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THE CENTER FOR POLITICAL ECONOMICS

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Surveys on Trust and the Peace Process:

Israeli Report

May 2021

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Israeli Report

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Role of education, daily life experiences, and exposure to violence

ISRAELI REPORT

MAPPING SOURCES OF MUTUAL DISTRST IN PALESTINIAN-ISRELI RELATIONS:

Final Report

June 21 2021

The Research Framework – Palestinian-Israeli Research (Macro -

PSR): Comprehensive Survey

Short Introduction

Two studies were performed within the framework of the project of studying trust between Israelis and Palestinians. The first study was exploratory carried in August 2020 and the second a major study carried in November 2020. The report includes both studies based on the same hypotheses.

Research hypotheses –

Four major hypotheses were examined in the two studies:

1. Daily harsh life experience will have a major effect of diminishing trust towards the rival group.
2. Exposure to violence and conflict will have a major effect of diminishing trust towards the rival group.
3. Negative presentation of the rival group in the education system will have a major effect of diminishing trust toward the rival group.

4. The more trust one feels towards the rival group, the probability he will support the peace process increases.

STUDY 1[1]

Methods

Population

The sample of this survey constituted Israelis, 704 Jews and 205 Arabs, all citizens of Israel. Among the Jews were 176 between the age of 18 and 29 and 528 were at the age of 30 and above. In total, the participants in the survey were 431 (47.4%) males and 478 (52.6%) females.

Political and religious orientation[2]

With regard to the political orientation among Jews, about 65.2% saw themselves as holders of right political views, about 20.7% saw themselves as centrist and only 10.5% classified themselves as leftists.

With regard to the religious orientation among Jews, 36.5% defined themselves as secular, 26.1% as traditional, 23.7% defined themselves as religious, and 12.9% as ultraorthodox.

Questionnaire

[1] Study 1 was performed by cooperation between the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and The Evans Mediation and Conflict Management, School of Social and Policy Studies of Tel Aviv University. Macro-The Center for Political Economics was not involved in the planning of the study 1, construction of the questionnaire and carrying the field work. Macro used the relevant collected data for examining the hypotheses of the trust project.

[2]Political orientation in Israel on the left-right dimension in this study refers only to the position one has towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The left wing orientation expresses readiness to solve the conflict peacefully with the two-state solution, objects to occupation and Jewish settlement on the occupied territories and sees the Palestinian as partners to negotiate with. On the other hand, right wing opinions here represent: not seeing Palestinians as partners for negotiations, believing that they aim to destroy Israel, support Jewish settlement in the occupied territories and object to any withdrawal from the occupied territories.

In the study we used only 14 questions divided to different themes. Several questions assessed the extent of trust towards Palestinian people and its leadership, another group of questions measured experiences of violence and separately exposure to violence and conflict related incidences. As follows, we built different groups of questions, which when combined, helped us assess: perception of the effects of the education to the other side, influence of different sources on the view of the Palestinians and more. All the questions that were used in study 1 appear in Appendix A

On the basis of the used questionnaire we constructed set of variables that appear in Appendix B

Procedure

The study was carried in August 2020.

Results

Means

Israeli Jews reveal very low level of trust towards the Palestinian. It is possible to say that trust does not exit. Many of them (34%) explain the lack of trust with the attribution that the Palestinian educational system incites against Israel and Jews; 25% say that they cannot trust Palestinian leadership: 15% attribute their lack of trust to the Palestinian religion and culture and 10% do not trust Palestinians because of their political goals.

The support for two state solutions is on the mid-level –not much of support and not much of opposing. Israeli Jews do not have a positive expectations regarding Palestinian preferences: 36.2% of them believe that the Palestinians prefer violent struggle against the occupation, 8.8% prefer nonviolent struggle, 25.3% prefer to reach peace agreement and 13.3% prefer the status quo. Also Israeli Jews almost did not experience direct violence –either never or once. But they reported an exposure to the violence of the Palestinians (Palestinians taking action against Israel in international forums or Palestinians taking action against Israel in international forums). Israeli Jews (56.2%) stated that they believe that the Israeli schools present Palestinians indifferent but in contrast believe (82.1%) that Palestinians school present Israelis with negative stereotypes. Finally, Israeli Jews worry about being harmed by Palestinians as well as that Israel may lose its

Jewish nature. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables. A deeper examination of the data indicates that the younger Israeli Jews supported less peace process with the Palestinians. They also less believe that Palestinians will accept the existence of the Israeli state. Younger Israeli Jews had also more exposure to the Palestinian violence related to conflict than older Israeli Jews. They also believe that the Israeli educational system presents Palestinians in a more positive way than the older Israeli Jews. Finally, younger Israeli Jews worry more than older Israeli Jews about being harmed by Palestinians and about losing Jewish character of the state.

Table 1: Means and Standard Deviation of the Variables (Jews)

Variable	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Support for Peace	**2.86**
	(0.84)
Trust for Palestinians	**3.76**
	(0.87)
Experience of Violence	**2.70**
	(0.92)
Exposure to Violence	**2.48**
	(1.08)
Education- Israeli Schools	**1.91**
	(0.55)
Education- Palestinian Schools	**2.89**
	(0.38)
Fear of Harm by Palestinians	**2.44**
	(0.89)
Fear of losing Jewish Identity	**2.58**

	(1.04)
Promoting Trust/ Distrust	**2.07**
	(0.32)

Correlations

In order to substantiate the proposed hypotheses regarding the relationships between the investigated variables we used calculations of correlations (see Table 2).

Table 2 shows that trust and support for peace are highly related. Meaning that the more trust exists among Israeli Jews, the more they support the peace process (r=.63). All the other correlations are either of very low magnitude or non-significant. The significant correlations explain at best only about 4% of the effect.

