jews. The idea that Israel should live in peace with its neighbors has also faded from Jewish consciousness. In 1998, 78% of Jewish respondents stated that it is "very" important. Today only 52% of Jews cite it, reflecting a steady decline from year to year.

Trust in public and government institutions, particularly the judicial system, the media and the religious institutions, has decreased significantly in relative to previous surveys. In terms of sense of personal security (personal exposure to violence, a threat to personal security, economic security and security in general), the overall feeling is of security, but not very high.

The deep social polarization felt in Israel in recent years, especially in the relationship between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel, is expressed more intensely in the present study. The survey findings indicate a continued decline in the share of Jews who think that full political equality is very important, 50% in 1998 to 35% today. However, there are encouraging data in this regard. The latest youth studies regularly tested whether Israeli Jews were willing to prevent Arab citizens from civil rights, such as the right to be elected to the Israeli parliament. In 2004, more than half of the Jewish respondents supported this position while in the current survey it decreased to 39%.

The research project combines quantitative and qualitative research. **The qualitative research** was conducted in four focus groups among specific segments of the youth population. The findings and insights gained from the focus groups contributed much to the formulation of the final survey questionnaire and to the interpretation given subsequently.

The quantitative research was divided into three parts: **The first part** included the collection, processing and analysis of periodic demographic data of Israeli youth from various official sources, local and international.

**The second part** included a comprehensive survey by "Midgam – Research and Consulting" among a sample of 1,264 people (the 15-18 age group sample was of 631 respondents – 486 Jews and 145 Arabs, the 21-24 age group sample was of 633 respondents – 470 Jews and 163 Arabs). Analysis of the survey results included: screening questions periodically by the detainee issue, weighting the data file to correct sampling biases, building and testing measures the relationship between the findings Demographic characteristics of youth and young people. Analysis of the survey results included: sorting the questions into chapters according to the subject studied, weighting the data file to correct sampling biases, building measures and testing the relationship between the findings and demographic characteristics of Israeli youth.

**The third part** dealt with substantive issues that were monitored over time. In other words, the analysis of the results of the tracking questions from the current survey compared to those of the three previous surveys (1998, 2004 and 2010). In the framework of this analysis a mapping of Israeli youth and how it has changed in relation to the basic terms of demographic characteristics and political orientation,



was prepared. In addition, data from the time series was presented, while providing a social and historical context to explain statistical changes - or, alternatively, consistent findings.

Throughout this book, the term "teenagers" refers to ages 15-18 and the use of the term "young people" refers to ages 21-24.

# Chapter 1: Periodic Demographic Data on Teenagers and Young People in Israel


Dr. Roby Nathanson, Itamar Gazala and Ron Leyzer

In this chapter, statistical data on the youth population in Israel between the ages of 15 and 24 will be presented as a basis and background for the survey. Throughout the chapter, the term "young people" will be used to refer to those aged 15-24, unless otherwise stated. The data presented here will attempt to profile the young people in Israel in the context of demography and on the subjects of sector and religion, education, employment, poverty and exclusion. This will be presented in comparison to data from OECD countries.

## General Data


In 2015, there were some 1.26 million young people in Israel between the ages of 15 and 24. The proportion of young people in the total population decreased from 20% in the 1970s to 17.2% at the beginning of the 1980s, and in 2015 constituted some 15%. The difference in the proportions of the young people between these time periods is a product of the difference in the composition of the population in Israel when the state was founded in comparison to the current composition of the population. A large proportion of the citizens of the state in the early years after it was founded were immigrants and for that reason the proportion of children and teenagers was lower. The proportion began to increase until it reached a peak at the beginning of the 1970s. In the 1980s, the proportion of teenagers and young people dropped to 17.5%, and since then it has been decreasing gradually.

**Figure 1: Population of Israel and persons aged 15-24 (thousands), 1955-2015**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Israel 2016, Table 2.5


**Figure :2 Proportion of persons aged 15-24 in the whole population, 1955-2015**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Israel 2016, Table 2.5

Despite this, the proportion of young people in Israel was among the highest in the OECD countries. It was exceeded only by Mexico, Turkey and Chile, with Israel in fourth place, and was higher than the OECD average by 2.1 percentage points.


**Figure 3: Proportion of persons aged 15-24 out of the whole population in OECD countries, 2013**



Source: OECD Stat

In 2015, some 286,200 young people lived in the Central District (23%), some 238,400 in the Northern District (19%), some 193,900 in the Southern District (15%), some 186,500 in the Jerusalem District (15%), some 156,500 in the Tel Aviv District (12%), some 140,600 in the Haifa District (11%) and some 59,900 young people lived in the area of Judea and Samaria (5%).

**Figure 4: Geographic Distribution of Ages 15-24, by District, 2015**




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Israel 2015, Table 2.19

### **Sector and Religion**

Young people in Israel, like the general population, can be classified into four sectors: Jewish secular (state school system), Jewish state-religious, Jewish ultra-Orthodox, and Arab. Each sector has different cultural characteristics, and unique values. There are also characteristics that are common to some sectors, such as common festivals in the Jewish sectors in contrast to the Arab sector.

The proportion of each sector in the total population of school children in Israel has changed over the years. The proportion of pupils in the higher classes in the Arab sector increased from 12% in 2000 to 19% in 2015. The proportion of the ultra-Orthodox grew from 13% in 2000 to 20% in 2015. Conversely, there were noticeable trends of shrinkage in the state-religious and state-secular sectors. In 2000, the proportion of pupils in the state-religious stream of education was approximately 15%, while in 2015 this sector constituted only 13% of the total population of pupils. This strong trend is even more marked in the secular Jewish sector. In 2000, the group of secular Jewish pupils constituted some 60% whereas in 2015 this percentage decreased to just 47%. Nonetheless, the secular Jewish sector still constitutes the lion's share of all pupils in the higher classes.


**Figure 5: Proportion of Pupils in Higher Classes, by Education Stream, 2000-2015**



Source: Ministry of Education

There was a difference in the population groups as the annual growth rate of each of the education streams changed. In 2000 the rate of growth in the Arab and ultra-Orthodox sectors was high: 1.067. At the beginning of 2015 the growth rate of the Arab sector was 1.023 and the ultra-Orthodox was 1.051. The fertility rate of the ultra-Orthodox is very high, but in recent years that has been a significant drop in fertility in this group. The reason for this is that the ultra-Orthodox society is undergoing social, cultural and economic change. One of the factors that accelerated this change was the cutback in child allowances which brought ultra-Orthodox women and men into the labour market (Malach & Rebhun 2008). The significant drop in the pace of annual growth in the Arab population was linked to the general process of modernization that Arab society is undergoing, as well as the cut in child allowances starting from 2002 (Malach & Rebhun 2008). In contrast, the rate of growth in the secular and state-religious streams rose slightly from 1.003 and 1.006 in 2000 to 1.031 and 1.035 in the year 2015 respectively.


**Figure 6: Annual Rate of Growth by Education Stream, 2000-2015**



Source: Taub Center

Another classification of the young people can be by national affiliation, and particularly by Jewish and non-Jewish youth, because there are cultural characteristics such as festivals as well as values and perceptions that differ between these groups. In 1955, the number of Jews aged 15-24 was some 238,200, which constituted approximately 86.6% of this population group and 10.3% of the entire Jewish population. This proportion decreased and in 2015 was 68.9% -- some 867,000 Jewish young people. The proportion of non-Jewish young people constituted 13.4% in 1955 -- some 36,700. This proportion increased and in 2015 constituted 31.1% -- some 391,600 non-Jewish teenagers and young people. The number of Arab teenagers and young people in Israel was approximately 350,400 in 2015, some 4.2% of the whole population. It is notable that the proportion of Jewish young people dropped in comparison with the proportion of those who are not Jewish.


**Figure 7: Ages 15-24 by National Group, 1955-2015**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Israel 2016, Table 2.5

The proportion of teenagers and young people (15-24) who identify with the Muslim religion out of the total population of young people rose from 17% in 1998 to 24% in 2015. The proportion of Druze remained largely unchanged. The proportion of Christians also remained stable over the years. The proportion of Jewish young people decreased from 76.8% in 1998 to 68.7% in 2015. This rate is in keeping with the birth rate in these population groups.

**Figure 8: Ages 15-24, by Religion, Selected Years**




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Israel

## **Education**

The proportion of young people in Israel expecting to attain a high school education during their lifetime is higher than the average in the OECD and is estimated at 89.6% of all young people in this age group. The OECD average is 85.4%.


**Figure 9: Proportion of Young People Expected to Attain High School Education (as a percentage of all 15-25 year-olds) 2014**



Source: OECD Stat

The proportion of girls expected to obtain a high school education is somewhat higher than the proportion of boys aged 15-24 – 92.8% as compared with 86.7%, and is higher than the OECD average by 4.5 and 4.2 percentage points, respectively.

**Figure 10: Proportion of Young People Expecting to Obtain a High School Education (as a percentage of all persons aged 15-24) by sex, 2014**



Source: OECD Stat

The rate of participation of ages 20-24 in the Israeli education system is very low in comparison to OECD countries. In Israel the rate of participation is estimated to be 28.1% against an average 44.8% for OECD countries. The reason for this is connected to compulsory military service in Israel.


The demand for different areas of study has changed over the years. In 1998, some 23.5% of the candidates intended to study for a degree in the Humanities, in




comparison with 14.3% in 2015. The proportion of those wishing to study Social Sciences dropped from 30.7% in 1998 to 23.2% in 2015, but some of this decrease can be explained by the fact that, in 2010, an extra category of "Business and Management Sciences" was added, many areas of which were previously considered part of the Social Sciences. The proportion of those intending to study Law rose from 5.5% in 1990 to 9.6% in 2015. The proportion of people intending to study Engineering and Architecture increased from 12.9% to 16.7%. The proportion of those wishing to study Natural Sciences and Mathematics dropped from 15.1% to 12%. The proportion of those intending to study Agriculture decreased from 0.8% to 0.6% which is relatively stable. The proportion of those intending to study Medicine and Para-Medical Studies fluctuated – in 1998 it constituted 11.6%, in 2004 it was 15.6% and in 2010 it dropped to 9.5% then increasing to 12% in 2015.

During the years 2010-2015, in many areas of study the trend changed. For example, in contrast to the trend, there was an increase in the proportion of those wanting to study the Humanities, the Natural Sciences and Mathematics, and Agriculture while, at the same time, there was a concomitant decrease in the proportion of those wishing to study Engineering and Architecture. It should be noted that some of the difference in the data can be explained by the fact that 1998 and 2004 data refer only to the universities.

**Figure 11: The Demand for Fields of Study at Universities and Colleges\*, Selected Years**






Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Israel  
 \* 1998 and 2004 refer only to universities

The proportion of students studying for a B.A. degree among young people rose from 21.6% in 2005 to 24.2% in 2015. Because the majority of young people comply with their duty to serve in the military, the percentage of ages 22-24 entitled to this degree is more than three times higher than that of ages 18-21 in 2014.

**Figure 12: Proportion of Students for a First Degree (as a percentage of the population group), Selected Years**




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Israel 2016, Table 8.53

### **From Education to Employment**

In 2014, the proportion of young people employed was the highest since 2000 and was estimated at approximately 8.8% as against 7.2%. 58% of the employed young people work up to 4 hours per week, 25% work 4-8 hours weekly and 33% of them work 8-20 hours weekly. 40% of those 16-18 reported that their studies had been harmed because of their jobs (The Israel National Council for the Child, 2015).

The rates of employment of Israeli young people aged 15-24 are high in comparison to OECD countries. In Israel, 26.3% of teenagers aged 15-19 are employed in contrast with the OECD average of 22.8% and 64.7% of young people aged 20-24 in contrast with the OECD average of 56.4%. The rate of young people aged 20-24 in Israel combine working and studying more than the OECD average, 44.4% versus 33.4%. This figure can attest to the difficulty of these younger ages to support themselves during their studies or alternatively, young Israelis are trying to start their professional careers before completing their studies.

**Figure 13: Ages 20-24 in the Education System, by Labour Force Status, 2015**




Source: OECD Stat

The unemployment rates for ages 18-24 increase as the number of years of education goes up (except for the unemployment in the non-Jewish sector with 0-8 years of schooling. Nevertheless, it should be stated that the number is very low –some 690 persons only). In 2015, 21,800 Jewish 18-24 year-olds had an education level of 0-12 years and were not employed; this constitutes 6.7% of the Jewish population in the labour force for these ages with the same education level. In contrast, 8,600 non-Jews of these ages with the same education level were not employed, constituting 10.1% of the non-Jewish population in the workforce for these ages and level of education. There were 7,700 Jews with 13-15 years of education who were not employed – this constitutes 7.4% of the Jewish population in the workforce of these ages and the same education levels and there were some 3,000 non-Jewish unemployed constituting about 13.2% of the non-Jewish population in the workforce of those ages and education levels. There were some 2,000 Jews with 16 years of education and above

who were not employed, constituting 11.2% of the Jewish population in the workforce of those ages and level of education, and some 1,300 non-Jews were unemployed – 14.6% of the non-Jews in the workforce of those ages and that level of education. The data indicate a higher level of unemployment among the non-Jewish population in all the groups by education levels.


**Figure 14: Proportion of Unemployed Ages 18-24, by number of years of education and sector, 2015**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Israel 2016, Table 8.73

The rate of unemployment of young people in Israel who are not in the education system is somewhat higher in comparison to the OECD average – 18.6% as compared with 17%. It should be noted that soldiers serving in the army during their compulsory military service are counted as employed in the economy as is the practice in the countries with a similar type of service. Likewise, it must be noted that the general rates of unemployment in Israel are very low compared to OECD countries. One of the reasons that the rate of unemployment of ages 20-24 is high, despite the low general rate of unemployment, is the late entry of discharged soldiers into the workforce due to their military service duties.

**Figure 15: Unemployment Rates for ages 20-24 not in the Education System, 2015**




Source: OECD Stat

## **Exclusion and Poverty**

Teenagers and young people not in Education, Employment, or Training (NEET) are at greatest risk of being socially excluded, of having a low income, of being below the poverty line, and of lacking the skills to improve their socio-economic situation. In Israel the proportion of young people aged 15-19 lacking any framework is the highest in the OECD countries, constituting 8.83% where the OECD average is 6.34%.


**Figure 16: Ages 15-19 Not in Employment or Studies, 2015**



Source: OECD Stat

The rate of young people aged 20-24 who are not in training, education or employment is above the OECD average, as well. A possible explanation for this is the compulsory military service. Young Israelis enter the labour market and the higher education system later than in other developed countries due to the intense military service that they undergo. Many of them require a long time to recover before they "begin their lives" and some even choose to travel the world for months after discharge from military service. Conscription exists in other OECD countries such as Finland and Switzerland, but the military service in Israel lasts between two and three years, which is longer in comparison to similar service in other OECD countries (Education at a glance 2016, OECD indicators). Furthermore, military service in Israel is for men and women alike; this is not necessarily characteristic of other OECD countries with compulsory military service.


**Figure 17: Ages 20-24 not in Employment or Studies, 2015**



Source: OECD Stat

The rate of dropout from the educational frameworks varies between the sectors of the Jewish population, and is dispersed among the various age groups. As of 2015, in the ultra-Orthodox sector there has been a very significant dropout rate in the 10<sup>th</sup> to 12<sup>th</sup> grades that has reached 7.4% as compared with an overall dropout rate of 1.6% in the state-secular and state-religious sectors, and an approximate 3.1% dropout rate in the Arab population. The most significant rate of dropping out occurs in the eleventh grade in all of the sectors. In the ultra-Orthodox sector, the dropout rate in eleventh grade is 15.6%. These high rates of dropping out indicate that they will not be obtaining a "Bagrut" (matriculation) certificate which predicts future difficulty in becoming integrated into employment or higher education.


**Figure 18: Dropout rate from Educational Frameworks, by Sector and Grade, 2015**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Israel, Table 8.35

There is a significant difference between the secular and religious sectors as compared with the Arab and ultra-Orthodox sectors with regard to entitlement to a matriculation certificate. Above 80% of the religious and secular streams within the state education system are entitled to a matriculation certificate as opposed to 61.4% of Arab youth, and only 33.9% of ultra-Orthodox youth. This absence of entitlement is accompanied by an absence of the skills required for acceptance into the workforce or to higher education.

**Figure 19: Rate of Entitlement to Matriculation Certificate, by Sector, 2015**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Israel, Table 8.27

At working ages, the rate of risk of poverty is the highest for ages 18-24 in all European countries as well as in Israel. In Israel, some 30% of the 18-24 year-old age group is at risk of poverty (Central Bureau of Statistics, Report on Society in Israel).

An international comparison of poverty among ages 18-25 ranks Israel in the sixth place among OECD countries with a poverty rate of 18.2% as compared with an OECD average of 13.7% (National Insurance Institute, Annual Report 2015).

For 15-24 year-olds, the average gross income for salaried employees is NIS 2,917 per month, NIS 18.5 per hour worked (below the minimum wage) and the median income is NIS 2,003 per month. The average salary for men in this age group was NIS 3,195 per month and NIS 18.9 per hour and for women this was NIS 2,610 and NIS 18.1 respectively. In 2015, the average monthly income for a salaried employee in Israel was estimated at approximately NIS 9,503, NIS 55.7 per hour worked and the

median income was NIS 6,884. The low income of young people makes economic support necessary and does not facilitate full economic independence.

**Table 1: Average Gross Income (NIS) per month and per hour worked for Salaried Employees 15-24 years old, by sex, 2015**


	Average Gross Income (NIS per month)	Average Gross Income (NIS per hour worked)	Minimum Wage (NIS per hour worked)*
<b>Total</b>	2,917	18.5	Up to the age of 16 – 18.82
<b>Men</b>	3,195	18.9	Up to the age of 17 – 20.16
<b>Women</b>	2,610	18.1	Up to the age of 16 – 22.31 18 and above – 25.00

\* As of 01.04.2015. Starting 01.07.2016, the minimum wage was adjusted and stands at NIS 19.52 (Up to 16), NIS 20.92 (up to 17), NIS 23.15 (up to 18) and NIS 25.94 (18 and above), per hour worked.

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Household Expenditure Survey 2015

The average gross income of teenagers and young people (aged 15-24) was estimated to be approximately NIS 2,400 for women and NIS 2,854 for men with 9-12 years education. For those with 13-15 years of education the average was somewhat higher reaching NIS 3,233 for women and NIS 3,928 for men. In relation to the poverty line which is calculated according to the number of people in the family, in 2014 a single person whose income was less than NIS 3,077 was defined by the state as poor. Below NIS 4,923 a couple is defined as poor, and for 3 souls the amount is NIS 6,522 (National Insurance Institute, 2015).

**Figure 20: Average Gross Income (NIS) for Salaried Employees Aged 15-24, by Years of Education and Sex, 2014**




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Israel 2016, Table 8.74

For 15-25 year-old Jewish men the average gross income for a salaried worker was NIS 2,798 and for Jewish women NIS 2,659. For Arab men in the same age group, the income was NIS 4,245 and for Arab women NIS 3,344.