Table 2: Correlation Between Variables (Study 1- Jews)

	Support for peace	Trust	Experience of violence and conflict	Exposure to Palestinian Violence	Education in Israeli Schools	Education in Palestinian Schools	Fear of Harm by Palestinians	fear of Loosing Jewish Identity	Promoting Trust / Distrust
Support for peace	*	-0.63* (N=535)	0.1*	0.17*	0.015*	non-sig	0.15*	non-sig	-0.12* (N=491)
Trust		*	non-sig	-0.15*	-0.12*	non-sig	-0.21*	non-sig	non-sig
Experience of Violence and Conflict			*	0.15*	non-sig	non-sig	non-sig	non-sig	non-sig
Exposure to Palestinian Violence				*	non-sig	non-sig	0.18*	0.16*	non-sig
Education in Israeli Schools					*	0.22*	0.1*	0.1*	0.1*
Education in Palestinian Schools						*	non-sig	non-sig	non-sig
Fear of Harm by Palestinians							*	0.5*	non-sig
Fear of Loosing Jewish Identity								*	non-sig
Promoting Trust/Distrust									*

STUDY 2

Methods

Population

The sample of this survey constituted 879 Israelis, 748 Jews and 131 Arabs, all citizens of Israel. In addition, the sample was increased with 317 young respondents who were 18-29 years old: 271 young Jews and 46 Israeli Arabs. In the report we segmented respondents by combining young

respondents (18-29 years old) of the large-scale sample with the respondents from the younger sample. Thus, the survey included 455 young Jews, 79 young Israeli Arabs, 561 older Jews and 102 older Israeli Arabs. In total, the participants in the survey were 46.2 % males and 53.8 % females.

Political orientation[3]

The political orientation differed between Jews and Israeli Arabs (See Diagram 1). Among Jews, about 56% saw themselves as holders of right political views, about 30% saw themselves as centrist and only 13% classified themselves as leftists. Younger Jewish respondent's political orientation had a higher prevalence of rightist opinions (about 66% saw themselves as rightists) while only 8% supported leftist political views. Among Israeli Arabs, 61% defined themselves with as holders of leftist opinions and only 30% as holders of centrist views. Younger Israeli Arabs had a lower percentage of support to left wing opinions and prevailed commonness of center-oriented opinions, more common compared to the older Israeli Arabs.

Diagram 1: Political Affiliation of the Respondents by the Groups



[3]Political orientation in Israel on the left-right dimension in this study refers only to the position one has towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The left wing orientation expresses readiness to solve the conflict peacefully with the two-state solution, objects to occupation and Jewish settlement on the occupied territories and sees the Palestinian as partners to negotiate with. On the other hand, right wing opinions here represent: not seeing Palestinians as partners for negotiations, believing that they aim to destroy Israel, support Jewish settlement in the occupied territories and object to any withdrawal from the occupied territories.

Religion

In the Jewish sample, 43.4% categorized themselves as secular, 33.5% as traditional, 13% as religious and 10.2% as ultraorthodox (Haredi). Among Younger Jewish respondents, there is a higher prevalence of ultraorthodox Jews (17.1%) and religious Jews (15.6%), in comparison to the older generation, which is comprised of only 8.9% ultraorthodox Jews and 12.1% religious Jews (See Diagram 2). We found a similarity when we asked about the importance of religion and both age groups yielded similar responses: 64.12% of the older Jewish respondents answered that religion is "very important" or "important" in their eyes, and only 33.75% claimed that it is either "not important" or "not important at all". Similarly, among the Younger Jewish respondents 63.7% answered that the religion is "very important" or "important" for them and 32.5% claimed that it is either "not important" or "not important at all"

Diagram 2: Religious Affiliation by a Group (Jews only)



Among the Israeli Arabs, 64% identified themselves as Muslims, 18.3% as Christians, 15.35% as Druze and 1.55% as other. This identification corresponds with the two generations of the Israeli Arabs living here. We found that Israeli Arabs have a larger percentage of people which religion is of great importance for them, as 76.57% of the older Israeli Arabs said that religion is "very important" or "important" in their opinion, and only 20.61% answered that it is either "not

important" or "not important at all". Among the younger Israeli Arabs 68.3% claimed that religion is "very important" or "important" in their opinion and only 19% answered that it is either "not important" or "not important at all".

Questionnaire

Before describing the questionnaire, it is important to note that the Israeli and Palestinian experiences of life differ considerably because of completely different context they live in. While Israelis live freely in a state that has an army, governmental institutions, work opportunities and much more, Palestinians live under Israeli occupation since 1967. This situation has daily implications for both sides' lives and affects greatly the differing experiences, views and exposures to violence of each side. Therefore, the questionnaire used in the Palestinian area has different emphases in a comparison to the questionnaire used in Israel. But even using the same questionnaire for Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs (citizens of Israel) is problematic because of different experiences in the state of Israel that is defined as Jewish State and because of the fact that many of the Israeli Arabs consider themselves as Israeli Palesntians.

The used questionnaire is comprised of 44 questions divided to different themes. Several questions assessed the extent of trust towards Palestinian people and its leadership, another group of questions measured experiences of violence and separately exposure to violence and conflict related incidences. As follows, we built different groups of questions, which when combined, helped us assess: perception of the effects of the education to the other side, influence of different sources on the view of the Palestinians and more.

In addition, we constructed a series of scales that measured the psychological perception that respondents hold towards the conflict and especially towards Palestinians. To build these scales we measured the following variables: respondents views about anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, ethos of conflict[4], stereotypic perception and delegitimization[5] of the Palestinians,

[4] *Ethos of conflict* is defined as the configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society at present and for the future in the contexts of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007, 2013). It is composed of eight major themes about issues related to the conflict, the in-group, and its adversary

[5] Delegitimization is defined as *"categorization of a group, or groups, into extremely negative social categories that exclude it, or them, from the sphere of human groups that act within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values,*

readiness to come in contact with a Palestinian, negative and positive emotions towards Palestinians, beliefs about stability of groups' characteristics and openness to hear information by Palestinians.

Furthermore, there were single questions that referred to various issues of the conflict: Concerns about the Israeli Palestinian conflict, effects of the normalization agreement with the Arab Gulf's States on the peace agreement with the Palestinians, the assurance of Israel's existence, worrying about being harmed by Palestinians, worrying about the future of the Jewish character in the state of Israel, the nature of the state of Israel, support of the two-state solution scheme and about the extent of general hope. Then, respondents were asked about their aspirations regarding both Israelis and the Palestinians with regard to the aspired solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, the questionnaire included questions that pertain to the socio demographic variables: Political orientation (5-point scale from left to right) gender, age, religion and the level of religiosity. The full questionnaire is presented in Appendix C.

Procedure

The study was carried in November 2020

Analyses

The analyses of the collected data had six different phases:

The detailed description of the analyses' phases is presented in Appendix D

Main Findings of the Survey Study 2

The first three hypotheses refer to the antecedents of distrust and the fourth portraits the role of trust between the sides regarding the peace process. The findings of our research mildly support hypotheses 1-3, but provided very strong support of hypothesis 4.

The results of the analyses of the entire Jewish sample, including both older and Younger Jewish respondents, showed unequivocally that socio-psychological variables that represent the

since these groups are viewed as violating basic human norms or values and therefore deserve maltreatment" (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012, p. 30).

psychological repertoire of the participants, determine to a large extent the distrust that they feel. The most important determinant of distrust is the negative stereotypes that Jews believe regarding Palestinians. Among those, thinking that they are violent and hostile is the leading parameter to build the feeling of distrust towards them. The second most influencing variable is the extent of being opened minded to information from the other side of the conflict. Closed minded individuals who were not ready to open their mind, accept and exchange information from the Palestinian, tend to be more distrustful. The third variable we found to prompt distrust is delegitimization. It is reflected by respondents denying humanity from Palestinians, viewing them as an excluded group from the sphere of human society. Among the older Jewish population, the third determinant of distrust appeared to be political orientation. Meaning that when one's opinion is within the right wing orientation, his/her distrust increases. Among the entire Jewish population, it seems that only after one's political orientation, comes the influence of the variable of exposure to violence and conflict, indicating that the more an individual was exposed to violence and conflict incidences, the less trust he shall hold towards the other side.

The analyses of Israeli Arabs' respondents reveal a different tale. Examining the entire sample indicates that the most important predictor of distrust is the influence of the Palestinian media, meaning that the more the Palestinian media fosters trust, the respondents feel of trust in Palestinians increases. In addition, there are the following predictors: views about Holocaust and Anti-Semitism, stereotyping of the Palestinians, political orientation, openness, negative presentation of Palestinians by Israeli teachers in Israeli schools and importance of religion.

Our most unequivocal finding shows that trust is the most important predictor of support in the peace process among both main groups in the sample, Jews and Israeli Arabs as well. Afterwards, we found additional socio-psychological variables such as ethos and stereotyping, which indicated that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative stereotypes he holds regarding Palestinians, the more he/she supports the peace process.

Another interesting and important finding regarding the Jewish sample was found while comparing the older and younger respondents, revealing that in all the indices of the socio-psychological repertoire, younger Israeli Jews are more commonly to hold right wing political views compared to older Israeli Jews.

Results

In order to execute the analyses, we constructed the different variables of the study, the process of their construction can be seen under Appendix E. We used a 5-point scale with items that were of interval type. In some cases, variables were nominal and did not enable a construction of such scale. Following, we can see the results shown with the different variables:

Phases 1, 2 and 3: Construction of the Variables, Calculation of Means and Standard Deviations and Calculations of the Differences among the Groups

Trust towards Palestinians

The results indicate a relative low level of trust towards Palestinians expressed within the Jewish sample. On a scale of 1-5 the mean Jewish respondent's answers is 2.25 points. On the other hand, Israeli Arabs rated their trust levels higher, and their mean answer stood on 3.25 points. Diagram 3 shows the means described above graphically.

Diagram 3: Mean Answers of Trust levels for All Groups



Comparison between the groups, shows that in general, Arabs feel higher levels of trust towards Palestinians compared to Jews. In addition, older Jewish respondents feel higher levels of trust towards Palestinians, compared to younger Jewish respondents.

In order to understand respondent's thoughts behind these answers, the questionnaire included the following nominal question: **If you think Palestinians are not trustworthy, why? Because …. [Select the most important factor]**

The results of the Jewish sample are shown below in Diagram 4. Most of the Jewish respondents (34.1%) attributed their lack of trust to the "Palestinian education system, which incites against Jews". About %24 do not trust Palestinians because of "their leaders who cannot be trusted". The older Jewish respondents did not differ by much in their answers, compared to the entire sample. The younger respondents attributed a higher importance to the following reason, for their lack of trust: the political aims of the Palestinians in the conflict (20%). (See Diagram 4 and 5). Israeli Arabs attributed their lack of trust mostly to other/ unknown reasons and also to lack of trust in Palestinian leaders (See Diagram 6 and 7).