**Figure 21: Average Gross Income (NIS) for Salaried Workers aged 15-24, by Sector and Sex, 2014**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Israel 2016, Table 8.74

## **Summary**

In Israel, young people constitute a smaller percentage of the general population and in 2015 were some 15% of the total population. Despite the decrease in the proportion of young people in the total population, in an international comparison, the percentage of young people in the total population is among the highest in the Western world. The proportion of Arab and ultra-Orthodox young people in the total population of young people has grown, at the same time as there has been a drop in the proportion of secular and national-religious Jewish young people. In 2015 the proportion of Arabs in the senior classes was estimated at 19%, the proportion of ultra-Orthodox pupils was some 20%, the proportion of pupils in the state-religious track was estimated at some 13% and the proportion of pupils studying in the state-secular track was some 47%. The proportion of Jewish young people is shrinking relative to the proportion of young people in general. In 2015, the proportion of Jewish young people was some 68.9%, compared with 77.6% and 88.6% in 1990 and 1955 respectively. Most of the young people live in the large districts – the central, Jerusalem, southern and Haifa districts.

The proportion of young people in Israel expecting to obtain a high school education in their lifetime is higher than the average in the OECD and is estimated to be 89.6% of all young people of these age groups, compared with an OECD average of 85.4%. On the other hand, the rate of participation of young people (20-24) in the education system in Israel is very low in an international comparison and is estimated to be

28.1% corresponding with compulsory military service for those ages. In 2014, more young people chose to study engineering and architecture, while fewer were interested in studying the Humanities and Law as compared with the year 1990. The proportion of 18-24 year olds earning a B.A. degree was estimated to be 24.3% in 2014.

The proportion of young people in employment in 2014 was the highest since 2000. The integration of young people into employment is likely to harm their educational achievements. In an international comparison, it is evident that the rate of employment of 15-19 year olds is high compared to OECD countries and is estimated to be 32.6% of young people. For ages 18-24, there is a higher proportion of those not employed among persons with 13-15 years of study, with the proportion of those not employed in the Jewish population being lower than the proportion of non-Jews who are not employed. The rate of unemployment of Israeli young people in 2015 is slightly higher than the OECD average. This statistic is surprising since the rate of unemployment in Israel is very low in an international comparison.

In Israel there is a high proportion of young people who neither work nor study and this is estimated to be approximately 8.82%, compared to the OECD average of 6.34%. Young people not fitting in to any framework will have difficulty in integrating into the labour market and are liable to be shunted to the margins of society. The proportion of young people in the 15-24 year old age group who are not in any framework is above the OECD average. The highest proportion of dropouts in the 10th to 12th grades in the population tracks can be observed among the ultra-Orthodox and was estimated at 7.4% in 2015. Some 81% of religious and secular youth in the general or state education track are entitled to a matriculation certificate, as compared with 61.4% of Arab youth and only 33.9% of ultra-Orthodox youth. The high rate of dropouts together with the low rate of entitlement for the matriculation certificate will cause difficulties in integrating into the labour market and acceptance for higher education. The income of teenagers and young people is low relative to the average and median income according to 2014 data. This low income does not allow for economic independence for those age groups.

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## **Chapter 2: Teenagers and Young People – What Do They Think of Themselves and What Do They Think of the State? Findings of a Survey**

Dr. Mina Zemach

### **Aims of the Research**

The current survey is the fourth in a series of surveys tracking the positions and perceptions of Israeli teenagers (aged 15-18) and young people (aged 21-24). The previous three surveys were conducted in 1998, 2004, and 2010. The present survey examined the following subjects, some of which were examined in the preceding surveys and others touch on the spirit of the present:

#### **A. Personal Identity and the Sense of Belonging**

- Employment situation and economic independence
- Political positioning and affiliation with religion
- Personal goals
- Interviewees' perceptions about their future (whether or not they will succeed in realizing their personal goals)
- Sense of belonging and involvement with Israeli society
- Sense of personal security

#### **B. Perceptions and Positions about Israeli Society**

- Desired characteristics of the State of Israel
- Trust in government institutions
- Various assessments about the State of Israel (on subjects related to democracy)
- Perceptions about threats to the State of Israel

#### **C. Positions about Israel-Arab Coexistence**

#### **D. Positions on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict**

#### **E. Positions about Germany**

- Perceptions about Germany's attitude to Jews and Judaism in general and about Israel in particular
- Level of involvement with the Holocaust

## **Methodology**

### **A. Research population and sample**

The research population consisted of the following groups which were the target population in the previous surveys too: teenagers aged 15-18 and young people aged 21-24.<sup>1</sup>

For the 15-18 age group, a group of 546 interviewees was sampled – 420 Jews, and 144 Arabs; for the 21-24 age group the sample was 634 interviewees – 476 Jews and 158 Arabs. These samples were formed using stratified sampling; in the Jewish sector the strata were defined according to the following variables: gender, place of residence, level of religiosity. In the Arab sector the strata were defined by religion and place of residence.

### **B. Data collection**

In the Jewish sector, interviews were conducted with both age groups by means of the internet. In the Arab sector, different methods were used according to the age group: teenagers were interviewed face to face; young people were interviewed by telephone.

### **C. Time of conducting the survey**

The interviews were conducted at the end of August and the beginning of September 2016.

### **D. Data analysis**

1. The questions were classified into sections according to the subject being examined:

After the answers were received, the survey questions were classified into sections and sub-sections. This division was carried out using two criteria: the a priori one was internal validity, that is to say, the assessment of which questions provide answers to that subject and relate to that same content domain. The second criterion used to classify the questions was empirical – analysis of the facets in order to locate the questions having a common element that indicate that they belong to the same content

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<sup>1</sup> Due to their service in the military, the age groups between 18 (and above) and 21 (and below) were not included in this research population.

domain. It ought to be noted that there was congruence in the division between these two criteria.

2. Weighting of the data file to correct sampling biases:

The data file for the Jewish sector was weighted according to the variable of affiliation with religion; the data file of the Arab sector was weighted by the variable of religion. In the combination of data for the whole sample, each sector was assigned the weighting in accordance with its weight in the population.

3. Building the indicators:

The findings of the analysis of the components served as the basis for creating the indicators. An indicator was formed from items that the component analysis identified as belonging to the same content domain and whose internal consistency is Cronbach's  $\alpha \geq 0.60$ .<sup>2</sup> The test of internal consistency of the measure that is the result of two questions was conducted by means of an examination of the simple correlation coefficient. The tests were conducted on each of the groups, teenagers and young people, separately.

4. Examining the link between socio-demographic characteristics:

The connection between the socio-demographic characteristics was examined only in the Jewish sector.<sup>3</sup> When it was possible to join several questions into a combined indicator, the common indicator was examined. The socio-demographic characteristics that were examined were: nationality, age group, gender, religiosity, and self-positioning on a left-right continuum. In order to examine the link between the socio-demographic characteristics and the value of the indicator, use was made of variance analysis and the t test; the statistical significance of the links with the individual item was examined by means of the chi-squared test.

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<sup>2</sup> When a component analysis indicates a common factor, it is justified to use the marginal value of 0.60.

<sup>3</sup> The number of cases sampled from the Arab sector in each age group did not allow for further segmentation.

5. Remarks about the data key:

- a) In this chapter there are tables presenting the distribution of responses to each of the research questions. These tables present data about the whole sample and for each of the research groups, by nationality (Jews and Arabs) and age. The tables that present the link, in the Jewish sector, between socio-demographic characteristics and the answers to the questions studied are presented in an appendix at the end of the chapter (the number of the table in the appendix is the same as the number of the respective table in the body of the chapter). In the body of the chapter, only the insights derived from the tables are presented. In order not to overburden the reader, in the tables presenting the link between the socio-demographic characteristics and the positions examined several answers were combined. The pattern of this combination was determined by empirical considerations, in other words, according to the full distribution of the answers. For example, when the empirical distribution showed that the correct cut-off point was between "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree" but empirically there is no cut-off point between "somewhat disagree" and "strongly disagree", the two categories of the latter questions were combined whereas the former two were separately presented. When the scale of the questions was numerical, the criterion for combination was equal distribution, to the extent possible, between the combined categories (quintiles, quartiles, tertiles). The averages presented in the table were based on the detailed distribution (in which there are 5 or 10 levels) and not on the combined data.
- b) Each of the parts in the chapter on findings is divided into sub-chapters. In each sub-chapter, each table is presented together with questions relevant to it. The insights derived from the data in the specific table appear after the table. In the narrative summary of the link between the examined positions and the socio-demographic characteristics, only the links that were found to be significant are presented. If a particular link is not mentioned, this means that it was not statistically significant. The summary of the findings about the

links is presented through the pattern of the link (for example, a rising positive link, a type-U link, etc.). Sometimes only the layers in which the responses differ significantly from the responses in other layers are presented.

- c) In this chapter, the precise level of statistical significance of the various links or gaps was not stated. If a link or gap was mentioned as significant, that means that the level of significance was less than 0.05.
- d) The questions are written in masculine form only for the sake of convenience.

## **Findings**

### **1. The identity of the interviewees – personal characteristics and aspirations**

#### **a. Identity of the interviewees**

The survey examined the following personal characteristics:

- Employment situation (the questionnaire presented the interviewees with various options of employment and they were asked "which of the following best describes what you do at present?")
- Economic support ("Do your parents support you economically in any way, such as, for example, giving you money for housing, helping with paying for your residence, buying you commodities you need on a regular basis?")
- Level of religiosity (Jews only "How do you define yourself from a religious point of view?")
- Positioning in terms of ideology ("How do you describe yourself ideologically, politically?" The answers were on a right-left continuum)




**Table 2: Employment situation**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age Groups		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>Which of the following best describes what you are doing at present?</b>	Studying	74.0%	46.2%	95.5%	34.6%	79.0%	43.2%
	Specializing in a particular profession	2.0%	4.5%		18.1%	1.6%	8.0%
	Working full time	4.7%	27.8%	1.9%	15.1%	4.1%	24.5%
	Working part-time because I haven't found a full time position	2.5%	3.1%		4.2%	1.9%	3.4%
	Working in a part-time position by choice	7.1%	9.1%	2.6%	4.4%	6.0%	7.9%
	Looking for work	3.3%	4.8%		4.9%	2.5%	4.9%
	Not working and not studying	3.9%	3.4%		18.6%	3.0%	7.3%
	Don't know/refuse	2.5%	1.1%			1.9%	.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

**Table 3: Economic support**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age Groups		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>Do your parents support you economically in any way? Such as, for example, giving you money, providing housing, helping with paying for your residence, buying you commodities you need on a regular basis?</b>	Parents support me completely	54.6%	20.3%	63.5%	33.5%	56.7%	23.7%
	Parents support me significantly	30.2%	41.8%	25.2%	26.9%	29.0%	38.0%
	Parents help me just a little	8.8%	23.6%	7.5%	14.4%	8.5%	21.2%
	Parents don't help me at all	2.0%	10.6%	1.4%	9.6%	1.9%	10.4%
	Parents don't help me at all and I even support them	.3%	2.6%		15.6%	.3%	5.9%
	Don't know/refuse	4.1%	1.0%	2.3%		3.7%	.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

**Figure 22: Economic support by parents, ages 21-24**



Data about the sample population and the gap between Jews and Arabs:

1. *Teenagers – each national group separately and comparison between the groups:*

The great majority are studying and not working (74% of the Jews and 96% of the Arabs). Most of them report that their parents support them economically completely or significantly (85% of the Jews and 89% of the Arabs). As this data shows, among the Arabs the proportion of teenagers who study and do not work is higher than the respective proportion among the Jews. Conversely, among the Jews, the proportion of teenagers who work full time is relatively high (15% as against 5%). No differences were found between the two national groups regarding the proportion of those supported by their parents.

2. *Young people – each national group separately and comparison between the groups:*

Approximately half of the young people (51% in the Jewish sector and 53% in the Arab sector) are studying. Some 60% of Jews and Arabs are supported by their parents; 16% of the Arab young people support their parents. In the Arab sector there is a relatively higher proportion of those who neither work nor study than in the Jewish sector.

3. *Gaps between teenagers and young people:*

Only the expected gaps were found regarding employment and parental support.

No gaps were found between gender groups, groups distinguished by affiliation with religion, and positioning on the right-left continuum.

**Table 4: Ideological positioning**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age group		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>How would you define yourself ideologically politically?</b>	Very right-wing	13.1%	11.2%	1.6%	1.2%	10.5%	8.6%
	Right-wing	32.5%	36.7%	5.9%	2.1%	26.4%	27.8%
	Center right	19.1%	24.9%	3.9%	1.9%	15.6%	19.0%
	Center	11.0%	8.6%	44.0%	34.5%	18.6%	15.3%
	Center left	10.2%	9.2%	1.3%	2.9%	8.2%	7.6%
	Left-wing	4.5%	4.4%	2.7%	10.8%	4.0%	6.0%
	Very left-wing	.4%	.9%	2.0%	4.5%	.8%	1.8%
	Don't know/refuse	9.2%	4.1%	38.5%	42.1%	15.9%	13.9%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

**Table 5: Level of religiosity**

		Jews	
Age Group		15-18	21-24
<b>How do you define yourself from a religious point of view?</b>	Secular	40.7%	40.8%
	Traditional	35.6%	34.9%
	Religious	9.8%	9.3%
	Ultra-Orthodox	13.9%	15.0%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470

Data for the sample groups and the gap between Jews and Arabs (positioned on a right-left continuum:

When we talk of positioning on a right-left axis we cannot talk of teenagers and young people in general, but we must distinguish between the two national groups. As will be described below, Jewish teenagers and young people tend towards the right, while Arabs position themselves in the center. Among the Arabs, a high percentage

does not position themselves on this continuum at all (39% of teenagers, 42% of young people) and those that do position themselves tend towards the center (44% of all teenagers, 35% of young people).

Affiliation with religion (Jews):

Approximately a quarter of the Jewish teenagers define themselves as religious (10%) or ultra-Orthodox (14%); similar percentages of young people define themselves as religious (9%), or ultra-Orthodox (15%).


#### **b. Goals that the interviewees wish to attain at this stage of their lives**

The questionnaire presented the interviewees with several goals and they were asked ("Which of these best expresses your goals in life?")

**Table 6: Goals in life – mark two main goals**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age group		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>Which of these best expresses your goals in life?</b>	Economic success	43.2%	63.0%	38.8%	41.2%	42.2%	57.3%
	Obtaining higher education	47.6%	37.7%	58.2%	33.3%	50.1%	36.5%
	Enjoying life, entertainment, good meals, beach	34.5%	41.1%	33.3%	48.7%	34.2%	43.1%
	Contributing to the state and society	21.2%	16.6%	18.2%	9.4%	20.5%	14.8%
	Volunteering for important issues	8.0%	8.0%	8.3%	7.5%	8.1%	7.8%
	Going to live overseas	6.7%	7.9%	9.7%	4.2%	7.4%	6.9%
	Contributing as much as possible to the IDF	15.2%	1.4%	4.5%	.9%	12.8%	1.3%
	Don't know/refuse	4.4%	3.7%	1.3%	2.2%	3.7%	3.3%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

**Figure 23: Goals in life – mark two main goals**



- 1) Following are the goals according to the frequency the interviewees mentioned them as the two main ones.

**Table 7: Goals in life, ranked by order of importance**

	Jews		Arabs	
Age group	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Obtaining higher education	1	3	1	3
Economic success	2	1	2	2
Pleasures in life	3	2	3	1
Contribution to society	4	4	4	4
Contribution to IDF	5	7	7	7
Volunteer work	6	5-6	6	5
Emigrating overseas	7	5-6	5	6

- 2) Among teenagers in both the Arab sector and the Jewish sector, the most prominent goal is obtaining higher education (48% among the Jews and 58% among the Arabs mentioned this as one of their two main goals).

Among the young people, Jews and Arabs, hedonistic goals are prominent. Among the Jews, economic success is in the first place (63%) and pleasures in life is in the second place (41%); among the Arabs the same goals are prominent but in reverse order – pleasures in life (49%), economic success (41%).

- 3) Among the teenagers, the girls aspire more to obtain higher education (54% as compared with 46% for the boys) and the boys aspire more to economic success (47% compared with 39%). No gender differences were found among the young people.

Among the teenagers, there is a gradual increase in the desire to obtain higher education as the affiliation with religion increases (from 49% among the secular ones to 60% among the ultra-Orthodox). The desire for economic success is particularly prominent among the ultra-Orthodox (51%) and is lowest among the religious (32%). The desire to enjoy life decreases in correlation with the affiliation with religion (from 48% among the secular to 14% and 21% among the religious and the ultra-Orthodox respectively). Contributing to the state is particularly notable among the religious (58%). For young people, the desire to enjoy life is prominent among the secular and the traditional (52% and 47%, respectively) and the desire to contribute to the state is notable among the religious (49%).


### **c. Sense of belonging**

The interviewees were asked "Which of the following sentences is most correct for you? – I feel like a citizen with rights equal to other citizens/ I feel that I don't belong to Israeli society".

**Table 8: Sense of belonging**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age group		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>Which of the following sentences is most correct for you?</b>	I feel like a citizen with rights equal to other citizens	77.9%	77.2%	78.4%	60.0%	78.0%	72.8%
	I feel as though I don't belong to Israeli society	12.3%	14.3%	13.1%	34.5%	12.5%	19.5%
	Don't know/refuse	9.9%	8.5%	8.6%	5.5%	9.6%	7.7%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

**Figure 24: Sense of belonging**



*1) Data relevant to all research groups:*

The majority of the interviewees, teenagers and young people, Jews and Arabs, feel themselves to be citizens with equal rights (78% of teenagers, Jews and Arabs, have a sense of belonging; 77% of the Jewish young people and 60% of the Arab



young people have a sense of belonging). However, for the Arab young people there is a large minority (35%) who feel alienated from Israeli society. Among the teenagers too, both Jews and Arabs, and among the Jewish young people there are those who feel alienated, but they constitute a minority that is not large (14%-12%).

*2) Differences between Jews and Arabs:*

Among teenagers no differences were found between the two national groups. Among the young people, Jews have a greater sense of belonging than Arabs (77% against 60%); Arabs feel more alienated (35% against 13% for Jews).

*3) Differences between the age groups:*

As the data show, for the Jewish sector there were no differences between teenagers and young people. In the Arab sector, teenagers feel that they have equal rights more than do the young people (78% against 60%). For young Arab people, the proportion of those who feel that they do not belong to Israeli society is relatively higher for Arab teenagers (35% compared with 14%).

*4) Link with socio-demographic characteristics:*

For both the teenagers and the young people no gender differences were discerned. For both the teenagers and the young people, the sense of belonging of the ultra-Orthodox was lower than that of the others (72% of ultra-Orthodox teenagers and 63% of ultra-Orthodox young people). While among the teenagers, those who support the center feel less like citizens with equal rights than others (77%), the young people supporting the center feel more belonging than the others (91%).