Diagram 4: Reasons for Mistrust Towards Palestinians among Jewish Respondents



Diagram 5: Reasons for Mistrust Towards Palestinians among Younger Jewish respondents



Diagram 6: Reasons for Mistrust Towards Palestinians among Older Arab Respondents



Diagram 7: Reasons for Mistrust Towards Palestinians among Younger Arab Respondents



Experience of violence

This variable included various items that referred to different kinds of direct personal experiences of violence. The results indicate that Jewish respondents reported low levels of experiencing violence, so that the mean answer was between 2.12 (older segment) and 2.15 (younger segment) on a scale of 1-5, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Experience of Violence (Jews)

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	2.12 (0.91)
Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)	2.15 (0.87)

Exposure to violence and to the conflict

This variable is assembled by items that indicated indirect encounter with Palestinian violence, either by seeing or hearing.
The variable exposure to violence- through hearing or seeing it on media, shows a relative high level of exposure among Jewish respondents: above 3.5 points out of 5, that is without meaningful differences between older and younger Jewish responses. Among the Arab respondents, the exposure is at lower level, about 2.5 point (see Table 4).

Table 4: Exposure to Violence

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	3.78 (0.83)
Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)	3.76

	(0.87)
Older Arab respondents (N=102)	2.70
	(0.92)
Younger Arab respondents (N=79)	2.48
	(1.08)

Perception of the effects of education on the views held by the other side

As expected, Jews and Israeli Arabs differ regarding their evaluation on how Israeli teachers present Palestinians. Jews believe that Israeli teachers present Palestinians in a more positive manner compared to Israeli Arabs (see Diagram 8). Specifically, Israeli Jews tend to think that Israeli teachers present the Palestinians neither negatively nor positively. And also not surprisingly, Israeli Arab respondents tend to think that Israeli teachers portray Palestinians in a more negative manner.

Diagram 8: In your view, how do Israeli Teachers Portray the Palestinians?[6]



[6] On a scale of 1-5. 1 being negatively and 5 positively.

Table 5 shows that Israeli Jews tend to believe that schools in Israel present Palestinians mostly indifferently, with a slight lean towards a negative presentation. Israeli Arabs, in contrast, believe that the presentation is more likely to be accompanied with negative stereotypes and labels. Interestingly, we found that young Jewish and Arab respondents believe that Palestinians are presented more negatively, compared to responses by the older respondents.

Table 5: Views on Palestinian Representation in Israeli schools[7]

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	3.22 (1.6)
Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)	3.43 (1.4)
Older Arab respondents (N=102)	3.66 (1.8)
Younger Arab respondents (N=79)	3.77 (1.8)

Israeli Jews believe that the Palestinian educational system presents Israeli Jews negatively (between very negatively and negatively). Israeli Arabs believe that the Palestinian educational system presents Israelis somewhat less negatively (between little negatively and neither negatively nor positively). Table 6 presents the means and standard deviations.

Table 6: Views on Israeli Representation in Palestinian Education

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)

[7] On a scale of 1-5. 1 being negatively with stereotypical labels, 5 being positively as fellow human beings.

Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	1.52 (0.7)
Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)	1.57 (0.81)
Older Arab respondents (N=102)	2.29 (0.93)
Younger Arab respondents (N=79)	2.53 (0.99)

Influence of various sources on the views of the Palestinians

In general, respondents rated the different sources presented to them as having little influence on their views. The media was rated as the most influential source on respondents' views, and then were political leaders (aggregated views of the entire sample). Younger Jewish respondents seem to evaluate also friends and family as the very influential source on their views, compared to the rest of the sample (See Table 7).

Table 7: Sources of Influence on Respondents' Views of Palestinians (means and standard deviation)[8]

	Social Environment	Education	Media	Political leaders	Religious leaders	Israeli Leadership
Older Jews	2.32 (1.11)	2.05 (1.01)	3.11 (1.15)	2.81 (1.26)	2.25 (1.35)	2.44 (1.05)

[8] On a scale of 1-5. 1 representing low levels of reported influence, 5 representing high levels.

Younger Jewish respondents	2.79 (1.20)	2.21 (1.10)	3.24 (1.23)	2.83 (1.36)	2.46 (1.42)	2.55 (1.08)
Older Arabs	2.47 (1.21)	2.21 (1.07)	2.93 (1.25)	2.73 (1.37)	2.35 (1.33)	2.19 (1.28)
Younger Arab respondents	2.43 (1.27)	2.39 (1.24)	2.96 (1.26)	2.63 (1.31)	2.42 (1.38)	1.99 (1.13)

The following eight items helped us asses influences on trust held among the four groups (older and younger Israeli Jews and older and younger Israeli Arabs). Respondents from the entire sample indicated that all of them had a small contribution to diminishing trust towards Palestinians. The means presented below in Table 8 indicate that the influence of these sources range from 2 (somewhat diminishing trust) to a maximum around 3 (neither diminish nor foster). The table and analyses show that while Jewish respondents think that various Palestinian related sources contribute more to diminish trust than Israeli Arabs, Israeli Arabs think that the Israeli sources contribute more to diminish trust compared to Palestinian sources.

Table 8: Sources of Influence on Trust between Israelis and Palestinians (means and standard deviations)[9]

	Palestinian Leadership	Israeli Media	Palestinian Media	Israeli Curricula	Palestinian Curricula	Israeli Social media	Palestinian Social media
Older Jews	1.80 (0.96)	2.63 (0.99)	1.79 (1.04)	2.97 (0.87)	1.69 (1.00)	2.62 (0.95)	1.87 (1.03)

[9] On a scale of 1-5. 1- greatly diminish trust to 5- greatly foster trust.

Young Jews	1.88 (1.08)	2.49 (1.07)	1.85 (1.07)	2.84 (0.91)	1.39 (1.08)	2.51 (1.06)	1.85 (1.05)
Older Arabs	2.31 (1.23)	2.48 (1.16)	2.36 (1.20)	2.47 (1.27)	2.38 (1.25)	2.37 (1.27)	2.38 (1.25)
Young Arabs	2.43 (1.27)	2.38 (1.21)	2.43 (1.30)	2.30 (1.24)	2.43 (1.26)	2.27 (1.27)	2.34 (1.28)

Psychological variables

A set of psychological variables which pertains to the world view related to the conflict were also built on the basis of the questionnaire. Each variable consisted of different items, and structured separately, as follows:

There were two items which assessed **views about feelings regarding anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.** Both items were evaluated highly by Jewish respondents. On the 5-point scale the mean was 4.28 for the older Jewish respondents and 4.26 for the younger respondents. Israeli Arabs, in contrast, evaluated these two items lower, around 3 (neither small nor large extent), specifically the mean of older Israeli Arabs is 3.11 and for the younger respondents was 3. There were no meaningful differences between older and younger generations in both national groups.

Four items assessed **ethos of conflict.** The results showed that in general, Jews accept the premises of the ethos of conflict, on a 5-point scale the mean is 2.58 (2 indicates "agree" and 3 indicates "neither disagree nor agree"). Younger Jewish respondents adheres even more to the ethos of conflict compared to older Jewish respondents (the means were 2.47 for younger Jewish respondents and 2.62 older respondents). The mean of Israeli Arab population resulted at 3.46.

Two items measured the **stereotypic perception** of Palestinians. The results revealed that in general, **Jews have a negative view of the Palestinians.** They rejected the perception that Palestinians are peaceful and non-violent. The general mean of Jewish responses was 2.16 (2 indicates "not true", regarding the positive perceptions above). The younger and older Jewish respondents differ: **The younger Jewish respondents hold a somewhat more negative**

stereotypes regarding Palestinians (Mean answers were 2.10 and 2.22 respectively). **Israeli Arab respondents view Palestinians more positively** (mean 3.4), which means that their perception is between 3 (neither true nor true) and 4 (somewhat true). Older and younger Israeli Arabs groups provided similar mean results, 3.41 and 3.44 respectively.

Measuring of **delegitimization** has shown that **Jews tend to delegitimize Palestinians** (do not conceive them fully as human). Using a scale between 0 and 100 (0 indicating completely delegitimizing view) the mean score of conceiving them human was 49.81. In contrast, the mean of Israeli Arab's responses was 74.19. Furthermore, **younger Jewish respondents tend to delegitimize Palestinians even more, compared to older respondents** (their mean scores were 46.13 and 51.06 respectively).

The variable **Social distance** was assessed with one item and measured an individual's readiness to have a Palestinian friend or acquaintance. The mean score of the entire sample was 3.45, meaning that their feelings are between 3 - "neither want nor do not want" and 4 – "do not really want"). **Younger Jewish respondents were found slightly less interested in a contact with a Palestinian, compared to older respondents** (their mean scores were 3.64 and 3.39 respectively). Israeli Arab respondents scores were in the between 2 and 3, which indicates they feel between "somewhat want" and "neither want nor do not want".

Another relevant item to this variable that was measured is **dichotomous**, by asking respondents: "Have you ever had a Palestinian friend or personal acquaintance now or in the past", with only two responses available, yes or no. Diagram 9 below, shows the differences among Israeli Arabs: we found that there are older Israeli Arabs that reported that they have a Palestinian friend or personal acquaintance, compared to younger Israeli Arabs. Among Jewish respondents, **we did not find a significant difference between older and younger respondents,** only about 20% report having a Palestinian friend or personal acquaintance.

Diagram 9: Close Relationships of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians





Measuring negative emotions towards Palestinians revealed that Jewish respondents hold neutral feelings with a mean score of 3 on a 5-point scale, indicating that they feel negative emotions to a "neither small nor large extent". In particular, younger Jewish respondents have expressed somewhat stronger negative emotions compared to older respondents, 3.35 and 2.96 respectively. Unlike the above, Israeli Arabs responses revealed that they barely feel negative emotions toward Palestinians, with a mean answer of 1.8.

When we measured **positive emotions** towards Palestinians, results show that **Jewish respondents feel such emotions only to a small extent**, with a mean answer of 2.4 on a 5-point scale. In accordance with the last variable presented, **Younger Jewish respondents feel positive emotions to a lower extent compared with older respondents** (2.20 and 2.48 respectively). **Surprisingly**, Israeli Arab respondents revealed a neutral extent of feeling positive emotions towards Palestinians**,** with a mean answer of 2.91.

Assessing the variable **malleability** has taught us that **to some extent, Jews tend to hold the belief that groups have a fixed nature of characteristics and cannot change.** On a scale from 1 to 5 ("certainly disagree' and "certainly agree" respectively with the belief indicating that groups have a fixed nature of characteristics) the mean answer was 3.34, no significant differences were found between older and younger Jewish responses. Israeli Arab respondents differ also in this variable, in comparison to the Jewish sample, with a mean rating of 2.69.

The assessment of the variable **openness** has shown that **Jews can be considered close minded rather than opened minded**. They express lack of readiness to get information from a Palestinian. The mean of their responses on a 5 points scale resulted at 2.98. (from 1 indicating "to no extent" and 5, "to a large extent"). similarly, to the distribution found with other variables, Younger Israeli Jewish respondents were found to be less open minded compared to older respondents (with the mean scores of 2.80 and 3.04 respectively). Israeli Arabs responses have shown that in general, they tend to have a more opened mind, with a mean score of 3.30 in this particular case.

The following part of the questionnaire included a few variables that were measured via one item only.

Concerns rising due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were measured by asking "Are you concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?". Below, we can examine Table 9 which indicates that **neither Jewish nor Arab Israelis are very concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict**. The mean scores of the entire sample were 3.18**,** indicating that their concern is neither small nor large. In other words**, both populations do not deny its existence, but it does not preoccupy their thoughts too much.** We also found that there are no significant differences in levels of concern between the age groups, for both Jewish and Arab groups of the sample.