**2. The level of security the interviewees feel in various domains and their assessment of the likelihood of achieving their goals**

The respective questions were:

"Do you today feel a threat to your personal security or to that of those close to you?"

"To what extent do you feel secure or insecure in each of the two following areas – your economic situation/personal exposure to violence?"

And the concluding question was: "Taking into consideration all the factors determining your personal situation – school, employment, family, economic situation, future political and other developments – to what extent do you feel secure or insecure?"

(Aside from the first question about personal security, the answers to the questions were given on a scale of 1-10 where 1 was completely insecure and 10 was completely secure).

An additional question dealt with the interviewees' perception of the likelihood of their achieving their goals: "To what extent are you sure or unsure that you will be able to achieve your personal goals in Israel?"

**Table 9: Level of economic security**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age group		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>To what extent do you feel secure or insecure about your economic situation where 1 is completely insecure and 10 is completely secure</b>	1-5	20.8%	38.0%	6.9%	26.8%	17.6%	35.1%
	6-7	28.1%	39.5%	17.6%	36.5%	25.7%	38.7%
	8-10	38.9%	20.4%	75.4%	36.8%	47.3%	24.6%
	Don't know/refuse	12.2%	2.2%			9.4%	1.6%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
	Average	7.0	6.0	8.6	6.7	7.4	6.2
	Standard deviation	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.0
	Frequency	426	460	145	163	571	623
	Minimum	1	1	2	1	1	1
	Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10

**Table 10: Level of exposure to personal violence**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age group		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>To what extent do you feel secure or insecure about personal exposure to violence, where 1 is completely insecure and 10 is completely secure</b>	1-4	29.9%	29.2%	21.9%	31.4%	28.1%	29.7%
	5-8	32.3%	39.6%	13.4%	28.5%	28.0%	36.7%
	9-10	29.8%	27.5%	59.8%	38.6%	36.7%	30.3%
	Don't know/refuse	8.0%	3.8%	4.9%	1.6%	7.3%	3.2%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
	Average	6.2	6.2	7.6	6.3	6.6	6.2
	Standard deviation	3.1	3.0	3.5	3.6	3.2	3.2
	Frequency	447	452	138	161	585	613
	Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10

**Table 11: Threat to personal security or of those close to you**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age group		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>Do you feel a threat to your personal security or to that of those close to you?</b>	Feel a very great threat	6.6%	5.3%	4.6%	1.1%	6.2%	4.2%
	Feel a fairly great threat	22.9%	29.4%	5.0%	2.8%	18.8%	22.6%
	Feel a fairly low threat	43.6%	43.7%	29.0%	22.7%	40.2%	38.3%
	Feel no threat at all	20.7%	18.4%	60.0%	71.6%	29.7%	32.1%
	Don't know/refuse	6.2%	3.2%	1.3%	1.8%	5.1%	2.9%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633


**Table 12: General level of security**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age group		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>Taking into consideration <u>all the factors determining your personal situation</u> – school, employment, family, economic situation, future political and other developments – to what extent do you feel secure or insecure? Where 1 is completely insecure and 10 is completely secure.</b>	1-5	13.4%	19.2%	8.2%	11.3%	12.2%	17.2%
	6-7	32.4%	38.0%	30.4%	29.9%	31.9%	35.9%
	8	29.3%	24.2%	18.8%	16.7%	26.9%	22.3%
	9-10	25.0%	18.6%	42.5%	42.1%	29.0%	24.6%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
	Average	7.4	7.0	8.1	7.9	7.6	7.3
	Standard deviation	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8
	Frequency	486	470	145	163	631	633
	Minimum	1	2	4	1	1	1
	Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10

- 1) The various dimensions of the security cannot be explained by a common factor and the links between them are not strong. Theoretically, this means that it is not possible to address the sense of security, in general, beyond assessing all the subjects that determine the security of the individuals. Nonetheless, as is evident from the interviewees' reactions, most of them are able to report that they feel a general level of security. So it seems that individuals can sum up their assessment of their sense of security, but the factors contributing to this differ for the individuals.
- 2) The overall feeling, for both teenagers and young people is that they are secure, but this is not high.

Following are the averages that summarize the sense of security in general and the sense of security in various domains:

**Figure 25: Sense of security – summary (10-level scale)**



- 3) Among the young people, Jews and Arabs, the sense of personal security in the face of threat is higher than the security in other domains. Among the teenagers, personal security is similar to security in other domains.

It is worth stating that more than a quarter of the Jewish teenagers (29%) and approximately one-third (35%) of Jewish young people feels a high level or fairly high level of threat to their personal security. Furthermore, 44% of Jewish teenagers feel a low level of threat. Only about one-fifth (21%) of Jewish teenagers feel no threat at all.

For Arab teenagers, the proportion of those who do not feel any threat at all is significantly higher (60% of teenagers and 72% of young people).

- 4) Among the Jewish groups, the sense of economic security of teenagers is higher than that of the young people. No differences were found between the age groups regarding exposure to violence and personal security in the face of threat. Moreover, no differences were found between the two age groups regarding the overall sense of security.

Among the Arabs, there is no specific pattern of difference between the levels of security of the various age groups.

- 5) Among both the teenagers and the young people no link was found between the socio-demographic characteristics that were examined and economic security, personal exposure to violence and general assessment of their personal situation. However, in relation to personal security it was found that

there were differences between the socio-demographic groups. Among both the teenagers and the young people, girls experience a greater feeling of threat than boys, and among the interviewees whose political positions were on the left, the percentage that feels a great threat is relatively low.

**Table 13: Perceptions about the likelihood of achieving goals**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age group		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>To what extent do you feel sure or unsure that you will be able to achieve your personal goals in Israel?</b>	Very sure	15.5%	16.4%	23.9%	18.2%	17.4%	16.9%
	Fairly sure	42.4%	38.3%	55.7%	50.5%	45.4%	41.5%
	Not so sure	33.7%	38.2%	14.1%	19.3%	29.2%	33.3%
	Not sure at all	4.8%	5.0%	3.1%	6.9%	4.4%	5.5%
	Don't know/refuse	3.7%	2.0%	3.3%	5.1%	3.6%	2.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

1) *Teenagers, two national groups and the differences between the groups:*

Most of the teenagers, Jews and Arabs, are sure or fairly sure that they will be able to achieve their personal goals in Israel (58% Jews and 80% Arabs). As is apparent from the data, the proportion of Arab teenagers who think that they will be able to achieve their goals in Israel is higher than the respective proportion among the Jews.

2) *Young people, two national groups and the differences between the groups:*

Most young people think that they will be able to achieve their personal goals in Israel (55% of Jews and 69% of Arabs). However, attention must be paid to the proportion of those who think that they will not be able to achieve their goals in Israel (43% of Jews and 26% of Arabs). From this data, it is apparent that the proportion of Arab young people who think they will be able to achieve their goals in Israel is higher than the respective proportion of Jews (69% against 55%). Among the Jews, there is a higher proportion of those who think they will not be able to achieve their goals (43% against 26%).

3) *Teenagers compared with young people:*

In the Jewish sector no significant differences were found between teenagers and young people. In the Arab sector, the proportion of teenagers who believe that they will be able to achieve their goals in Israel is higher than the respective proportion among the young people (80% against 69%).

4) For both age groups no gender differences were discerned; the closer to religion the higher the level of certainty about achieving goals; and among the supporters of the left, the proportion of those who were sure they could achieve their goals in Israel was relatively low.

### **3. The importance attributed to various values**

The importance attributed to various values was examined both by means of direct questions and by means of questions that examine the value profile desirable for the state.

One direct question related to two values – basic rights for minorities, freedom of expression and the interviewees were asked to state: "To what extent is this important or unimportant to you?" (The answers were on a 10- level scale where 1 was completely unimportant and 10 was very important).

Another direct question concerned preferences in case of a conflict between the requirements of democracy and the requirements of state security: "Sometimes the principles of democracy clash with the needs of state security. When that occurs, what should be the decisive factor – the requirements of the state or the democratic values?"

Indirect questions dealt with the desired value profile of the state. The interviewees were presented with a list of characteristics of states – economic equality between citizens, democracy, the nation-state (for Arabs, a state of all citizens), peace with the neighboring states, full equality for political rights for all, high standard of living, gender equality – for each of these they were asked to "State if it is important or unimportant for you that this should exist in the State of Israel." The answers were given on a 5-level scale where 1 was completely unimportant, 5 was very important.

Another question related to the conflict between the needs of democracy and the security needs of the state.

Tables 14-17 present the interviewees' reactions:

**Table 14: Level of importance attributed to giving basic rights to minorities**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age group		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>To what extent is it important or unimportant to you that <u>basic rights</u> should be given to minorities, where 1 is completely unimportant and 10 is very important?</b>	1-5	18.7%	30.9%	3.3%	8.0%	15.1%	25.0%
	6-7	20.4%	22.4%	6.9%	6.6%	17.3%	18.3%
	8-9	26.5%	21.6%	12.6%	10.5%	23.3%	18.8%
	10	27.7%	22.5%	76.3%	73.5%	38.9%	35.6%
	Don't know/refuse	6.7%	2.6%	1.0%	1.5%	5.4%	2.3%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
	Average	7.5	6.8	9.4	9.1	8.0	7.4
	Standard deviation	2.5	2.7	1.4	2.0	2.4	2.7
	Frequency	453	458	144	161	597	619
	Minimum	1	1	2	1	1	1
	Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10

**Table 15: Level of importance attributed to freedom of expression**


		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age group		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>To what extent is <u>freedom of expression</u> important or unimportant to you, where 1 is completely unimportant and 10 is very important?</b>	1-7	26.1%	40.5%	9.2%	9.1%	22.2%	32.4%
	8-9	34.9%	30.6%	7.1%	9.8%	28.5%	25.3%
	10	35.6%	28.0%	82.8%	79.7%	46.4%	41.3%
	Don't know/refuse	3.4%	.8%	1.0%	1.5%	2.8%	1.0%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
	Average	8.2	7.7	9.4	9.3	8.5	8.1
	Standard deviation	2.2	2.1	1.5	1.8	2.1	2.2
	Frequency	469	466	144	161	613	627
	Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10



**Table 16: Democratic principles against needs of state security**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
Age group		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>Sometimes democratic principles clash with the needs of state security. When that occurs, what should be the determining factor – state security requirements or democratic principles?</b>	Always security needs	33.0%	34.4%	20.8%	29.6%	30.2%	33.2%
	Usually security needs, except in exceptional circumstances	42.6%	47.2%	24.8%	16.6%	38.5%	39.3%
	Usually democratic principles except for exceptional circumstances	14.6%	14.8%	18.5%	19.6%	15.5%	16.0%
	Democratic principles always	1.7%	1.0%	17.7%	17.7%	5.4%	5.3%
	Don't know/refuse	8.1%	2.6%	18.2%	16.6%	10.4%	6.2%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

**Figure 26: Democratic principles against needs of state security**



**Table 17: Profile of values desired by the state**

For each of the following, state if it is important or not important to you that these things should exist in the State of Israel, where 1 is completely unimportant and 5 is very important		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>A state in which there is more economic equality between the citizens</b>	1-3	23.3%	26.3%	1.3%	5.2%	18.2%	20.9%
	4	29.4%	29.0%	8.7%	11.2%	24.6%	24.4%
	5	43.6%	44.2%	89.0%	82.7%	54.1%	54.2%
	Don't know/refuse	3.8%	.5%	1.0%	.9%	3.1%	.6%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
	Average	4.1	4.0	4.9	4.8	4.3	4.2
	Standard deviation	1.0	1.1	.5	.6	1.0	1.0
	Frequency	467	468	144	162	611	630
	Minimum	1	1	1	2	1	1
	Maximum	5	5	5	5	5	5
<b>A democratic state</b>	1-3	11.1%	16.4%	3.0%	4.6%	9.2%	13.3%
	4	17.2%	26.6%	10.0%	9.3%	15.6%	22.1%
	5	68.4%	56.4%	87.0%	86.2%	72.7%	64.1%
	Don't know/refuse	3.4%	.7%			2.6%	.5%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
	Average	4.5	4.4	4.8	4.8	4.6	4.5
	Standard deviation	.8	.9	.5	.6	.8	.8
	Frequency	469	467	145	163	615	630
	Minimum	1	1	2	2	1	1
	Maximum	5	5	5	5	5	5


For each of the following, state if it is important or not important to you that these things should exist in the State of Israel, where 1 is completely unimportant and 5 is very important		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>A Jewish State/ For Arabs: A state of all citizens</b>	1-3	3.7%	6.2%	4.7%	7.1%		
	4	9.3%	8.1%	9.0%	7.0%		
	5	85.7%	84.0%	86.3%	85.9%		
	Don't know/refuse	1.3%	1.7%				
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
	N	486	470	145	163		
	Average	4.9	4.7	4.8	4.8		
	Standard deviation	.5	.6	.6	.7		
	Frequency	431	447	145	163		
	Minimum	1	1	1	1		
	Maximum	5	5	5	5		
<b>A state living in peace with its neighbors</b>	1-3	21.0%	22.6%	6.4%	6.1%	17.7%	18.3%
	4	22.0%	27.6%	6.6%	7.3%	18.5%	22.3%
	5	54.4%	49.2%	87.0%	86.6%	61.9%	58.9%
	Don't know/refuse	2.6%	.6%			2.0%	.5%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
	Average	4.2	4.1	4.8	4.8	4.3	4.3
	Standard deviation	1.1	1.1	.7	.5	1.1	1.0
	Frequency	473	467	145	163	618	630
	Minimum	1	1	1	3	1	1
	Maximum	5	5	5	5	5	5

For each of the following, state if it is important or not important to you that these things should exist in the State of Israel, where 1 is completely unimportant and 5 is very important		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>A state in which all groups have full equality in political rights</b>	1-3	28.9%	39.4%	4.3%	3.7%	23.2%	30.2%
	4	26.2%	29.2%	8.0%	9.2%	22.0%	24.0%
	5	40.6%	29.5%	87.7%	86.2%	51.4%	44.1%
	Don't know/refuse	4.3%	1.9%		.9%	3.3%	1.7%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
	Average	4.0	3.7	4.8	4.8	4.2	4.0
	Standard deviation	1.1	1.1	.6	.5	1.1	1.1
	Frequency	465	461	145	162	610	623
	Minimum	1	1	1	3	1	1
	Maximum	5	5	5	5	5	5
<b>A state with a high standard of living</b>	1-3	10.2%	14.4%	2.3%	5.5%	8.3%	12.1%
	4	24.3%	30.2%	7.9%	11.0%	20.5%	25.3%
	5	63.5%	55.2%	88.1%	82.6%	69.2%	62.2%
	Don't know/refuse	2.0%	.2%	1.6%	.9%	1.9%	.4%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
	Average	4.5	4.4	4.9	4.8	4.6	4.5
	Standard deviation	.8	.8	.5	.5	.7	.7
	Frequency	476	469	143	162	619	631
	Minimum	1	2	2	3	1	2
	Maximum	5	5	5	5	5	5

For each of the following, state if it is important or not important to you that these things should exist in the State of Israel, where 1 is completely unimportant and 5 is very important		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
A state in which women and men are equal	1-3	16.5%	20.4%	2.0%	5.5%	13.1%	16.6%
	4	17.3%	18.8%	9.2%	8.6%	15.5%	16.2%
	5	64.1%	60.5%	87.8%	85.9%	69.6%	67.1%
	Don't know/refuse	2.1%	.2%	1.0%		1.8%	.2%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	485	466	145	163	630	629
	Average	4.4	4.3	4.9	4.8	4.5	4.4
	Standard deviation	1.0	1.0	.4	.6	.9	.9
	Frequency	475	465	144	163	619	628
	Minimum	1	1	3	1	1	1
	Maximum	5	5	5	5	5	5

- 1) It was found that the reactions to the direct questions about the importance of democratic values (equal rights for minorities, freedom of expression, and aspiration to a democratic country) have one common element and they can be combined into one indicator (Cronbach  $\alpha$  = .810). This element is not common to other characteristics that the survey dealt with in the context of the desired profile of the state – Jewish state/state of all citizens, peace, and high standard of living – and the three have no common element.
- 2) The interviewees attribute great importance to democratic values. The averages that express the importance of theoretical values and the importance associated with the various components of the profile of the state are as follows (on a 5-level scale).

**Figure 27: Democratic values – summary**



\*The original scale had 10 levels; for the purposes of comparison it was changed into a 5-level scale.

- 3) Despite the great importance attributed to democratic values among both the Jews and the Arabs, in the two age groups, there was a preference for security needs rather than democratic needs if a conflict were to arise between the two factors: Among Jewish teenagers 74% would give preference to security and 18% to democracy; among the Arabs 46% expressed priority for security against 36% for democracy.  
Among Jewish young people 82% prioritized security over democracy 16%; among the Arabs 46% prioritized security over 37% for democracy.
- 4) The data show that the Arabs assign greater importance to democratic values than the Jews do. As noted, for both national groups there is a preference for security needs, but this preference is significantly more prominent in the Jewish sector than in the Arab sector.
- 5) No disparities were found between the age groups.
- 6) Regarding other values that are not expressions of democracy, it was found that the importance attached to them was similar to that attached to democratic values.

**Table 18: Other values – summary table**

	Jews		Arabs	
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Jewish state/all citizens	4.9	4.7	4.8	4.8
A state at peace with its neighbors	4.2	4.1	4.8	4.8
High standard of living	4.5	4.4	4.9	4.8

7) Both among the teenagers and the young people no gender disparities were found for the above values. The more closely people were affiliated to religion the more the importance of democratic values decreased. Both for teenagers and for young people no link was found between how the individual positioned himself on political positions and the importance attached to democratic values.

8) With regard to other values whose importance was examined in this survey – Jewish state/state of all citizens, peace, high standard of living – no link was found between the socio-demographic characteristics and the importance attributed to these values.

#### **4. Perceptions about the state**

This chapter examines the following subjects:

- The positioning of the state according to various subjects
- Trust in government institutions
- The problems and the disputes that threaten the state
- The level of optimism (or pessimism) about the future of the state

##### **a. Positioning of the state according to various indicators**

The interviewees were presented with several components of democracy and were asked "For each of them, please state if it exists in the State of Israel at an appropriate level, too much, or too little".

**Table 19: Profile of the State of Israel by indicators relating to democracy, according to interviewees' perceptions**


		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>Majority rule</b>	Exists too little	19.2%	26.8%	13.7%	28.0%	17.9%	27.1%
	Exists in appropriate amount	54.9%	48.4%	50.1%	36.4%	53.8%	45.3%
	Too much	14.3%	15.5%	30.6%	30.6%	18.0%	19.4%
	Don't know/refuse	11.7%	9.3%	5.6%	5.0%	10.3%	8.2%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
<b>Minority rights, protection and representation of minorities</b>	Exists too little	49.7%	43.1%	34.8%	71.7%	46.3%	50.4%
	Exists in appropriate amount	28.7%	29.2%	45.6%	22.1%	32.6%	27.3%
	Too much	11.3%	20.5%	15.0%	1.3%	12.1%	15.6%
	Don't know/refuse	10.3%	7.3%	4.6%	5.0%	9.0%	6.7%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
<b>Freedom of expression</b>	Exists too little	24.9%	22.9%	37.0%	54.1%	27.6%	30.9%
	Exists in appropriate amount	44.6%	46.6%	44.2%	37.1%	44.5%	44.1%
	Too much	24.5%	27.9%	16.3%	4.5%	22.6%	21.9%
	Don't know/refuse	6.0%	2.7%	2.6%	4.3%	5.2%	3.1%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633



		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>Social involvement</b>	Exists too little	28.8%	40.1%	36.0%	58.9%	30.4%	44.9%
	Exists in appropriate amount	54.2%	45.5%	43.4%	27.7%	51.7%	40.9%
	Too much	7.8%	7.1%	14.0%	8.1%	9.2%	7.4%
	Don't know/refuse	9.2%	7.3%	6.6%	5.3%	8.6%	6.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
<b>Equality</b>	Exists too little	61.8%	60.1%	49.9%	72.3%	59.1%	63.2%
	Exists in appropriate amount	29.4%	30.6%	32.2%	18.2%	30.1%	27.4%
	Too much	3.7%	7.1%	14.7%	5.2%	6.3%	6.6%
	Don't know/refuse	5.0%	2.2%	3.3%	4.3%	4.6%	2.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

- 1) It was found that there is a common factor in the assessment given to the state according to various indicators (Cronbach  $\alpha = 0.62$ ).
- 2) In each of the groups in the research there is no majority for those who thought that the values surveyed exist in the state to an appropriate degree, except for teenagers in which there is a majority (even though it is small) who state that in relation to two value components – majority rule and social involvement – that they do exist in the state at an appropriate level.

**Figure 28: Distribution of the interviewees who think that the following values exist in the state to the appropriate degree**



3) *Disparities between the national groups:*

In the Jewish sector, the two characteristics that were perceived as existing to a more appropriate degree than others were majority rule and social involvement and after them came freedom of expression. The two characteristics that were perceived as existing to a lesser degree than others were minority rights and equality. In the Arab sector, the two most prominent characteristics that exist to an appropriate degree were majority rule and freedom of expression and after that came social involvement. The subjects perceived as less prominent were, like in the Jewish sector, minority rights and equality.

4) *Disparities between the age groups:*

In the Jewish sector, with regard to two values, majority rule and social involvement, more teenagers than young people thought that they exist in the state to an appropriate degree (55% against 48% and 54% against 46% respectively).

In the Arab sector, in four out of the five values examined, teenagers thought more than young people that they are present in the state to an appropriate degree: majority rule (50% against 16%), protection of minority rights (46% against 22%), social involvement 43% against 28%) and equality (32% against 18%).

- 5) In examining the link between socio-demographic characteristics and the average assessments of the state according to the various indicators mentioned, it is apparent that in the two age groups there are no gender differences and there are no differences between the groups that are differentiated according to their affiliation with religion. In both age groups there was a gradual decrease in the average of the assessment given to the situation in the state as the individual's positioning tended more to the left. Among teenagers, from 1.8 among those who position themselves as on the right, to 1.6 among those who position themselves in the center, to 1.5 among those who position themselves on the left. Among the young people the respective values were 1.9, 1.7 and 1.4.

#### **b. Trust in government institutions**

The survey addressed the following institutions: the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), legal system, the Knesset, the media, religious institutions, the police, the political parties, and the Histadrut General Federation of Labor. For each of these, the interviewees were asked to state "To what extent do you or do you not trust them (you rely or don't rely on them)?"


**Table 20: Trust in government institutions**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>IDF</b>	Have complete trust	44.7%	36.2%	14.1%	19.1%	37.7%	31.8%
	Have trust	42.2%	47.2%	24.6%	18.5%	38.2%	39.8%
	Have almost no trust	6.6%	11.1%	19.6%	16.3%	9.6%	12.5%
	Have no trust at all	1.1%	4.6%	21.5%	25.7%	5.8%	10.1%
	Don't know/refuse	5.3%	.8%	20.2%	20.5%	8.7%	5.9%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>Legal system</b>	Have complete trust	13.0%	5.8%	8.9%	17.5%	12.1%	8.8%
	Have trust	45.9%	42.1%	30.1%	36.9%	42.2%	40.8%
	Have almost no trust	25.1%	33.5%	21.0%	20.0%	24.2%	30.1%
	Have no trust at all	8.9%	17.0%	17.6%	12.1%	10.9%	15.7%
	Don't know/refuse	7.1%	1.5%	22.5%	13.5%	10.6%	4.6%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
<b>The Knesset</b>	Have complete trust	4.4%	1.5%	7.2%	3.3%	5.0%	1.9%
	Have trust	32.8%	23.1%	28.6%	28.5%	31.9%	24.5%
	Have almost no trust	41.1%	44.6%	23.6%	33.3%	37.1%	41.7%
	Have no trust at all	12.4%	28.6%	16.6%	20.8%	13.3%	26.6%
	Don't know/refuse	9.3%	2.2%	24.1%	14.2%	12.7%	5.3%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
<b>The media</b>	Have complete trust	4.6%	1.8%	7.8%	5.5%	5.3%	2.8%
	Have trust	32.9%	19.5%	22.4%	35.9%	30.5%	23.7%
	Have almost no trust	33.3%	40.7%	27.7%	28.0%	32.0%	37.4%
	Have no trust at all	23.7%	36.8%	21.1%	20.2%	23.1%	32.5%
	Don't know/refuse	5.6%	1.2%	21.0%	10.4%	9.1%	3.6%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
<b>Religious institutions like the Rabbinate/ for Arabs only religious institutions</b>	Have complete trust	14.1%	9.3%	10.6%	7.7%	13.3%	8.9%
	Have trust	23.9%	23.2%	30.0%	38.4%	25.3%	27.1%
	Have almost no trust	22.0%	25.1%	17.7%	19.2%	21.0%	23.6%
	Have no trust at all	30.3%	38.5%	19.3%	18.6%	27.8%	33.3%
	Don't know/refuse	9.7%	4.0%	22.4%	16.1%	12.6%	7.1%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>The police</b>	Have complete trust	8.7%	6.5%	12.5%	19.3%	9.6%	9.8%
	Have trust	48.6%	39.5%	26.2%	32.2%	43.4%	37.6%
	Have almost no trust	28.2%	35.6%	20.7%	20.7%	26.5%	31.8%
	Have no trust at all	9.2%	16.9%	19.7%	18.0%	11.6%	17.2%
	Don't know/refuse	5.3%	1.5%	21.0%	9.8%	8.9%	3.6%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
<b>Political parties in Israel</b>	Have complete trust	2.5%	.9%	5.2%	3.0%	3.1%	1.5%
	Have trust	18.0%	15.6%	16.2%	22.8%	17.6%	17.5%
	Have almost no trust	51.4%	52.4%	27.6%	24.0%	46.0%	45.1%
	Have no trust at all	17.9%	27.5%	25.5%	32.4%	19.6%	28.8%
	Don't know/refuse	10.2%	3.6%	25.5%	17.8%	13.7%	7.3%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633
<b>The Histadrut</b>	Have complete trust	4.6%	1.2%	9.7%	8.8%	5.7%	3.1%
	Have trust	28.6%	27.0%	21.3%	28.9%	27.0%	27.5%
	Have almost no trust	23.7%	26.8%	20.2%	18.8%	22.9%	24.8%
	Have no trust at all	10.2%	18.1%	17.2%	20.3%	11.8%	18.7%
	Don't know/refuse	32.9%	26.9%	31.5%	23.1%	32.6%	26.0%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

**Figure 29: Trust in government institutions, have trust or complete trust**



- 1) It was found that there was one common factor in the degree of trust that the interviewees give to the various government institutions. An examination of the correlation between the degrees of trust in various institutions, between one another, shows that they can be joined together into one combined indicator (Cronbach  $\alpha = 0.63$ ) which can be termed "Trust in government institutions".
- 2) Most of the interviewees did not display trust in most of the government institutions that the study covered. Following is the order of the government institutions according to the percentage of interviewees who trust in them (1 is the institute having the highest level of trust and 8 indicates the institute in which the trust was the lowest).

**Table 21: Trust in government institutions, ranked in order**

Age group	Jews		Arabs	
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
IDF	1	1	1-4	5-6
Legal system	2	2-3	1-4	1-2
Police	3	2-3	1-4	1-2
Media	4-5	7	6-7	4
Knesset	4-5	5-6	5	7-8
Religious institutions	6-7	4	1-4	3
Histadrut	6-7	5-6	6-7	5-6
Political parties	8	8	8	7-8

In the Jewish sector, for both age groups, only the IDF has the majority of those trusting in it (87% among teenagers and 83% among young people). Among teenagers there are two other institutions, both of them from the field of legal enforcement that are trusted by most of the interviewees, the legal system (59%) and the police (57%); the other institutions examined by the study do not enjoy a majority of persons trusting in them.

In the Arab sector, among teenagers none of the government institutions obtain a majority who trust them. In this age group, the proportion of those who did not know how to decide whether it was possible or not possible to trust the institutions was especially high (between 20% who were undecided about the IDF up to 33% who were undecided about the Histadrut). Among the Arab young people, only the institutions in charge of law enforcement obtained a majority who trusted in them: the legal system (54%) and the police (52%).

- 3) As expected, no correlation was found between the two national groups regarding the ranking of the government institutions by percentage of the interviewees who trusted them.
- 4) In each of the national groups no correlation was found between the two age groups regarding the order of the institutions that are trusted.

- 5) Both among the teenagers and the young people no link was found between socio-demographic characteristics and the component of trust in government institutions, that is, the average trust in government institutions (aside from all the government institutions that were studied).

**c. The problems and disputes that threaten the state**

The interviewees were presented with a list of problems and were asked: "Which of the two problems that the State of Israel is grappling with today are the most important two problems to which the government must give first priority."


The question about the tensions that constitute a threat to the state listed disagreements and the interviewees were asked "Which of these disputes most endangers Israeli society?"

**Table 22: The most important problems that the government must deal with**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>Which of the following problems that Israel grapples with today are the two most important problems that the government must assign the highest priority</b>	Level of living expenses/social gaps	61.1%	73.9%	34.7%	47.3%	55.0%	67.1%
	National security/terror	61.9%	62.0%	11.1%	16.8%	50.2%	50.3%
	Education	27.3%	30.0%	45.3%	25.9%	31.4%	28.9%
	Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel	23.3%	14.7%	39.7%	54.0%	27.1%	24.8%
	Advancing the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians	13.0%	11.8%	27.9%	11.0%	16.4%	11.6%
	Don't know/refuse	2.5%	.4%	4.8%	3.4%	3.0%	1.2%
	Total	189.1%	192.8%	163.5%	158.4%	183.2%	183.9%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633



**Figure 30: The most important problems that the government must deal with**




**Table 23: The disputes that most endanger Israeli society**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>Which dispute most endangers Israeli society?</b>	Between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel	50.1%	40.2%	48.0%	55.0%	49.6%	44.0%
	Between the right-wing and the left-wing	26.6%	30.6%	10.4%	8.9%	22.9%	25.0%
	Between the religious and the secular	9.3%	14.9%	7.9%	14.7%	9.0%	14.8%
	Between the rich and the poor	5.0%	8.0%	22.9%	6.6%	9.1%	7.6%
	Between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim <sup>4</sup>	2.5%	2.7%	.7%	3.0%	2.1%	2.7%
	Don't know/refuse	6.6%	3.7%	10.1%	11.8%	7.4%	5.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

<sup>4</sup> Ashkenazim - Jews descended mainly from Central and Eastern Europe .Mizrahim - Jews descended mainly from the Middle East and North Africa.

**Figure 31: The disputes that most endanger Israeli society**



- 1) Following is the order of the problems that the interviewees in the various samples assessed, by the degree of priority that should be given to dealing with them (where 1 is the highest priority and 5 is the lowest):

**Table 24: The most important problems that the government has to deal with, ranked in order**

	Jews		Arabs	
Age group	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Cost of living expenses	1	1	3	2
National security/terror	2	2	5	4
Education	3	3	1	3
Relations between Jews and Arabs	4	4	2	1
Advancing the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians	5	5	4	5

Aside from the fact that the topic of advancing negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians was relegated to the bottom of the scale, there is a lack of correlation between the perceptions of Jews and the perceptions of the Arabs regarding the priority for problems requiring treatment. In the Jewish sector, there was a complete correlation between the teenagers and the young people with regard to the ranking of the problems in order of the importance attributed to them. In the Arab sector, there is similarity between the two age groups, but it is not full correlation.

- 2) The order of the disputes according to the extent to which they are perceived as endangering Israeli society follows (where 1 indicates that the dispute endangers Israeli society more than all the others and 5 less than all the others).

**Table 25: The disputes that most endanger Israeli society, ranked in order**

	Jews		Arabs	
Age group	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Between Jews and Arabs	1	1	1	1
Between right-wing and left-wing	2	2	3	3
Between religious and secular	3	3	4	2
Between the rich and the poor	4	4	2	4
Between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim	5	5	5	5

All the groups in the sample agree both about the problem that most endangers Israeli society – the dispute between Jews and Arabs – and about the problem that least endangers Israeli society – the disputes between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim. In the Jewish sector, there is full correlation and in the Arab sector there is almost full correlation between teenagers and young people regarding the ranking of the disputes by the level of danger that they pose to Israeli society.

- 3) With regard to the problems of the state considered most pressing both for the teenagers and for the young people, there were no perceived gender disparities.
- 4) Both among teenagers and among young people, the religious attribute greater importance than others to national security (84% for teenagers and 75% for young people). Both among teenagers and among young people, the percentage of those attributing prime importance to advancing the negotiations with the Palestinians is relatively higher among the secular (19% among teenagers and 17% among the young people).

The subject of national security was particularly important for those supporting the right (73% of teenagers and 71% of young people). The closer their personal positioning on the right-left continuum was to the left, the

greater the importance given to advancing the negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians was - increasing gradually - (among teenagers from 5% for those positioning themselves on the right, to 17% positioning themselves in the center, to 33% of those positioning themselves on the left; among the young people the respective values were 5%, 29%, and 36%).

5) With regard to the disputes that endanger Israeli society, among the teenagers no link was found between the socio-demographic factors that were examined and the level of danger posed by the various disputes. Among the young people, it was found that girls more than boys attribute threatening power to disputes between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel (47% against 34%), the secular and traditional persons perceive a greater threat than do the religious and the ultra-Orthodox (44%-45%, as opposed to 28% and 37% respectively). However, those who positioned themselves on the left perceive a lower threat in this dispute than do the other interviewees (30%). The disputes between right and left are less threatening for the secular and the ultra-Orthodox than for the traditional and the religious.


#### **d. Level of optimism (or pessimism) about the future of the state**

The concluding question in this chapter was "To what extent are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the state?"

**Table 26: Optimism or pessimism about the future of the state**

		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
<b>To what extent are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the state?</b>	Very pessimistic	3.2%	7.2%	7.5%	9.0%	4.2%	7.7%
	Fairly pessimistic	31.7%	39.4%	19.5%	15.9%	28.9%	33.3%
	Fairly optimistic	44.9%	38.3%	41.2%	43.3%	44.1%	39.6%
	Very optimistic	9.5%	8.6%	25.8%	16.2%	13.2%	10.6%
	Don't know/refuse	10.7%	6.6%	6.0%	15.5%	9.6%	8.9%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

**Figure 32: Optimism or pessimism about the future of the state**



- 1) A significant majority of the Arabs (67% of teenagers and 60% of the young people) and a small majority of the Jewish teenagers (54%) were optimistic about the future of the state. The Jewish young people were divided between optimism and pessimism (47% each).
- 2) Arab teenagers and young people are more optimistic than Jews about the future of the state.
- 3) For both national groups, the teenagers are slightly more optimistic than the young people although the differences are not statistically significant.
- 4) In both age groups no gender disparities are found. In both age groups, the religious people are more optimistic than the others (89% in both age groups) and the secular are more pessimistic than the others (51% among the teenagers and 63% among the young people). In both groups, as they move from right to left, the optimism decreases and the pessimism increases.

## **5. Positions about Jewish-Arab coexistence**


The interviewees were asked two questions about this subject: "To what extent do you agree with or oppose the following assertion: Arab citizens of Israel should be prohibited from being elected to the Knesset" and "Do you oppose

or agree with the following opinion: Most of the Arabs have not reconciled with the existence of the State of Israel and would destroy it if they could?"

**Table 27: Positions on Jewish-Arab coexistence**

To what extent do you agree with or oppose the following assertion:		Jews		Arabs		Total	
		15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Arab citizens of Israel should be prohibited from being elected to the Knesset	Completely agree	27.0%	29.2%			26.8%	28.0%
	Agree	12.6%	14.4%		4.9%	12.5%	14.0%
	Not sure	20.9%	23.1%	50.0%		21.0%	22.1%
	Oppose	14.5%	16.4%		13.7%	14.4%	16.3%
	Completely oppose	18.6%	15.5%	50.0%	81.4%	18.8%	18.3%
	Don't know/refuse	6.5%	1.4%			6.4%	1.3%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	3	21	489	491
Most of the Arabs have not reconciled with the existence of the State of Israel and would destroy it if they could	Completely agree	33.4%	40.0%	14.7%	5.4%	29.1%	31.1%
	Agree	26.3%	31.6%	35.3%	18.1%	28.4%	28.1%
	Not sure	15.6%	12.9%	29.7%	18.9%	18.9%	14.5%
	Oppose	14.2%	11.0%	7.9%	29.4%	12.7%	15.7%
	Completely oppose	5.7%	3.3%	4.9%	18.6%	5.5%	7.2%
	Don't know/refuse	4.8%	1.2%	7.4%	9.6%	5.4%	3.4%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470	145	163	631	633

**Figure 33: "Arab citizens of Israel should be prohibited from being elected to the Knesset", among Jews**



- 1) More than a third (40%) of Jewish teenagers and 44% of Jewish young people think that Arab citizens of Israel should be prohibited from being elected to the Knesset.
- 2) Most of the Jewish interviewees agree with the opinion that states that most Arabs have not become reconciled with the State of Israel and would destroy it if they could (60% of teenagers and 72% of young people). It is worth noting that among the Arabs, half of the teenagers and about a quarter of the young people (23%) agree with this claim; it is possible that some of them related only to the first part of the statement which says that Arabs have not become reconciled to the existence of the State of Israel.
- 3) Among teenagers no gender disparities were found. Among the young people, women more than men agree that Arab citizens of Israel should be prevented from being elected to the Knesset (50% as opposed to 37%). In both age groups, the closer the interviewees are to religion, and the closer they are to the right, the more there is a gradual increase in the percentage of those agreeing to those statements.