Table 9: Concern over the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	3.21 (1.03)
Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)	3.24 (1.15)
Older Arab respondents (N=102)	3.18 (1.43)
Younger Arab respondents (N=79)	3.11 (0.39)

Measuring the **effect of recent peace agreement with the Arab Gulf States**, has revealed that **Jews and Israeli Arabs** agree that the "Abraham Agreement", with both Bahrain and the Emirates, did not contribute significantly to the efforts of reaching an agreement with the Palestinians. The mean scores of each section of the sample were all below 3 on the 5-point scale, indicating that all Israelis felt it had little contribution for the peace efforts, with the Jewish group rating its contribution at 2.80 and the Arab group at 2.71 ("neither to a small nor large extent").

Jewish and Arab Israelis' answers differed considerably when asked if they agree with the following statement: "**only a powerful Israeli military can assure the existence of Israel**." While the Jewish group mainly agreed with the above, the Arab respondents opposed it. On a 5-point scale (1 and 5 indicating "certainly disagree' and "certainly agree", respectively) the mean rating by Israeli Jews was 4.23 and 2.86 by Israeli Arabs. There is also a small variance between the ratings given by different generations, as the mean rating by older Israeli Jewish respondents was 4.27 compared to 4.11 rated by the younger respondents. As for the Israeli Arab group, older respondents mean rating was 2.85, while the younger respondents felt even less sympathetic to the statement and their mean rating was 2.65.
Reportedly, Israeli Jews feel **worried about being harmed by the Palestinians**, to some extent. Measured on a scale of 5 points, from 1, indicating "never worried" to 5, indicating "very much worried", Younger Jewish respondents worry more than the older respondents as mean ratings resulted at 3.70 and 3.17 respectively. On the other hand, Israeli Arabs expressed lower levels of concern as their mean score was 1.95.

Not surprisingly, Israeli Jews worry considerably more compared to Israeli Arabs regarding the future of the <u>Jewish character of Israel.</u> Measured on a scale of 5 points, from 1, indicating "never worried" to 5 indicating "very much worried", Jewish and Arab respondents mean rating differed by 1.37 points, as the mean rating were 4.23 and 2.86 respectively. Furthermore, older respondents worry more compared to younger respondents, as the Israeli Jewish groups differed at 4.27 and 4.11, respectively, and the Israeli Arab groups differed at 2.85 and 2.64, respectively.

Surprisingly, Jewish and Arab respondents both agree with the statement: "Israel will have to choose between Apartheid state or losing its Jewish nature, if it will not choose the solution of two states to two nations". Both groups disagree with it, meaning that Israel will not have to choose

between Apartheid state or losing its Jewish nature by ruling out the two states solution**.** All different segments rated their level of agreement below 3 (neither disagree nor agree), as shown below in Table 10.

Table 10: Respondents' Thoughts on Israel's Character (Apartheid or Jewish) Regarding the "Two-State Solution"

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	2.50 (1.33)
Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)	2.33 (1.23)
Older Arab respondents (N=102)	2.59 (1.26)
Younger Arab respondents (N=79)	2.39 (1.28)

Table 11 shows that Israeli Jews tend to hold a neutral view, with regard to the notion of **supporting the two state solution**, while Israeli Arabs have presented higher levels of supporting this solution, 2.6 and 3.77 respectively (there was a 5-point scale ranging from 1 "strongly oppose" to 5 "strongly support"). Additionally, younger Israeli Jewish respondents expressed stronger opposition compared to older respondents, as their mean rating were 2.26 and 2.85, respectively. As for the Israeli Arab groups, the different generations have shown a smaller difference, as their mean ratings resulted at 3.87 by older respondents and 3.58 by the younger ones.

Table 11: Respondents' Position on the "Two-State Solution"

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	2.85 (1.34)
Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)	2.26 (1.22)
Older Arab respondents (N=102)	3.87 (1.19)
Younger Arab respondents (N=79)	3.58 (1.33)

The variable Hope was measured with the question: "When you think about your life as an Israeli, how many times do you feel that you lose hope for the better future?" On a 5-point scale ranging from 1 indicating "never", through 3 indicating "sometimes" and 5 indicating "always", the mean rating of the entire sample was 2.87. As shown in Table 10, it seems Israeli Arabs are less hopeful regarding their future here, in comparison to Jewish respondents, as their mean ratings were 3.34 and 2.91, respectively. We also see that there is no significant difference between the generations.

Table 12: Frequency of "Loss of Hope" for a Better Future

Population	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Older Jewish respondents (N=563)	2.83 (1.08)
Younger Jews (N=455)	2.91 (1.10)
Older Arab respondents (N=102)	3.43 (1.27)

Younger Arab respondents (N=79)	3.35 (1.27)

Trust in **Israeli media** reporting about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was assessed with one item, asking: "To what extent do you trust information presented by the Israeli media regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?" The responses were given on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 to 5 indicating "none" and "to a large extent", respectively. The mean ratings by all different segments of the sample were surprisingly similar, near 2.84 (neither small nor large extent), indicating that Israelis, both Jews and Arabs, do not see the Israeli media as very trustworthy with covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Diagram 10 shows the distribution of responses from all four groups, **about perceived aspirations of the Palestinians**. Older Israeli Jewish respondents attributed to the Palestinian Authorities moderate aspirations compared to younger Israeli Jewish respondents: about 28% % of the former believe that the Palestinians aspire either to "regain some of the territories conquered in the 1967 war", or" regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war", but only 16% think so among the younger Jewish respondents. About one third in both groups attribute either "conquest of the State of Israel and regain control over the pre 1948 Palestine" or "conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel". Israeli Arabs differ in their attributions. Many of them did not respond to this question, especially among the younger Israeli Arabs. Among the older Israeli Arabs 34.3% thought that the Palestinian authority aspires "to regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war".