**6. Level of preoccupation with the Holocaust and perceptions about Germany (for Jews only)**

**a. Level of preoccupation with the Holocaust**

The extent of preoccupation with the Holocaust was examined both on the personal level ("Are you personally interested or not interested in the subject of the Holocaust?") and on the level of assessments regarding Israeli society ("Of the following, which is the one that best states Israeli society's view of the Holocaust – Israeli society deals with the Holocaust too much, more than is appropriate/Israeli society deals with the Holocaust too little/Israeli society deals with the Holocaust at an appropriate level").

**Table 28: Level of preoccupation with the Holocaust**

		Jews	
		15-18	21-24
<b>Are you personally interested in the Holocaust?</b>	Not at all	2.4%	3.2%
	Somewhat	24.6%	31.8%
	Greatly	41.4%	44.8%
	Very greatly	28.4%	18.9%
	Don't know/refuse	3.2%	1.3%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470
<b>Of the following, which best states Israeli society's preoccupation with the Holocaust – select one only</b>	Israeli society deals with the Holocaust too much	10.2%	8.8%
	Israeli society deals too little with the Holocaust, much too little	31.6%	36.6%
	Israeli society deals with the Holocaust at an appropriate level	52.5%	51.2%
	Don't know/refuse	5.8%	3.3%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470



- 1) A large majority of the interviewees in both age groups are interested in the Holocaust at least somewhat. About two-thirds (70% of the teenagers and 64% of the young people) are greatly or very greatly interested in the Holocaust. About half of the interviewees in both age groups (52% and 51% respectively) think that Israeli society deals with the Holocaust at an appropriate level, but about one-third (32% of teenagers and 37% of young people) think that there is too little preoccupation with the Holocaust.
- 2) Among the teenagers, girls are more interested in the Holocaust than boys (78% against 69%) and the ultra-Orthodox are less interested than others (53%). Among the young people, no link was found between socio-demographic factors, except for the relatively high interest of the religious (71%).

#### **b. Perceptions about Germany of today**


The interviewees were presented with several opinions about present-day Germany ("Germany today is among the countries friendly to Israel"/"Germany today is no different than Germany in the past, and a Nazi regime could arise there"/"The extermination of Jews was supported, in effect, by the majority of the German people and not only by the Nazi leadership") and for each of them, they were asked to state "Is this true or not true in your opinion?" Table 31 presents the interviewees' responses.

**Table 29: Perceptions about Germany today**


		Jews	
		15-18	21-24
<b>Germany today is among the countries friendly to Israel</b>	Completely wrong	6.3%	4.1%
	Somewhat wrong	11.3%	16.6%
	Somewhat correct	42.8%	46.5%
	Very correct	20.4%	19.2%
	Don't know/refuse	19.2%	13.7%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470

<b>Germany today is no different than Germany in the past, and a Nazi regime could arise there</b>	Completely wrong	31.3%	27.8%
	Somewhat wrong	32.2%	40.9%
	Somewhat correct	19.9%	16.7%
	Very correct	6.8%	7.0%
	Don't know/refuse	9.8%	7.6%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470
<b>The extermination of Jews was supported, in effect, by the majority of the German people and not only by the Nazi leadership</b>	Completely wrong	7.6%	7.0%
	Somewhat wrong	23.2%	24.3%
	Somewhat correct	34.5%	35.8%
	Very correct	22.0%	22.6%
	Don't know/refuse	12.7%	10.3%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%
	N	486	470


**Figure 34: "Germany today is among the countries friendly to Israel", among Jews**



**Figure 35: "Germany today is no different than Germany in the past, and a Nazi regime could arise there", among Jews**



**Figure 36: "The extermination of Jews was supported, in effect, by the majority of the German people and not only by the Nazi leadership", among Jews**



- 1) All of the above three assertions regarding Germany have a common factor (Cronbach  $\alpha = 0.78$ ) that can be termed "The image of Germany in the context of the Jewish people and Israel".
- 2) Slightly more than half of the interviewees (56% of the teenagers and 58% of the young people) think that most of the German people supported the extermination of the Jews during the Holocaust. However, at the same time, some two-thirds (64% of teenagers and 69% of young people) do not agree

with the statement that Germany of today is no different from Germany in the past and similar percentages (63% of teenagers and 65% of young people) think that Germany today is one of the countries that is friendly to Israel.

- 3) The examination of the links to socio-demographic characteristics shows that:
  - a. No gender disparities are found in the assessments of Germany.
  - b. As the association with religion decreases, so there is a gradual increase in the assessment of Germany, from an average of 2.1 (on a 4-level scale) among the ultra-Orthodox to 2.9 (on the same scale) among the secular. This data is true for both teenagers and young people.
  - c. For both teenagers and young people no significant link was found between where the individual positioned himself on the right-left ideological continuum and their assessments regarding Germany.

## **Appendix: Link with Socio-Demographic Characteristics**

**Table 30: Economic support from parents**

<b>Teenagers</b>											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Parents support me economically	85.5%	90.7%	88.9%	85.2%	93.5%	87.8%	87.0%	84.7%	94.7%	90.8%	84.4%
Parents do not support me economically	14.1%	9.0%	10.2%	14.8%	6.5%	12.2%	13.0%	15.3%	5.3%	8.2%	12.7%
Parents do not support me economically and I even support them	.5%	.3%	.9%							.9%	2.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	217	186	182	160	43	16	168	84	48	68	35
<b>Young People</b>											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Parents support me economically	59.2%	65.5%	64.3%	61.0%	47.7%	72.6%	63.2%	65.9%	60.1%	60.1%	55.0%
Parents do not support me economically	39.3%	31.0%	33.9%	34.1%	50.6%	27.4%	34.3%	32.5%	35.1%	38.6%	33.8%
Parents do not support me economically and I even support them	1.4%	3.5%	1.9%	4.9%	1.6%		2.5%	1.6%	4.9%	1.3%	11.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	197	270	189	163	44	71	225	118	40	66	18

**Table 31: Goals in life**

<b>Teenagers</b>											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Obtaining higher education	45.9%	54.1%	48.7%	49.2%	52.2%	59.9%	49.2%	53.7%	46.5%	51.5%	43.7%
Economic success	47.1%	38.7%	42.2%	47.0%	31.9%	51.4%	51.1%	39.2%	35.5%	29.8%	50.1%
Enjoying life, entertainment, good food, beach	37.3%	37.7%	47.9%	33.6%	13.5%	21.1%	28.5%	41.9%	44.8%	46.9%	43.4%
Contributing to the state and society	22.6%	22.1%	15.9%	19.8%	58.0%	21.4%	27.4%	18.3%	18.9%	25.9%	5.0%
Contributing as much as I can to IDF	20.0%	13.0%	14.8%	19.8%	19.3%		21.3%	13.7%	17.5%	11.3%	11.2%
Volunteering for important subjects	3.8%	12.5%	8.1%	6.5%	10.2%	10.0%	5.8%	11.1%	5.3%	11.3%	6.8%
Moving overseas	7.5%	6.2%	9.1%	6.5%		3.9%	2.7%	6.8%	15.6%	9.4%	10.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	219	187	186	161	46	13	173	83	50	66	34
<b>Young People</b>											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Economic success	67.9%	63.5%	63.2%	67.0%	58.3%	73.2%	74.3%	58.5%	51.9%	59.5%	51.9%
Enjoying life, entertainment, good food, beach	40.9%	44.0%	51.6%	47.0%	20.8%	17.4%	37.3%	48.0%	45.1%	53.2%	29.2%
Obtaining higher education	36.3%	41.2%	40.0%	37.6%	36.3%	42.7%	38.2%	41.2%	46.6%	33.8%	39.7%
Contributing to the state and society	17.5%	17.1%	12.3%	15.1%	48.7%	16.5%	18.4%	18.4%	10.1%	15.7%	18.9%
Volunteering for important subjects	6.5%	9.6%	4.0%	9.3%	10.4%	17.9%	4.9%	9.6%	17.4%	9.0%	18.1%
Moving overseas	10.2%	6.7%	11.3%	7.6%	5.0%	1.7%	7.5%	7.6%	6.7%	13.0%	6.0%
Contributing as much as I can to IDF	3.1%	.2%	1.0%	.7%	8.1%		1.3%	1.5%	5.2%		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	190	264	191	162	43	58	217	116	40	65	16

**Table 32: Sense of belonging**

Teenagers											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
I feel like a citizen with equal rights to other citizens	87.0%	86.4%	89.2%	84.0%	90.2%	72.3%	86.9%	90.6%	76.9%	90.8%	82.6%
I feel as though I don't belong to Israeli society	13.0%	13.6%	10.8%	16.0%	9.8%	27.7%	13.1%	9.4%	23.1%	9.2%	17.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	211	173	178	150	43	12	158	80	50	67	29
Young people											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
I feel like a citizen with equal rights to other citizens	84.7%	84.0%	85.0%	91.2%	89.1%	62.9%	88.4%	82.8%	91.4%	75.9%	55.3%
I feel as though I don't belong to Israeli society	15.3%	16.0%	15.0%	8.8%	10.9%	37.1%	11.6%	17.2%	8.6%	24.1%	44.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	185	247	178	150	41	63	210	111	36	59	16

**Table 33: Sense of security**

Teenagers											
Economic security (10-level scale)											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	7.2	6.7	7.2	6.8	7.1	6.4	7.0	6.7	6.7	7.4	7.2
Standard deviation	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.7	2.1
Frequency	202	166	171	142	41	14	152	75	45	64	31
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	3	2
Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10

Exposure to violence (10-level scale)											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	6.4	6.0	6.2	6.0	6.8	7.0	6.1	6.2	5.7	6.5	6.9
Standard deviation	2.9	3.3	3.0	3.1	3.0	3.5	3.1	3.3	3.3	2.3	2.3
Frequency	208	180	183	149	42	13	158	81	49	68	31
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Personal threat											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Feel great sense of threat	23.2%	37.2%	28.3%	31.8%	27.8%	28.0%	32.2%	31.8%	34.8%	18.2%	26.5%
Feel a low sense of threat	49.3%	46.8%	52.5%	46.3%	38.7%	42.0%	38.4%	52.3%	52.2%	62.8%	51.6%
Feel no threat at all	27.5%	16.0%	19.2%	21.9%	33.5%	30.0%	29.5%	15.9%	13.0%	18.9%	21.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	215	179	179	156	44	15	168	83	47	68	28
General security (10-level scale)											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	7.6	7.2	7.4	7.4	7.6	7.5	7.6	7.3	7.2	7.4	7.5
Standard deviation	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.6	2.0	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.5	1.6
Frequency	226	194	190	168	46	16	174	85	50	70	40
Minimum	2	1	1	1	1	4	2	1	1	3	4
Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Young people											
Economic security (10-level scale)											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	6.2	5.9	6.1	5.6	6.0	6.7	6.2	5.5	5.9	6.2	6.4
Standard deviation	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.8	2.2	1.8	1.9
Frequency	194	267	190	162	42	68	220	115	40	68	17
Minimum	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	2	3	3
Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10



Exposure to violence (10-level scale)											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	6.2	6.2	6.2	5.6	6.7	7.2	6.4	5.8	6.1	6.3	6.4
Standard deviation	2.9	3.1	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.1	2.8	2.7	3.2
Frequency	191	263	184	161	40	69	218	114	38	67	17
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Personal threat											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Feel great sense of threat	24.6%	44.4%	30.8%	43.3%	33.4%	35.0%	39.8%	44.8%	24.4%	17.8%	28.3%
Feel a low sense of threat	49.5%	41.9%	52.6%	42.1%	36.1%	36.9%	37.9%	42.6%	53.4%	71.3%	29.1%
Feel no threat at all	25.9%	13.8%	16.6%	14.6%	30.5%	28.0%	22.4%	12.6%	22.2%	10.9%	42.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	193	263	188	157	43	69	217	115	39	68	17
General security (10-level scale)											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	7.0	7.1	6.8	6.7	7.4	8.1	7.2	6.7	7.0	7.0	7.6
Standard deviation	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.7	2.2
Frequency	199	273	192	165	44	71	226	118	40	68	20
Minimum	2	2	2	2	4	3	2	3	3	2	3
Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10

**Table 34: Perceptions about the likelihood of achieving goals**

Teenagers											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Certain	59.8%	58.4%	51.6%	59.8%	83.8%	71.3%	69.3%	51.1%	60.1%	45.4%	54.0%
Not certain	40.2%	41.6%	48.4%	40.2%	16.2%	28.7%	30.7%	48.9%	39.9%	54.6%	46.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	218	189	184	163	45	14	171	83	50	69	34

Young people											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Certain	56.4%	55.5%	47.2%	49.7%	75.4%	81.7%	61.7%	48.5%	51.1%	46.6%	74.8%
Not certain	43.6%	44.5%	52.8%	50.3%	24.6%	18.3%	38.3%	51.5%	48.9%	53.4%	25.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	195	267	186	164	44	69	222	118	40	64	19

**Table 35: Importance of democratic values and preferences for security needs and democratic requirements**

Teenagers											
Average importance of democratic values (10-level scale)											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	8.0	7.9	8.5	7.6	7.2	6.5	7.4	7.7	8.4	9.0	8.7
Standard deviation	2.1	2.1	1.7	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.2	1.9	2.0	1.5	1.6
Frequency	217	190	186	165	42	15	167	84	50	70	37
Minimum	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	2.5	3.5
Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Average importance of democratic expressions in Israel (5-level scale)											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.2	3.9	3.6	4.1	4.3	4.4	4.6	4.4
Standard deviation	.7	.7	.6	.7	.8	1.0	.8	.7	.7	.5	.8
Frequency	224	193	189	168	45	15	173	85	50	70	38
Minimum	1.5	1	1.5	1.75	1.75	1	1	2.5	2.25	1.75	1.5
Maximum	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5

Security needs compared to democratic needs											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Always security needs	34.9%	30.9%	21.8%	42.5%	40.3%	52.9%	46.7%	32.8%	27.3%	6.0%	27.3%
Usually security needs, aside from exceptional situations	44.7%	50.9%	48.3%	46.2%	50.1%	43.3%	43.8%	53.8%	41.4%	51.4%	50.5%
Always/usually democratic values	20.4%	18.1%	29.9%	11.3%	9.6%	3.8%	9.5%	13.3%	31.1%	42.6%	22.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	215	175	177	154	43	13	165	85	44	67	27
Young people											
Average importance of democratic values (10-level scale)											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	7.1	7.4	7.7	7.2	6.9	6.5	6.7	7.6	7.9	8.6	6.4
Standard deviation	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.4	2.2	1.9	2.0	1.4	2.5
Frequency	197	271	190	163	44	71	222	118	40	68	20
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3.5	3.5	2
Maximum	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Average importance of democratic expressions in Israel (5-level scale)											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	4.0	4.2	4.3	4.1	3.9	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.1	4.5	3.5
Standard deviation	.8	.7	.7	.7	.7	.8	.7	.6	.9	.7	.9
Frequency	199	272	192	165	44	70	226	118	40	68	19
Minimum	1.67	2.25	2	2.25	2	1.67	1.67	2.75	2.25	2	2.25
Maximum	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Security needs compared to democratic needs											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Always security needs	35.3%	35.4%	23.5%	38.4%	51.5%	50.2%	52.5%	28.6%	12.7%	1.4%	45.2%
Usually security needs, aside from exceptional situations	48.2%	48.7%	51.3%	51.0%	36.9%	42.1%	42.0%	57.1%	65.4%	47.0%	42.3%
Always/usually democratic values	16.4%	15.9%	25.1%	10.6%	11.6%	7.7%	5.5%	14.3%	21.9%	51.5%	12.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	195	264	186	163	42	69	221	115	39	68	16

**Table 36: Assessments about the presence of various democratic characteristics in the State of Israel (3-level scale)**

Teenagers											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.7
Standard deviation	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.3	.3
Frequency	223	189	188	165	44	15	172	85	50	70	35
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Maximum	3	2.67	3	2.67	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	3	2.6	2.4
Young people											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.9
Standard deviation	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.5	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4
Frequency	197	269	191	163	43	69	223	117	39	68	19
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.25
Maximum	3	3	2.8	2.8	3	3	3	2.67	2.6	3	3

**Table 37: Average trust in government institutions (4-level scale)**

Teenagers											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5
Standard deviation	.5	.5	.4	.5	.5	.4	.5	.4	.4	.4	.6
Frequency	220	189	187	165	43	14	169	85	50	70	34
Minimum	1	1.5	1	1.5	1.38	1.5	1.38	1.63	1.63	1	1
Maximum	4	4	4	3.88	4	3.25	4	3.88	3.75	3.38	4
Young people											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Standard deviation	.5	.5	.4	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.4	.4	.6
Frequency	198	273	191	165	44	71	226	118	40	68	19
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.5	1	1

Maximum	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	3.25	3	3.5
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**Table 38: Perceptions about the problems in the state requiring treatment and the disputes threatening Israeli society**

Teenagers											
Problems requiring treatment											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Cost of living expenses/social gaps	65.9%	61.5%	66.3%	64.2%	53.9%	60.1%	62.0%	68.5%	72.2%	61.6%	54.5%
National security/terror	59.1%	65.6%	51.5%	68.3%	83.5%	63.5%	76.7%	69.4%	42.5%	36.0%	52.3%
Education	27.5%	29.4%	31.8%	25.6%	27.6%	19.1%	27.2%	20.1%	32.5%	34.5%	36.5%
Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel	22.8%	24.9%	25.6%	22.0%	21.4%	26.0%	18.6%	25.1%	30.0%	28.2%	28.2%
Advancing the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians	12.4%	13.5%	19.2%	7.2%	3.9%	22.9%	4.7%	8.2%	17.2%	33.2%	18.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	222	190	187	165	44	15	172	85	50	68	35
Disputes threatening Israeli society											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel	50.7%	55.8%	50.6%	56.9%	49.4%	52.6%	55.1%	54.3%	59.2%	43.4%	49.3%
Between right-wing and left-wing	29.7%	26.9%	27.8%	25.9%	39.8%	30.3%	30.4%	27.6%	17.9%	30.9%	30.8%
Between religious and secular	9.9%	9.9%	13.4%	5.6%	9.7%	12.6%	7.6%	8.6%	15.6%	12.8%	11.1%
Between rich and poor	6.0%	5.8%	5.1%	8.8%	1.1%		4.1%	6.5%	7.3%	8.6%	6.7%
Between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim	3.6%	1.7%	3.2%	2.8%		4.5%	2.9%	3.0%		4.3%	2.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	213	180	183	155	42	14	167	83	48	66	30

Young people											
Problems requiring treatment											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Cost of living expenses/social gaps	73.9%	74.5%	75.4%	74.9%	62.7%	76.7%	73.6%	79.1%	61.9%	77.2%	68.0%
National security/terror	58.0%	65.4%	52.5%	70.3%	75.0%	62.4%	77.7%	63.0%	53.9%	17.8%	52.6%
Education	29.8%	30.4%	29.9%	25.9%	35.7%	37.2%	29.4%	30.6%	24.1%	31.9%	43.6%
Relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel	15.9%	13.9%	19.1%	10.0%	17.4%	11.9%	9.3%	14.2%	21.1%	31.2%	9.9%
Advancing the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians	13.8%	10.4%	17.0%	11.9%	3.1%	3.0%	4.6%	4.2%	29.3%	36.3%	20.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	198	272	192	163	44	71	225	118	40	68	19
Disputes threatening Israeli society											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel	34.3%	47.3%	43.9%	45.0%	28.9%	36.5%	43.4%	45.2%	43.0%	29.6%	43.2%
Between right-wing and left-wing	33.3%	30.6%	29.1%	37.7%	45.6%	15.5%	33.2%	30.6%	25.7%	35.7%	18.0%
Between religious and secular	17.0%	14.2%	14.7%	8.3%	15.6%	35.0%	13.8%	15.4%	13.6%	22.6%	12.7%
Between rich and poor	11.4%	5.9%	10.6%	7.0%	9.9%	3.3%	7.2%	7.1%	17.7%	7.4%	12.6%
Between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim	3.9%	1.9%	1.6%	2.0%		9.7%	2.4%	1.7%		4.8%	13.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	192	163	187	160	43	64	220	116	38	65	16

**Table 39: Optimism/pessimism about the future of the state**

Teenagers											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Pessimistic	36.5%	43.1%	51.4%	32.5%	11.2%	49.7%	27.5%	41.5%	47.7%	60.3%	39.3%
Optimistic	63.5%	56.9%	48.6%	67.5%	88.8%	50.3%	72.5%	58.5%	52.3%	39.7%	60.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	207	170	175	147	42	13	160	77	44	68	27

Young people											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Pessimistic	48.0%	51.2%	63.3%	47.3%	11.6%	43.8%	37.1%	56.9%	58.0%	74.6%	47.2%
Optimistic	52.0%	48.8%	36.7%	52.7%	88.4%	56.2%	62.9%	43.1%	42.0%	25.4%	52.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	188	253	177	160	42	62	209	113	37	65	17

**Table 40: Positions about Jewish-Arab coexistence in Israel**

Teenagers											
Arab citizens of Israel should be prohibited from being elected to the Knesset											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Agree	35.9%	38.8%	20.8%	47.0%	56.3%	78.9%	60.2%	33.0%	13.3%	5.5%	30.0%
Not certain	22.4%	26.4%	22.1%	28.9%	22.8%	6.5%	21.8%	37.0%	30.7%	5.3%	37.3%
Oppose	41.6%	34.8%	57.1%	24.1%	20.9%	14.6%	18.0%	30.0%	56.0%	89.1%	32.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	216	176	181	153	45	15	167	83	46	69	27

Arabs have not become reconciled to the existence of the State of Israel and would destroy it if they could											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Absolutely agree	31.5%	30.4%	19.0%	37.8%	47.4%	55.9%	52.8%	28.5%	12.0%	2.3%	10.0%
Agree	26.6%	30.3%	23.4%	33.5%	27.8%	34.0%	28.1%	37.7%	31.9%	9.7%	41.2%
No opinion/Not certain	17.0%	18.9%	22.4%	14.4%	15.5%	6.4%	13.2%	11.1%	26.6%	24.4%	34.9%
Oppose	24.8%	20.5%	35.2%	14.3%	9.2%	3.7%	6.0%	22.7%	29.5%	63.7%	13.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	219	183	182	161	45	14	171	83	49	70	29

Young people											
Arab citizens of Israel should be prohibited from being elected to the Knesset											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Agree	37.2%	49.7%	27.9%	44.1%	66.4%	75.4%	68.0%	31.5%	17.3%		57.8%
Not certain	25.4%	21.8%	25.8%	28.4%	15.4%	10.5%	20.3%	32.3%	34.8%	13.1%	18.0%
Oppose	37.3%	28.5%	46.3%	27.5%	18.2%	14.1%	11.7%	36.2%	48.0%	86.9%	24.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	199	266	190	160	44	71	226	117	39	68	16
Arabs have not become reconciled to the existence of the State of Israel and would destroy it if they could											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Absolutely agree	36.1%	43.9%	26.1%	42.3%	52.3%	68.6%	60.1%	27.8%	29.0%	3.1%	48.3%
Agree	34.7%	29.9%	33.1%	36.1%	27.7%	22.0%	31.2%	48.7%	28.3%	11.6%	13.4%
No opinion/Not certain	12.6%	13.5%	18.2%	13.4%	6.1%	2.9%	4.5%	18.1%	25.9%	22.6%	25.6%
Oppose	16.7%	12.7%	22.6%	8.2%	13.9%	6.5%	4.2%	5.4%	16.7%	62.6%	12.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	199	267	191	161	44	70	225	118	40	68	15

**Table 41: Interest in the Holocaust**

Teenagers											
Personal interest											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Not interested	31.3%	22.0%	26.2%	27.2%	23.0%	47.0%	28.7%	23.2%	27.4%	21.9%	38.8%
Interested	68.7%	78.0%	73.8%	72.8%	77.0%	53.0%	71.3%	76.8%	72.6%	78.1%	61.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	218	190	183	165	44	15	170	85	50	70	32



Assessments about Israeli society											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Israeli society deals too much with the Holocaust, more than is appropriate	14.5%	8.8%	13.8%	12.6%	4.5%		10.1%	10.0%	8.3%	21.7%	10.6%
Israeli society deals too little with the Holocaust, less than is appropriate	30.6%	32.1%	28.1%	35.5%	22.3%	54.7%	35.2%	29.9%	33.9%	22.0%	30.5%
Israeli society deals with the Holocaust to an appropriate degree	54.8%	59.1%	58.1%	51.9%	73.2%	45.3%	54.7%	60.1%	57.8%	56.2%	58.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	216	184	181	164	43	12	167	85	50	69	30
Young people											
Personal interest											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Not interested	39.4%	32.6%	36.0%	37.3%	29.0%	33.6%	32.4%	34.8%	34.0%	44.5%	46.7%
Interested	60.6%	67.4%	64.0%	62.7%	71.0%	66.4%	67.6%	65.2%	66.0%	55.5%	53.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	196	270	190	163	42	71	225	116	39	67	19
Assessments about Israeli society											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Israeli society deals too much with the Holocaust, much more than is appropriate	9.7%	8.7%	12.3%	8.9%	5.1%	3.2%	5.3%	8.3%	14.3%	18.2%	17.2%
Israeli society deals too little with the Holocaust, much less than is appropriate	33.1%	41.5%	35.1%	39.0%	27.4%	50.0%	43.4%	39.2%	37.8%	16.0%	44.1%
Israeli society deals with the Holocaust to an appropriate degree	57.2%	49.8%	52.6%	52.1%	67.4%	46.8%	51.3%	52.5%	47.9%	65.7%	38.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	193	263	186	162	42	66	218	116	40	66	16

**Table 42: Average attitudes toward Germany (scale from 1, the most negative attitudes, to 4, the most positive attitudes)**

Teenagers											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	2.8	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.4	2.1	2.5	2.8	2.9	3.0	2.8
Standard deviation	.6	.7	.5	.6	.7	.8	.6	.6	.5	.6	.7
Frequency	219	180	186	159	41	13	165	83	49	70	32
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.33	1.50	1	1.33
Maximum	4	4	4	4	4	3.67	4	4	3.67	4	4
Young people											
	Gender		How do you define yourself in terms of religion?				How would you define yourself ideologically politically?				
	Male	Female	Secular	Traditional	Religious	Ultra-Orthodox	Right	Center-right	Center	Left	Don't know/refuse
Average	2.7	2.6	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.0	2.5	2.8	2.9	3.0	2.2
Standard deviation	.6	.6	.5	.5	.7	.6	.6	.5	.5	.5	.8
Frequency	194	262	188	160	39	68	217	115	40	66	17
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.67	1.50	1
Maximum	4	4	4	4	4	3.33	4	4	4	4	3.33

# Chapter 3: Summary of the findings of the qualitative study – personal, national and social positions of teenagers and young people

Michal Shapira

## Background and Aims

The aim of the study is to map the perceptions and positions of teenagers and young people on personal, social and national topics. These include:

- Personal expectations about the future and personal happiness
- Positions about Israeli society, the direction in which the State is moving, democracy, human rights, religion and state, personal contribution to shaping the state, and positions about relations with Germany.

## Methodology and Population

The study was carried out using the methodology of focus groups and consisted of 4 groups that included men and women aged 15-24 divided as follows.

Group No.	Age	Composition	Region
1	21-24	Secular young men and women	Center
2	21-44	Ultra-Orthodox young women	Center
3	15-18	Teenagers (m &f)- religious and traditional sector	Center
4	15-18	Teenagers (m &f) – Arab sector	Umm-el-Fahm

## General remarks

- The four sectors studied differ markedly from one another in the values imbibed at home, contents of school studies, and religion.
- The complex fabric of life in Israel makes it important to relate to each sector separately.

- Nevertheless, in relating to the Jewish sector, some of the research findings indicate that there are common elements in the opinions of the participants that cut across religion, age, and place of residence.
- The first part of the following chapter will reveal the findings common to the Jewish sector, placing specific emphasis on each sub-group within it.
- The findings about the Arab sector will have a separate sub-section in this chapter.

## **Main Findings in the Jewish Sector**

### **a. Personal vision and future**

- Most of the participants assign a significant value to higher education in their future. Teenagers express their intention to study academic studies, and most young people are in the midst of the process of making this choice or investing in higher education.
- The perception of the importance of studying is an aspect of personal fulfillment particularly in order to integrate into the work force with an advantage.

*"What I am studying is the direction, administration in a pharmaceutical company; that will give me economic stability and employment security."*

- All the ultra-Orthodox young women have an academic degree in various fields (law, accounting, architecture), and view their career as an important value that they hope to implement in the future alongside establishing a family. Even though this is not a representative sample, it is evident that this trend that resonates in this group has been seen in the ultra-Orthodox sector in recent years.

*"I see myself teaching mathematics at the university in the future. I would like that very much."*

- It is evident that the religious teenagers who participated in the study have a very focused perception of their future and their aspirations are higher than those of the participants from the secular sector.

*"I don't have a defined dream. But I want to do something meaningful, so that I am remembered. So that people know who Dvir Horwitz was, even if they*

*don't in the whole world, but here; let's say that there could be a theorem in physics named after me."*

- One of the explanations that can be related to this is their young age and their immediate future that is perceived as more structured. The older participants are at a post-army or pre-studies crossroads and they are more confused.

*"Concern, doubts, lack of sleep, anxiety about starting real life; I have no direction about what to study and what to work at. I am interested in a lot of things but in the end we have to choose something and I don't know what; I thought of beginning to take courses and then deciding, I feel a bit lost."*

- All the participants in the study view establishing a family as an important value. The great majority of the young people see themselves as having a family within the next ten years.
- All of the ultra-Orthodox women participants are married and all are planning to be mothers of children in the near future.

#### **b. In Israel or abroad**

- Most of the religious and traditional teenagers see their future in Israel.
- A small proportion of the participants in the secular and ultra-Orthodox group do not rule out moving abroad.
- Moving abroad is perceived largely as an experiment, gathering experiences and, for some, as the only option to cope economically.
- Nonetheless, most of the participants see themselves as belonging to Israeli society, and even those who see themselves emigrating, believe that they are referring to an experience and not to permanent residence.

#### **c. Sense of belonging to Israeli society**

- The participants feel a deep sense of belonging to Israeli society.
- This finding is overwhelmingly present in all the sub-groups of the Jewish sector.
- Israeli society is described, in all its various segments, as one entity composed of individuals that give it a unique character and tone.
- Israelis are characterized by the participants as being warm, willing to help, direct, sophisticated, and audacious, having weak manners, and lacking courtesy.

- The main variables on which the sense of belonging was based are: common language, common culture, "mindset", and attitude to the army.
- The participants are proud to belong to the entity they call "Israeli society".

Statements made by the participants:

*"Israeli-ness is: warmth, family, short fuse, caring, audacity, ambitiousness, technological progress."*

*"This Israeli audacity is something special, when there is a need to help in a war or overseas, they will help; that is really the moment of truth."*

*"For example, I was on a trip to Barcelona and there we met some Israelis and, to this day, we keep in touch and spend time together; that is something special, the ability to join up."*

*"We got stuck near Tiberias 3 weeks ago at 3 in the morning and there wasn't a single car that didn't stop and offer to help. Conversely, in Manhattan in the USA, my mother stumbled over a stone and fell together with my father and people just walked by them. That is something that would never happen in Israel. Never!!"*

*"I very much belong. I love Israel. You can see that mostly when you are overseas, you are seen to be an Israeli and everyone immediately makes friends."*

**d. Perception of democracy**

- The participants believe (and hope) that the democracy in Israel is stable.
- Nonetheless, some of them display ignorance about the term, and others would like to live in a democracy in which there are limits on freedom of expression for those entities perceived by them as extremists.
- Many participants do not see any contradiction between the term democracy and limiting freedom of expression.
- Many participants understand that the advantages of democracy are reserved for the majority and do not always apply to the minority.
- Among religious and ultra-Orthodox teenagers, the matter of the conflict between religion and state arises as a central obstacle to the existence of democracy. Most of the participants in those groups view religious laws as

more obligatory than laws of the state. In other words, given a conflict between them, the religious laws would take precedence.

Statements made by the participants:

*"Freedom of opinion, the majority decides, everyone can express himself as he wishes, I am in favor of democracy but, really, the weak ones who are the minority are hurt by it. For the Arabs, for example, it is harder to live here than for us."*

*"There is [democracy] in name, but in content it gets to places where you come across people speaking in the name of democracy, doing things in the name of democracy, for example, Ahmed Tibi who sits in the Knesset."*

*"There is a danger in freedom of expression because of the extremist, violent criticism which is not justified in my opinion, because there is a limit to expressing an opinion, and it could get to the point of prohibiting people from saying certain things."*

*"Democracy is not life. It is clear that we live in a democratic state. There are elections, but I don't think that it can be fully realized because there is such a diverse population. For me as an ultra-Orthodox woman, my democracy is that I have chosen the Torah and that is my democracy and my voice. We expect there to be full democracy but for us as ultra-Orthodox women it cannot be 100% put into effect, because of the laws of the Torah to which I am subject first and foremost."*

*"Not always. I don't think there always has to be democracy."*

**e. Human rights**

- Just like the perception of democracy, the perception of human rights is also infused with many contradictions.
- The participants declare that they are in favor of human rights, but from in-depth questioning it is apparent that some of them believe that there are people entitled to more rights and those that are not.
- Many participants view the sensitive human fabric in the state as well as the existing separation between religion and state as an impediment to the existence of equal human rights.

Statements made by the participants:

*"The Israeli Arabs who do harm should have their rights withdrawn. There is a Hamas representative in the Knesset, Hanin Zoabi, she must get out! How is it possible that she is in the Knesset? She must be removed urgently."*

*"People don't get equal rights and also those rights can't be exercised equally. Democracy goes to whoever was here."*

Question: Who is deprived?

Answer: *"The poor, the very old, women, Ethiopians, Russians, Arabs, gays."*

**f. Cost of living**

- The issue of the cost of living came up, unaided, as one of the urgent issues the state must deal with.
- The high cost of living is also perceived as a blow to the right to existence and also as a real impediment among the young people who wish to build their future in the state.
- The issue of the high cost of living came up as an urgent matter particularly for the group of young people because of the stage they are at in the cycle of life when they have to contend with it.

Statements made by the participants:

*"An apartment is something basic, it should be something to take for granted, and in this country, as a person of my age, I find myself thinking whether I will manage or won't manage to buy an apartment. A person who works ought to attain a certain standard of living. In my opinion, there are populations which do not pay their dues but they have rights. For example, the ultra-Orthodox who get allowances but don't serve in the army, and that is at my expense."*

**g. Security**

- Security is associatively perceived as part of the question of the Jewish-Arab conflict.
- The "Intifada of Knives" is perceived as an immediate threat to the daily lives of the participants.



- The Iranian threat is also perceived as endangering the existence in the region over the long term.
- Nonetheless, it is apparent that while on a declarative level the security of the state is in danger according to the participants, on the level of daily life, the participants feel a high sense of security.

Statements made by the participants:

*"All my associations relate to Arabs, terrorists, attacks..."*

Question: Do you feel secure?

*Answer: "Yes. I know that the situation in the country is not good and Jews are being killed. That hurts me but I am not one of those people who are afraid to go to Jerusalem."*

*"Arabs, terrorists, terror attacks. I personally am not afraid but it is a pity that that is the situation."*

*"There isn't so much security; there are terror attacks, wars, people killed. On a daily basis in my apartment in Ramat Aviv I feel secure. I am a little nervous about the knives. It is impossible to know really what will happen when."*

This is a charged subject with many responses, some of them contradictory.

**h. Religion and state**

- The participants (religious and ultra-Orthodox) see themselves as Jews before they are Israelis.
- Among the female ultra-Orthodox participants and also for some the religious teenagers and direct influenced by the level of their religiosity, the laws of the Torah are perceived as taking precedence over the laws of the state (as mentioned, in a situation of conflict the laws of the Torah would take precedence).
- Some of the secular participants view themselves primarily as Israelis.
- Most of the participants want the state to have a Jewish character (in the Orthodox religious sense), as determined in the Declaration of Independence.
- With regard to the levels of religiosity – opinion is divided.

Statements made by the participants, female ultra-Orthodox and traditional religious:

*"Why aren't there kosher places at Sarona (a shopping center in Tel Aviv)? Why are they open on Shabbat? This is the Jewish state so we should bolster the connection between religion and state."*

*"There are some things that we cannot compromise on like the matter of marriage, we wouldn't be able to know whether the parents are Jews, and we would be causing assimilation."*

*"Democracy, as secular people see it, cannot go together with the Torah. I am in favor of democracy except for religious subjects. This is the Jewish state and anyone who comes to live here knows and chooses to live in the Jewish state and we cannot compromise because then you would lose the Jewish character of the state."*

The secular participants:

*"In my opinion there should be a complete separation; the religious coercion distances people from tradition and from religion. The Law on Hametz (leavened bread) – people eat Hametz on Passover, and the Brit Milah (circumcision) – there is no law and everyone does it."*

*"I believe in the convergence between Judaism and the state and in the character of the state while maintaining absolute separation."*

**i. Government intervention in the economy**

- Since the cost of living is perceived as one of the most pressing problems in the state, many participants, particularly the young people, believe that the state should undertake a controlled intervention in economic life. The goal of this would be to minimize economic and social gaps and to allow a reasonable standard of living for weakened populations.

Statements made by the participants:

*"The economy, security and housing – the state should be responsible for the costs in Israel, the gaps between the rich and the poor."*

*"There are very large gaps in the population and the government should intervene more for the benefit of the weak."*

**j. The direction the state is taking**

- Differing perceptions of the religious/ultra-Orthodox and the secular participants.
- Secular participants express serious concern about the direction the state is taking in the sense of lack of tolerance towards the other, in security senses, demographic senses, increases in the gaps between the rich and the poor, and the cost of living.