Diagram 10: Respondents' Attributions on the PA's goals



The second question was: "Out of the following four possibilities which one do you think is **preferred mostly by the majority of Palestinians**?"

Diagram 11 shows similar views of the older and younger Israeli Jewish respondents. Over 40% of them think that the majority of Palestinians prefer "waging an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation". Only 21.1% of the older Jewish respondents and 12.5% of the Younger Jewish respondents believe that they prefer "to reach a peace agreement with Israel". In contrast, among Israeli Arabs, 52.94% believe that they prefer "to reach a peace agreement with Israel" and among the younger generation only 30.4% believe so. Less than 12% of the entire Arab sample believe that Palestinians prefer "waging an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation".

Diagram 11: Respondents' Attributions to Palestinians' Preferred Course of Action with Israel



Two additional questions examine the **aspirations of Israelis.** The first one was: **"**And what do you think is the long run **aspiration of Israel**?"

Diagram 12 indicates that older Israeli Jewish respondents attribute a clear aspiration, namely 28.4% attribute at least "withdrawal from part of the territories it occupied after guaranteeing its security". With that said, about 40% of the younger Jewish respondents choose a very militant aspiration- either "annexation of the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinian citizens" or "extending the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expelling its Arab citizens". Most of the Israeli Arabs claimed that they do not know what the aspiration of Israelis is. While a smaller group, 27.8% of the younger generation and 23.5% of the older generation, believe that Israelis aspire to "extend the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens".

Diagram 12: Respondents' Attribution to Israel' Preferred Course of Action



The second question was directly personal: **"**Which of the following four possibilities is the most **preferred to you,** about what should be done now, regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations:

Diagram 13 exhibits the four choices and reveals a clear difference between older and younger Israeli Jewish respondents. While 42.63**%** of the older respondents prefer to "reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians", the younger respondents hold a different opinion: 23.3% prefer to maintain the status quo; 20.88% to "wage a definitive war against the Palestinians in which Israel destroys their military capabilities", 18.68% to "reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians" and 14.07% prefer to "annex the territories or parts of the territories". In contrast to the above, about 50% of the entire Israeli Arab sample preferred to "reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians"

Diagram 13: Respondents' Preferred Course of Action by Israel Regarding the conflict

Phase 4: Relationships between the Variables

As the next step of the analyses we found it necessary to reveal relationships between the different variables selected for this study, and so four sets of correlations were calculated. The first set of correlations examined relationship within the six groups between the variable "trust towards Palestinians" and various variables presented in Table 13-(See Appendix F). Looking at the specific results of the carried correlations we found the following. Examining the variables "trust" and "experience of violence" yielded significant correlation, only in the younger Jewish an older Arab groups, (0.14) and (0.32) respectively, indicating that the more they experience violence, they feel less trust towards Palestinians. Examining "trust" and "exposure to violence" revealed that only among the young Israeli Jews (0.27) and older Jewish respondents (0.24) a significant correlation was found, indicating that the more they experienced exposure to violence, the less trust they felt toward Palestinians.

When examining education, we found a correlation between "trust" and "the view of how the Palestinian educational system presents Israelis", among younger and older Israeli Jews and Arabs in general. It indicated that the more respondents believed that the Palestinian educational system presents Israelis negatively, the less trust they felt.

Furthermore, a correlation was found between "trust" and "Israeli leadership" among all 6 groups (Israeli Jews, older Israeli Jews, younger Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, older Israeli Arabs and younger Israeli Arabs). This meant that the more the Israeli diminish the trust, the less the respondents feel trust. Trust and "Palestinian leadership and Palestinian social networks" correlations were found only among Jewish respondents. They indicated that the more this sources diminished trust, the less trust the respondents felt. Surprisingly, "trust" was found to be related to the variables "Anti-Semitism" and "Holocaust" with the entire sample, indicating that the less trust one feels towards Palestinians, the more he/she will agree with the statements" "Antisemitism prevails strongly among the nations of today" and "The holocaust cannot be forgotten and should serve as a lesson for Jews".

Table 14- (see Appendix F) displays the following relations: "the less trust felt towards the Palestinians, the more respondents believe in the stability of group characteristics", "the less readiness one has to hear information from a Palestinian, the more rightist political orientation one has and the more religious a respondent is (religion regards Jewish respondents only). Surprisingly, we found no correlation between "trust" and "importance of religion" among Israeli Arab respondents (may be because the majority of them declared that they are religious).

Table 15—(see Appendix F) shows relationships between "trust" and a series of socio-psychological variables. These correlations were carried only with Israeli Jews because we assumed that they do not make much sense for the Israeli Arabs who many consider themselves as Palestinians. The calculated correlations show very strong relationship to all the socio-psychological variables. Specifically, they indicate that the less trust the Israeli Jews feel towards Palestinians, the more they: Adhere to the ethos of conflict, perceive Palestinians with negative stereotypes, delegitimize Palestinians, abstain from meeting a Palestinian, feel negative emotions and also feel less positive ones towards Palestinians.

Table 16 – (See Appendix F) shows that among Jews, ethos of conflict, which represents the most important ideology related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (regarding conflict supporting narratives), is strongly related to all factors of influence examined and all socio-psychological

variables. Ethos of conflict goes well beyond the self-categorization: it provides elaboration what does it mean ideologically to support rightist orientation.

Phase 5: Testing the Hypotheses of the Study

The main hypotheses of this study suggest that trust is best predicted by: (1) experiences of violence, (2) exposure to violence and (3) perception of educational practices in Israel. In order to test these hypotheses, we carried **hierarchical regressions** (a reliable statistical **method** of analysis for identifying which variables have an impact on the explained variable, trust in our case).