Statements made by the participants:

*"We are living on borrowed time, the majority could change and become Arab, the State of Israel is Jewish and democratic but in the future it will be only democratic and not Jewish with an Arab majority or leftist organizations will take control and their decisions will be in the majority."*

*"I think that we are not moving in a good direction, society is becoming extremist, the Arabs will be more than 20%, and people hate one another."*

*"Extremism is increasing and hatred is gaining momentum in a worrying manner, and even without the demographic problems it is frightening to think what will happen here."*

- Religious and ultra-Orthodox participants expressed complete optimism with regard to the future of the state.

*"It is amazing from every point of view – technologically, socially, every aspect. It is prospering scientifically, security-wise, the Temple will be built and we will be a 'light unto the nations'."*

**k. Influence and social involvement**

- Even though all the participants intend to vote in the Knesset elections, and those who had the right to vote in the previous elections had exercised their right, most of them do not intend to participate in political and/or social activity. The participants are focused on developing in directions that would bring them economic well-being and personal happiness. Social/political aspirations are not usually part of this script.

Statements made by the participants:

*"I wouldn't be good at that. I can't quarrel with someone and then afterwards go to his daughter's wedding."*

*"I thought about it once, but I have foreign citizenship which I don't intend to give up."*

*"That's too big a responsibility for me."*

**1. Positions about Germany**

- The participants think that Israel should strengthen its ties with the countries of the world to improve its standing in the world.
- Germany is perceived as a country friendly to Israel. This friendship is perceived as an outcome of guilt feelings that motivate Germany's policy towards Israel and whose origins, of course, are historical.
- The participants are very connected to the story of the Second World War and the Holocaust of the Jews.
- Although the present generation in Germany is not perceived as responsible for the crimes of the previous generation, the attitude to the German people is one of qualified caution.
- The Holocaust is not perceived as a scenario that could be repeated, largely because of the strength of the state and the army.

Statements made by the participants:

*"The present generation is not connected to the Holocaust."*

*"It is a very influential and important country, they identify with us, the German people's character has not changed despite the passage of 70 years, they are still racist, and all the immigrants who are reaching there now – it may be taken out on them."*

*"It [the Holocaust] cannot happen because we have a good, large army."*

*"Germany awarded us a lot of points in the Eurovision."*

*"It's complicated, many years have gone by, and people of the previous generation have done things to atone, and the present generation says leave us alone, it's got nothing to do with us, and it's impossible to know if they would do that and if another country would do the same thing."*

Question: Hasn't Germany changed?

A: *"It has changed but we should still be cautious."*

*"We don't have so many connections that we could give up on this one."*

## **Main Findings in the Arab Sector**

### **a. Vision and personal future**

- As in the case of the Jewish sector, and even more so here, the participants view higher education as an essential condition for integrating into society.
- The participants are focused on their studies, and this is the main subject that occupies their daily lives.
- The girls who participated in the group view the advancement of women as one of the main challenges facing traditional Arab society.

### **Statements made by the participants:**

*"Education is the ultimate weapon of the woman."*

*"Sometimes hobbies are alright, they go ahead and everything is fine, but the real difficulty is in the sphere of studies and the matriculation examinations."*

*"Studying is not cool, or it actually depends on the school. I study in a school in which the curriculum is dry – no activities outside the school and it is boring sometimes; just studying all the time is not the solution."*

- Most of the participants didn't dare to dream of a future beyond employment and family. It is evident that their dreams are influenced by the significance of being a minority in the country, and even more so an Arab minority.

Statements made by the participants:

*"I know someone who wants to study fashion, but because he is male, and because of the state's restrictions it will be hard for him to realize his dream."*

*"The chances are fifty percent, because I'm not in a society that is all Arab; if I want to be a football player I don't think I'll manage to do that."*

*"It depends on the dream, because in some spheres it is impossible to advance in this country."*

- Among the girls, the matter of double exclusion was raised: exclusion based on nationality and on gender.

Statements made by the participants:

*"I am willing to go and study abroad but there is another obstacle and that is the family's objection."*

*"I like to live the way I want and that suits me, and I often objected to things that didn't suit me; I think Arab society supports boys more than girls."*

**b. The sense of belonging to Israeli society**

- The participants do not feel that they belong in Israeli society. The experience of being a minority dominates this feeling and they do not share with the Jewish participants any of the experiences that provide a feeling of belonging. The layers on which the feeling of belonging is based as expressed by the Jewish sector (language, mindset, culture, and army) are those very elements that differentiate the Arabs and contribute to their exclusion and to their feeling of not belonging.

Statements made by the participants:

*"We don't feel we belong..."*

*"I do feel that I belong to the state because I train with Jews and because, during the training we speak Hebrew."*

*"We are those who were here first, and we are the ones that assimilated them."*

*"The Arabs have more seniority in the country."*

**c. Perception of democracy and equal rights**

- The participants expressed great frustration in the face of what they perceive as democracy and equal rights "for Jews only". The participants feel like second class citizens in their own country that finds expression in daily discrimination and racism towards them.

Statements made by the participants:

*"There is no democracy in the State of Israel, no freedom, no equality, there is racism towards Arabs in the sphere of work, and they are prevented from being promoted and attaining a senior position and restrictions are placed on the Arab."*

*"It means treating us like human beings; Israel doesn't give us all our rights compared to the Jews."*

*"The state does not treat us right; it doesn't even solve problems like murder and all sorts of problems in Arab society which don't really interest the state."*

**d. Security**

- The participants feel a high sense of security in their daily lives in the state.
- Israel is perceived as investing great resources in maintaining this security, and even though they do not serve in the army, they enjoy the fruits of this security.

Statements made by the participants:

*"Actually the reverse is true, from the perspective of security, it is absolutely alright, and the fact that a Jew is willing to sacrifice everything so that someone can live, they take care of their lives."*

**e. The direction the state is taking**

- The participants are optimistic about the future of the state. It is worth noting that their attitude to this issue touches mainly on the economic aspect and on technological development.

Statements made by the participants:

*"In the field of economics, Israel is a leader, and in the security field it is moving in the right direction, because I feel secure in this country."*

*"In education and studies, Israel is a leader; it is a leader in construction and development."*

**f. Influence and social involvement**

- The participants do not believe that they are able to have an influence, especially in a country in which they are perceived as a minority. They prefer to invest most of their energy in personal development.

Statements made by the participants:

*"I really don't think we can make changes, we are the Arab minority and the most that has been achieved is a few seats in the Knesset."*

*"I don't think that it [The Arab Joint List political party] is really helping me as an Arab citizen of the state."*

**g. Positions about Germany**

- In general the level of involvement and interest in Israel's foreign policy is low.
- Nonetheless the participants believe that the relationship between Israel and Germany is an outcome of history and, for that reason, Germany is inclined to stand by Israel and help it.

*"Germany is more supportive of Israel."*

*"Germany supports Israel economically as compensation for the Holocaust."*

- The participants believe that the German people, in contrast to Germany's stated policy, tend to identify with the suffering of the Palestinian people.

*"The German people support the Palestinians more, but their state doesn't do anything special to help."*

*"It doesn't help and the world isn't interested in helping to solve the Palestinian problem."*



#### **h. Positions towards Arab countries**

- Arab countries are not perceived as being reliable in all things concerning the situation of the Arabs living in the State of Israel, in general, and Israeli Arabs in particular.

*"They have the economic and financial ability to help the Syrian refugees and the Arabs but they don't help at all.*

*"No, even the Arab countries hate us as the Arabs of 1948."*

#### **Summary and conclusions**

- The participants in the study (Jewish and Arab sectors) are very focused on their personal well-being, on their future, and their happiness.
- The religious and the ultra-Orthodox (Jewish sector) are more focused, and their path is clearer than that of the secular participants, the younger ones among them feel confused and overwhelmed with anxiety and a sense of losing their way.
- Teenagers who are in frameworks feel more secure than the young people who are at the stage of life when they are expected to make decisions that are perceived by them as critical with regard to their future.
- All the participants view higher education as having significant value and as a necessary condition for success in life. Among the Arab participants this feeling was especially prominent. The obstacles to a successful life, as perceived by them, are intensified due to their perceiving themselves as a minority and they understand that, in order to overcome these, they must try harder.
- The perceptions about Israeli democracy and equal rights are full of contradictions among all the audiences surveyed.
- In the Jewish sector, there is a perception that Israeli society is made up of communities that enjoy greater or fewer privileges. Not everyone benefits from full equal rights both in legal terms and in practice. This perception resonated among the Arab participants who feel like second-class citizens in their country.
- The perception of democracy suffers from contradictions both on the basis of limits on freedom of expression which is seen by many as desirable, and on the

basis of the combination between religion and state and the perception of ultra-Orthodox girls and some of the religious teenagers in the groups that the laws of the Torah take precedence over the laws of the state.

- All of the participants from the Jewish sector share a feeling of deep belonging to Israeli society based on language, culture, and mindset. The participants from the Arab sector do not share an equivalent feeling for exactly the same reasons.
- The participants have a sense of personal security in their daily lives, although, rationally, they are all aware of the security risks and threats to the state.
- All the participants believe that the state should intervene actively in economic life in order to reduce the cost of living, to diminish the gaps between the rich and the poor, and to enable citizens to live with dignity.
- Secular participants express pessimism with regard to the future of the state in terms of demography, security, and society. Religious participants express optimism in this context.
- German-Israeli relations are perceived as an outcome of guilt feelings on the part of the Germans and as an attempt to compensate for the past. Nonetheless, the friendship with Germany is perceived as an important asset for Israel on the world stage which is hostile to Israel.
- Among the Arab participants there is severe disappointment with the Arab countries which are perceived as not having the Arabs of the region in general and of Israel in particular on their public agenda.

# Chapter 4: Teenagers and Young People of Israel, Yesterday and Today: Comparison of Public Opinion Trends over Time

Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin

## Introduction

This chapter draws on the questions of the Youth Survey that have been asked in previous years to provide an overview of trends over time. How are the ideas, beliefs, hopes, values and experiences of teenagers and young people in Israel today different from those of the past?

About half of the questions in the 2016 study were asked in 2010. Many of them were also asked in previous years – some going as far back as 1998, others beginning in 2004. This fairly extensive tracking makes the Youth Survey a rare resource in the study of public opinion in Israel. Working with the data archives allows us to learn how the youth of yesterday, now adults, compare to people who are now the leaders of tomorrow.

The chapter begins by mapping how teenagers and young people of Israel today have changed from the past in terms of basic demographic characteristics and political orientation.

The chapter then moves into substantive topics that were tracked over time. These sections lay out the data emerging from the time series, while providing some social and historical context to help explain statistical changes – or consistent findings.

The topics that have been tracked over the years include:

- **Levels of optimism or pessimism** regarding the state and about their personal role within society. Are young people more or less optimistic now? What do they want and do they believe they can accomplish their goals in Israel?
- **Young people's sense of security** in Israel, regarding both the state and individual experience.
- **Trust in institutions.** The fundamental sense of optimism and security sets the stage for how people view the institutions that make up Israeli civic life. These questions all go back to 1998; changing attitudes on specific bodies tell

the story of individual institutional legitimacy over time, and changes among specific demographic groups in attitudes towards these institutions.

- **Social interaction.** The next section examines young people's attitudes towards social interaction and cohesion in Israel, particularly those who are prone to friction. These questions address values about the nature of Israeli society and politics; addresses the social schisms that threaten society, relations between Jews and Arabs, and support for equal participation in society.
- **Attitudes towards Germany and the Holocaust.** As in all previous years, the survey considers how young people view the history of Germany and the Jews today, and how they view the current relationship between the two peoples.

A note on methodology: The rich data set offers numerous dilemmas and a vast set of directions for analysis. In past years, the Jewish and Arab populations have been examined in the aggregate, while observing distinctions between teenagers and youth where relevant. The current chapter preserves this structure, based on the finding that these two populations are often distinctly different in their attitudes towards many issues, though not all. The distinction between teenagers and young people exists but is often less prominent than the different perspectives of Jews and Arabs, especially regarding trends over time; therefore this is mentioned mainly when relevant.

Further, in the attempt to tell the story of how Israeli society has changed through its youth, this chapter does not use a fixed framework for assessing attitudes by other demographic or ideological groups. Rather, the chapter takes a narrative form, observing patterns among subgroups defined by religion, ideology and gender, mainly where they stand out.

## **1. Who Are the Youth Now Compared to the Past?**

Throughout the history of Israeli public opinion research, religious observance has been the strongest demographic characteristic affecting political attitudes of Jewish citizens. For Arabs the variation of religious observance is not as closely tied to political attitudes, and is measured differently.


But among Jews personal religiosity ranging from secular to ultra-orthodox strongly predicts liberal/dovish/left attitudes, and society grows increasingly conservative, hard-line and right-wing with each higher level of higher religious observance. In other words, religious or secular identity affects a range of issues in Israel, not only those directly related to religion; they affect how Jewish society view democratic values, national identity, Jewish-Arab relations in Israel, opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Therefore, it is important to realize that the **level of religious observance in Israel is growing**. In 1998, nearly half of the young respondents were secular (49%), and in 2004 over half – 54%. In the intervening dozen years, the current survey shows that just over 40% of Jewish respondents consider themselves secular.

The rise in self-definition of 'Masorti' (traditional) is also striking, from 29% and 26% in 1998 and 2004, respectively, to the current level of 35% who consider themselves traditional. This is important because on various measures (in this but also other surveys), the biggest gap in political attitudes is found between the secular and traditional groups. The latter is somewhat closer in range to the religious, and this helps tilt society in favour of right wing attitudes.

At present, ten percent of the Jewish youth sample say they are religious and nearly 15% describe themselves as ultra-orthodox. The number of ultra-orthodox has therefore risen significantly from just nine percent in 1998 and 2004. Most surveys among the adult population of Israel (18+) show that ultra-orthodox are roughly 10% of society.

**Figure 37: Religious self-definition among Jews, 1998, 2004, 2010 and 2016**




These demographic shifts indicate that unless religious or traditional attitudes become less powerfully linked with right-wing political attitudes, the coming generation of adult Israelis will be more right wing (hawkish), less liberal, and more religious than previous ones.

Indeed, there has already been a corresponding change over the years in the ideological leanings of young people. In 2004, following a general right-ward shift among Israeli Jews during the second Intifada, 56% of all Jewish youth were right-wing, 25% were left, and eight percent were centrists. At present, 16% of Jews consider themselves left-wing – which includes people who define themselves as “centrists leaning somewhat more left.”

The corollary on the right is very high: nearly three-quarters of young people are right-wing (including center-leaning-right), and 62% among teenagers. True centrists are just over 10% among Jews, without significant difference between the two age groups. While data is not available for all years, and at points the question was asked differently, the trend is clear: young Jews have become far more polarized now. Just over ten percent now do not wish to identify as any leaning.

**Figure 38: Political identity self-definition, 2004 and 2016**



Arab young people are notably different. The outstanding finding is that a high portion does not wish to identify with any political ideology: roughly 40%. But this is not a new finding: there has been little significant change since the 2004 survey, when 35% also refrained from political self-definition.

Very small portions of Arab youth currently identify as right or left (8% or 10%, respectively, combining both age groups, which showed only tiny variation between them). But this finding contains a dramatic change: In 2004, fully half of all Arab respondents openly identified as left-wing, even as over one-third chose not to identify.

The intervening years have seen intensive strife – three wars in Gaza, renewed violence from the West Bank, and growing hostility towards Arab citizens in Israel. In this environment, many Arabs report significant fear among their communities, that political activity or even identity has dangers or discomfort and therefore many more prefer not to identify with the ideological left or right.

At the same time, young Arabs respondents who do not wish to identify may also be expressing alienation from Arab leaders in Israel. Like so many voters in other western democracies, they could be expressing disappointment and cynicism in general about politics. For these reasons, even the relatively high self-definition as “centrist” among Arabs in 2016 can be read more as a non-committal response, rather than a definition of centrist attitudes according to the Jewish population.

Another observation about the Arab youth; like their adult counterparts in many other surveys, they are far more likely to respond “don’t know” –not taking a position – on sensitive questions. This can also be interpreted as a refusal, decline, or suspicion of stating an opinion. It is not completely new, and can be seen in past years as well. But the tendency highlights something about either alienation from the major questions in Israeli society life, or worse – a fear that opinions have unwelcome repercussions. If true, such fears can be expected to reflect their attitudes towards life beyond the survey as well.

## **2. Mood: Optimism Declining for Jews, Rising for Arabs?**

The 2016 survey shows a precipitous decline in the level of optimism regarding the future of the state among young Jews. Just 51% of all Jewish respondents (15-18 and 21-25) felt optimistic about the future of the state, lower than at any point since the 1998 survey and over 10 points lower than in 2010 (62.6%). Yet by contrast to 2010, age trends were reversed: teenagers showed more optimism (54%) regarding the future of the state, while young people were slightly more pessimistic and just 47% said they felt optimistic about the future of the state.

Arabs in 1998 showed 52% optimism in the future of the state, dropping to a low of 36% in 2004. This was a natural decline that characterized the entire population that year, but was particularly pronounced among Arabs, probably due to the effect of the Intifada and the clear memory of the October 2000 events (the killing of 13 Arab citizens by Israeli police). Optimism was back up to 52% in 2010 – similar to 1998. Given the sharp decline among Jews, it is notable that the 2016 survey found a high point of 63%, nearly two-thirds of Arabs who said they feel optimistic about the future of the state.

When asked how **optimistic they are about being able to fulfill their personal goals in Israel**, once again the depressed state of young Israeli Jews is striking: 56% of all Jewish respondents say they are very or somewhat certain they can fulfill their aspirations in Israel. This is not only lower than at any point since 1998, it is nearly 30 points lower – a precipitous fall, and nearly 20 points below the second lowest score in 2004, before it, after the peak of the second Intifada.

Optimism or the lack of it is also clearly linked to political and religious ideology. The more religious each subgroup is among Jews, the more optimistic they are regarding the chances of fulfilling their goals in Israel - almost: the national religious youth are the most inspired, as nearly 80% are optimistic about fulfilling their goals. 71% of Haredi young people feel this way, but the number drops to 54% among traditional – and actually dips just below half among seculars. Precisely the same pattern is found among left, center and right-wing respondents. This trend is consistent with findings in 2010.




Yet again, on this question, Arabs expressed a greater level of optimism than in the past. They also display more diversity among age groups: 80% of Arab teenagers and 69% of young people felt they can achieve their personal goals – 74% in the aggregate. This can be compared to 60% in 1998, 50% in 2004 during the depressed years of the Intifada and October events; and a healthier 67% in 2010.

There are two potential and compelling explanations for the rise in optimism among Arabs that they will be able to fulfil their personal goals in Israel. The first is that the memory of the October 2000 events has faded somewhat for those who have just come of age. In the intervening years, there have been some collective improvements in the Arab community in Israel, including growing rates of higher education, especially among women.

The second major development is the massive deterioration of other Arab countries in the Middle East between the current and last survey in 2010. Arabs in Israel, no less than viewers around the world, have witnessed the deadly chaos of Syria, Iraq and know of the strict restrictions in other countries such as Saudi Arabia. They may be more aware than ever that in a material sense their lives are more stable in Israel.

**Figure 39: Optimistic about fulfilling goals in Israel, 1998-2016**



What are these goals that people hope to accomplish as individuals? In the past, a series of topics were listed and respondents were asked how important each specific goal was to them. In the current survey, the format was changed and participants were asked to rank them; further the answer “raise a family” was not asked, as it became

obvious that this is always ranked top priority for all in Israel's family-oriented society. In the past, this top answer regarding family generally competed with economic success, higher education and good friends for the top ratings of importance.

In the present 2016 survey, the patterns have not significantly changed. Without the "happy family" question, economic success, higher education and having good times have reached the top of the list. As in the past, obtaining higher education is nearly higher for Arabs than for Jews – it is the Arab youths' first priority (45% choose this, compared to 43% among Jews – within the margin of error). In fact, in previous years (and despite the different style of the question), there has been a larger gap showing higher importance of obtaining post-secondary education among Arabs relative to Jews. Still, education was second place for Jews, with "economic success" in the top position.

Among Arabs, economic success was ranked third-place – with "enjoying life" in second. These top three goals, however, received very close rankings.

Among Jews and Arabs alike, the other life goals, including volunteering for a good cause, giving to the Army (asked of Jews only) and living abroad are distant goals compared to the other ones mentioned. But the change in methodology makes it nearly impossible to compare them to past years.

### **3. Sense of Security: Falling**

Nearly one-third of Jewish youth feel a personal threat to their security, while about 64% did not feel any threat or just a small threat. Among those who did feel threatened, a much larger portion, over twice as many Jewish respondents, felt just a mild threat, than those who felt a serious threat.

The low number of Jews who feel threatened has risen somewhat since 2010 (when 24% of Jews felt threatened), probably since two more wars have been fought in Gaza since 2010, and the last two years have seen ongoing low level violence, mostly stabbings and vehicular attacks, which escalated in the fall of 2015. Correspondingly, the 64% who do not feel threatened fell from a high of three quarters (76%) in 2010, but does not go as low as 55.7% found in 2004, following bitter years of a violent Intifada starting from 2000.

At the same time, it is notable that about 36% of right-wing Jewish youth feel personally threatened, roughly double the portion of center or left-leaning young people. Another interesting finding that has remained consistent from 2010 is that among Jews, young women are far more likely to feel a sense of personal threat – in other words, experience fear – than young men: 41% to 23%, respectively. The gender distinction among Jews has no simple explanation; perhaps the high climate of fear based on attacks against civilians means young women fear physical violence – or perhaps anywhere in a big world of physical threats and violence, women face more fears than men. Yet it is notable that such a gap appears already among young people, and from the last two surveys, it appears to be consistent.


Overall, the young Arab respondents actually reported particularly low personal threat perceptions – with just seven percent who perceive a threat. This is lower than the roughly 11% of Arabs who felt threatened in 2010 and significantly lower than 36% from 2004 – again the shadow of the Intifada’s violence loomed large. While the numbers are small, in fact the opposite trend is found among Arabs – twice as many men feel personally threatened than women (nine percent, compared to about four percent).

#### **4. Trust in State Institutions**

Alongside the deep decline in optimism noted in the Jewish community, there is a harsh decline in the level of trust in the legal system. From a hearty three-quarters of young Jews who said they trusted the system in 1998, this figure has been on a nearly unbroken downward trend ever since. The decline paused only from 2004 to 2010, but it was stable – never climbing. At present just over half of Jews say they trust the courts. While teenagers show a stronger majority of 60%, among young people this figure too is at its lowest since 1998, with just 48% - a minority – stating trust in the legal system.

Yet both groups, and as a result, the average for Jews, show lower levels of trust than at any point since testing began in 1998 – significantly lower.

**Figure 40: Trust in legal system among Jews, 1998-2016**



One consistent finding is that right wing Israeli young people are significantly less likely to trust the court system than left wingers; the same pattern was observed in 2010. Thus at present just 47% of right-wing young people say they trust the court system, compared to nearly three-quarters of left-wingers (among the total sample). Again, very similar numbers appeared in 2010 based on religious levels.

A similar trust gap is seen among Jews based on religious identity: while among ultra-Orthodox, the number has not declined (about 1/3 trust the courts in 2016, almost the same as in 2010, the number of seculars who trust the court has declined from 81% (among secular adolescents in 2010) to just 63% (of all young secular respondents) in 2016.


Among Arabs the level of trust is lower still, with 39% of teenagers who trust the legal system, and 54% among young people – a 47% average of all young Arab respondents. This too is a significant decline from 2010, when nearly 70% of Arab youth trusted the courts – that number was similar in previous years. Among Arabs the decline is also notable as contrast with the high optimism noted at the start, and belies some of those positive findings.

One of the great constants among Jewish attitudes has been the **primacy of the IDF** – in every survey comparing trust in institutions, the IDF ranks number one by a large margin. This pattern is repeated in the 2016 survey as well, in which roughly 85% of Jews said they trust the IDF greatly, or somewhat. Yet this is slightly lower than the 91% average trust in the 2010 surveys.

Although the variation is minor – also relative to 90% in 1998 and 88% in 2004 – there are two indications of a genuine decline. First, the current total level of trust is the lowest of all four surveys. But more stark is the decline in intensity of trust. In the past, the large majority of Jewish respondents showed very high levels of “total trust” in the IDF: 63% in 1998, 58% in 2004, and 57% (statistically unchanged) in 2010. In each previous survey, the young people have shown a slightly lower level of total trust than teenagers.

However, in the current survey, this figure declines dramatically. Just 43% and 36% of young people and teenagers, respectively show total trust – all the remainder say they “trust” the IDF.

**Figure 41: "Complete trust" in the IDF among Jews, 1998-2016**




Arab trust in the IDF has always been significantly lower than for Jews, and logically so. A large portion of the Arab citizens of Israel were governed by the IDF, living under martial law for the first nearly-two decades of statehood. The older generation harbor negative collective memories, while the younger generation know the IDF primarily as an occupying army in the West Bank and Gaza.

The total level of trust among Arab youth at present is 38%. This is not a great departure from previous years. In 1998 Arab youth showed 54% trust – but this turns out to be the anomaly, perhaps a glimmer of the remaining hope from the Oslo years. 2004 saw the worst year for Arab attitudes towards the IDF, following four years of a very violent Intifada and the killing of 13 Arab citizens in 2000. The latter was perpetrated by police forces, but the bitter feeling surely spread broadly: fewer than one-quarter of Arabs expressed trust of any kind towards the IDF in 2004. In 2010, 41% of Arabs trusted the IDF. But here too, the levels of “total trust” have declined significantly from 2010 – resembling more closely the trends from the low point of 2004.

Similarly, levels of trust in the police itself have been erratic – from a high of 72% in 1998, the tail end of the Oslo years, to just 50% in 2004 following the October events. A rise in 2010 to 61% was not matched this year, when Arab trust in the police fell again to 46%.

This particular decline is not a surprise considering high levels of crime in the Arab community, and the widespread sense that the government does not invest in law enforcement in Arab areas. This issue came to the fore earlier in 2016 following an attack on civilians by an Arab citizen from the Triangle region, and the Prime Minister subsequently criticizing lawlessness in the community. But the problem is older and deeper. In 2014 Arab citizens were outraged over a police killing of an Arab demonstrator; in 2015 an internal police investigation against the officers decided against indicting them. These developments surely contributed to the decline in trust once again.

**Figure 42: Trust in police among Arabs, 1998-2016**



Regarding Israel's legislature, **the Knesset**, the numbers reflect cynicism about politics seen in the adult population as well – something that is not particularly unique to Israel. The findings in 2016 also land in between moderately better numbers in 1998, the worst levels in 2004 (only roughly one-quarter of both Arabs and Jews expressed trust in the Knesset) and a rise to the low 40s in 2010. In 2016 there has been a ten-point drop in trust for the Knesset, to 32% and 34% for Jews and Arabs, respectively.

In 2010, differences among teenagers and young people were prominent; in 2016, the gap was observed only among Jews: as in the past, younger respondents showed higher levels of trust in the Knesset (37% compared to 25% among young people). Among Arabs there was little significant difference between them. The lowering of trust as people enter the adult world most likely reflects the widespread disillusionment regarding state institutions as one comes into greater contact with them.

Why the drop in trust from 2010? Since that time, the Knesset has passed legislation that threaten democratic principles and target Arabs and left-wing attitudes. Since 2010 there has also been coalition instability leading to two further elections in quick succession, in 2013 and 2015, ongoing coalition bargaining, collapse, re-formation and rumours. Both a former President and a former Prime Minister have been sent to jail. While there is some consolation in knowing that the system is acting against those who transgress, the overriding feeling is jaded and angry towards the lawmakers.

In their assessment of **the media**, Jewish young people are notably skeptical – perhaps in a healthy way given the importance of critical thinking. In this case, 2010 appears to be the outlying year, when between 50-60% of young people (Jews and Arabs alike) expressed trust in the media overall (strong or moderate levels of trust).

At present 30% of the Jewish young people say they trust the media partly (only a very small portion of those say they completely trust the media). While this looks like a precipitous drop from 53% in 2010, in fact it is much closer to the 1998 and 2004 data – for both years just 36% and 37% said they trust the media.

What is notable from the last two surveys (2016 and 2010) is that the young people are significantly less trusting of the media than teenagers – by contrast to the first two surveys where both groups showed similar levels (1998 and 2004). It might be considered a normal and healthy development for growing teenagers to learn the importance of reading the media critically, and becoming more sceptical. However, more likely the lower trust among young people is part of the larger picture of general, significant lower trust in state institutions for reasons of cynicism, based on observation of such negative trends in public life. And the current level of 30% is still lower than at any other point. Interestingly, the data in 2016 for Arabs is not significantly different, in terms of low levels of trust for the media.

One incongruent finding relates to the religious institutions and the Rabbinate (for Jews). Here the figure is lower than ever as well, and reflects a major drop from 2010: from 60% trust to just 32%. Both the 1998 and 2004 surveys show 45% trust.

Among Arabs, in 2016 nearly half – 46% - say they trust the religious institutions. This too is a significant decline from previous years – from 71% in 1998 to 61% in 2004 and about 70% in 2010. The lower level may likely reflect growing levels of higher education in the Arab community, which may be correlated with greater scepticism of institutional religious authority (although this is speculation, and it is too speculative to tie education with changes in personal religious beliefs).

## **5. Social Relations in Israel**

Given the low levels of trust in state institutions and the worrying downward trend, it is valuable to consider what sort of state young people in Israel even want.

For Arabs, a high standard of living has often been considered extremely important (in the mid 80% range) and at present, it is even higher, with about 95% who say this is very or somewhat important.


Jews also rank this high, within the range of 80% to over 90% who say it is very or somewhat important. It is notable, that the Jews shows a significant drop in the percentage who say a “high standard of living” is very important (just 59% in 2016, down from roughly 70% in previous years); but not entirely clear why



When asked how important it is to have a state of full equality of political rights, Arabs responded very much as in previous years: that full equality is important or very important. The numbers are generally close to a consensus and over the years have ranged from the low 80s to a high of 95% this year.

However, the current survey shows a continuing decline in the portion of Jews who think full political equality is very important, from: 50%, to 56%, down to 42% and at present 35%.

**Figure 43: Full political equality "very important", 1998-2016**



The idea that Israel should be at peace with its neighbours is fading from Jewish consciousness as well. In 1998, fully 78% of Jews said this was “very” important. At present just 52% of Jews say so, reflecting a steady decline from year to year.

High support for gender equality is seen among both – but as in the past, is even higher for Arab young people: in all surveys since 1998, over three-quarters of Arab respondents have said this was “very important;” in the current survey this number rose to 87%.

The character of the state involves values, but also the nature of social relations. Israel has always been a highly divided society. These surveys show how perceptions about the divisions that are most threatening to social cohesion have changed or remained the same. In fact, throughout the years of the study, the Arab-Jewish divide has

always been perceived as the most threatening by the highest portion of respondents among both Arabs and Jews, since the question has been asked in 2004.


Among young Arab respondents, the sense of social schism was highest during the second Intifada – in 2004, fully two-thirds, 68%, said this was the most threatening divide. In 2010 the figure dropped somewhat to about 45%. However, the last few years have seen increasingly severe rhetoric against the Arab community in Israel, from far-right nationalist politicians. It is therefore notable that the portion of Arabs who cited this divide in 2016 was to 52% - a seven-point rise from 2010.

The other social divisions tested include Ashkenazi/Mizrahi, rich and poor, religious and secular and left or right. The findings have not significantly changed the ranking of these divisions – after the Arab-Jewish divide, the religious-secular divide is viewed as most threatening by the next-highest portion, although the actual number has fallen somewhat compared to previous years, and shows a similar portion as those who cite the division between rich and poor as the most threatening.

The Ashkenazi-Mizrahi social schism has received a certain extra measure of attention over the last two years as new generation of young Mizrahi activists have become increasingly vocal in the media and policy circles. During the time the survey was conducted, there was a highly publicized report advising the Minister of Education to include more Mizrahi heritage in Israeli education. Despite this, the young respondents appear fairly immune to such developments; this divide still ranks last and the numbers have not changed significantly from previous years: just over three percent view it as the most threatening divide.

In fact, among perception of social schisms there has only been one significant and important shift. In 2004, 17% of all young Jewish respondents thought the left-right divide was the most threatening. By 2016, this number has risen to 28% among Jews.

**Figure 44: Most endangering dispute among Jews, 2004-2016**




The change is an important indicator of a deep perceived polarization. Since Israel has always been an argumentative society, it is not always clear whether political polarization is worse than at any time in the past. But the fact that over one-quarter of young people view political divisions as the top social threat means either that the bitterness of these divides is worsening; or that political difference is increasingly seen as a danger to society. The latter is a worrying indicator of political intolerance.

Despite all this, the core tension of Israeli life is between Jews and Arabs. This is not only a matter of underlying feelings; there are policy implications. The youth studies have regularly tested whether young Israeli Jews were prepared to deny Arab citizens of civil rights, such as the right to be elected to Israel's parliament. In 2004, over half of Jewish respondents supported this position. In 2010, that the number declined to 46% and in the current survey fell again to 39% in the aggregate for Jews. Teenagers were slightly less likely to support this position (35%), compared to nearly 44% of young people (in 2010 there was hardly any difference between the two groups).

Yet there has been no change in the highly negative assumptions among Jewish young people that Arabs have not accepted the existence of Israel and wish to destroy it. In 2004 this portion reached two-thirds – in both 2010 and 2014, roughly 64% agreed. Just like in 2010, young people were significantly more likely to think the worst about Arabs – fully 72% believed they wish to destroy Israel, a very slight rise from 2010.

**Figure 45: Attitudes towards Arabs among Jews, 2004-2016**



Incidentally, a portion of Arabs agree with the statement that Arabs have not accepted the state and would destroy it – fully half of teenagers, but much fewer, just under one-quarter of young people. Since a high portion of teenagers also say they are not sure – 30% - and then starkly grow out of it (given the large drop among young people), the position seems to be bluster more than reality. Still it is troubling bluster. In 1998, about 34% of Arabs in total agreed with the statement and again 30% said they weren't sure; in fact this trend has hardly changed.

## **6. The Holocaust**

Since 2009, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has led the country with a heavy focus on existential threats; he has raised the theme of the Holocaust repeatedly. This was somewhat more marked during his term from 2009-2013, as part of his rhetoric linking the Iranian nuclear program to the Holocaust. In 2010, Jewish youth expressed the highest level of interest since the survey began in 1998 – over 80%, up from in the mid-60% range in earlier years. This could also be due to the accumulated impact of years of educational programming involving visits to Poland for high school students.

In the current survey, the number has decreased once again to precisely two-thirds of Jews who are very, or extremely interested in the Holocaust. But it remains a

consensus, with hardly any demographic variation or difference of interest based on political ideology – left, right and center, religious and secular alike, show the same high levels of interest. Further, their assessment of the quantity of attention has not changed – as in the past, over half say Israel deals with topic in just the right amount, while between 30% to 34% (in 2016) say Israel should address it more than it does. It is however interesting to note that as in the past, slightly more young women among Jews take interest compared to men – about 70% to 63%, respectively.

Among Arabs, 20% are interested (very or very much) in the topic, unchanged within the broad range of 7-30% found in previous years. About one-third believe that Israel deals with the topic too much, which is similar to the level in 1998. Again it is not surprising that 2004 was the year for bitter attitude among Arabs; at that time a high of over half – 53% - said Israel placed too much focus on the Holocaust. Here again there is an interesting gender distinction: more than double the number of young women say they take a “little” interest, compared to men (63% compared to 31%), and roughly half as many women as men say they take “no” interest (16% compared to 30%)<sup>5</sup>


It is also interesting to note that the belief that Germany is among the friendly nations to Israel has reached a high in 2016 among Jews: 64% say this is true or very true – relative to around the 40% mark in the first two surveys (1998 and 2004) and 60% in 2010. One potential reason is that over the intervening years from the last survey, other Western countries have become increasingly critical. Young people who are attuned to news may hear regular reports about criticism of Israel from western capitals, with German solidly supporting Israel in forums such as the UN.

Finally, just a small percentage believe Germany has not changed and could still see the rise of a Nazi regime: just 25% among Jews, the lowest since the question has been asked in 1998. There is another interesting development in this survey: In all previous years, nearly three-quarters of Jews agreed with the statement that most ordinary Germans supported the Holocaust. Only in the current 2016 study has this number fallen to 57%.

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<sup>5</sup> In 2016 the question was asked of only 23 Arab respondents.

**Figure 46: "The extermination of Jews was supported, in effect, by the majority of the German people and not only by the Nazi leadership" (% agree), 1998-2016**



## **Conclusion**

Trend over time are not totally consistent – in some ways, 2004 was still the most depressed year in attitudes among youth. If the same questionnaire was held among the adult population this may be the case for them too.

Certain specific data points have improved over time – threat perception is not as high as during those Intifada years, and on one measure of Jewish attitudes towards Arabs there is a declining portion who would deny civil rights of Arabs to be elected.

However, the 2016 survey stands out for the deep decline in optimism and trust in state institutions, particularly among the Jewish population. These findings reveal a sense that the state is stagnating, the institutions are either malfunctioning or worse – functioning according to unfair systems – and ultimately they point to alienation.

While the Jewish Arab divide in Israeli society is no less profound among youth – if not more – the religious-secular and partly overlapping ideological divide is prominent. It is the split between those major world views that underlies some of the more dramatic changes in the survey, such as optimism for the future of the state. Given that Israel has been governed by right-wing governments almost consistently since 2001, perhaps these findings reflect the more optimistic perspective of the group that knows it is poised to shape the future of the country, in their lifetime.