The first regression we ran examined only the Israeli Jewish sample (See Table 17-Appendix G). We found successfully a good picture due to analysis powerful ability to explain different levels of influence by various variables.

The results of the regression revealed indisputably that the best predictor of trust is the **"stereotype of Palestinians that Jews hold".** Meaning that the variable "negative stereotype of the Palestinians" has the strongest ability to predict lack of trust felt by an individual. The second best predictor was found to be **"level of openness to receive information from a Palestinian".**

Not far from the above and sorted from strongest to weakest, we found the following variables exhibiting slightly less, but still strong predicting abilities**: "Delegitimization"** (the more one delegitimizes, the less trust he/she feels), **"Political orientation" (**the more an individual's orientation tends to the right, the less trust he/she feels).

After these, the next variables revealed an even weaker ability of explanation: "**exposure to violence and conflict" (**indicating that the more a person was exposed to violence the less trust he/she feels), **"perception of how the Palestinian educational system portrays Israelis" (**indicating that the more the system is perceived as presenting Israelis negatively, the less trust Jews feel)**.**

Finally, the variables we found to have the weakest ability to predict trust levels were: "**ethos of conflict", "age"** and **"negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli educational system".**

Table 18 (see Appendix G) presents the results of the same **hierarchical regression analysis**, only this time we ran it on the older Jewish sample and found similar results to the analysis done on the entire Jewish population. Following is the list of predicting variables, sorted by strength of predicting ability, strongest to weakest: Stereotyping of the Palestinians (negative stereotyping), openness to information from a Palestinian (closure), political orientation (rightist orientation), perception of the Palestinian educational system (negative perception), age, exposure to violence and conflict, delegitimization of the Palestinians, influence of the Israeli leadership.

Table 19 (see Appendix G) presents the results of the **hierarchical regression analysis** performed on the younger Jewish sample. Again, stereotyping of the Palestinians (negative stereotyping) and openness to information from a Palestinian (closure), were found as best predictors of lack of trust towards Palestinians. Followed by: Delegitimization of the Palestinians, negative perception of the Palestinian educational system, importance of religion, negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli educational system, political orientation, experience of violence, exposure to violence, exposure to conflict and finally the influence of the negative view of the Palestinian educational system.

Table 20 (see Appendix G) presents the results of the **hierarchical regression analysis,** done with the Israeli Arab population. Not surprisingly, the results differ from the those presented above. We found that the variable with the strongest predicting power regarding lack of trust is "the influence of **the Palestinian media"** (indicating that the more the Palestinian media fosters trust the more a person has trust in Palestinians).

Other predictors presented from strongest to weakest are: views about **Holocaust and Anti-Semitism**, **negative stereotyping of the Palestinians**, political orientation, openness, negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli educational system and importance of religion.

An intriguing finding was that trust felt by Israeli Arabs toward Palestinians revealed an effect of their view of Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. Indicating that the more they believe in the spread of Anti-Semitism and the possibility of another Holocaust, the less trust they feel towards Palestinians.

Table 21 (see Appendix G) presents the results of the **hierarchical regression analysis** preformed on the older Israeli Arab population. The results below show that the predictors with the best

explanatory power of trust levels towards Palestinians are from the strongest to weakest effect: The influence of the Palestinian media, views about the Holocaust and Anti-Semitism, political orientation and negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli educational system.

Table 22 (see Appendix G) presents the results of the **hierarchical regression analysis** calculated on younger Israeli Arabs data. Surprisingly, it revealed only four consistent predictors which are presented in the following order (strongest to weakest): **Stereotyping of the Palestinians, the influence of the Palestinian media**, views about Holocaust and Anti-Semitism and negative emotions towards the Palestinians.

In sum. not surprisingly, findings show that **the socio-psychological variables that serve as the prism for information and processing experiences, play a crucial role in the development of distrust. Individuals who have negative stereotypes of the Palestinians and especially hold delegitimizing view have distrust towards the Palestinians.** But of surprise is the finding that the Israeli Arabs are affected by their view of Jews in the light of Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. The more they see Jews as victims of the Anti-Semitism and of the Holocaust, the less they have trust towards the Palestinians. The results did not show that this variable affected the Jews.

Phase 6: Examining the Variables that Predict Support for Peace-making

The last phase of this study focused on detecting variables that help predict an individual's level of support in the peace process. But first of all we constructed he index for peace support and found that it is a reliable one (0.79). Subsequently, like the analysis in phase 5, we used the same methodology, based on a hierarchical regression analyses. Only this time, we changed the predicted variable which was "level of support in the peace process" (see Appendix E). Thus, in the **hierarchical regression** analyses trust and all the other variables were the predictors of peace support.

But before reporting the regression analysis we would like to report that peace support did not receive a very high support among the respondents of our survey. In general, the mean for Israeli Jews is 2.39, indicating that it is even below the middle level (between to a small extent -2 and neither small nor high extent-3). The mean of Israeli Arabs is higher –3.49-above the middle. Of

special interest is the finding showing that the younger Israeli Jews support less the peace process than older Israeli Jews 2.26 and 2.45 respectively. No significant difference was found between younger and older Israeli Arabs –3.45 and 3.59 respectively.

An intriguing finding across all different groups was that trust was found to be the variable which predicts best an individual's level of support in peace. Table 23 (see Appendix-G) shows below that the regression on Jews indicates that after trust, the best predictors were: ethos of conflict, stereotyping of the Palestinians, political, orientation exposure to violence and conflict, influence of the Israeli leadership and view of the Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.
We also found that Israeli **Jews show high levels of supporting peace, when they have:** high trust in Palestinians, low level of ethos of conflict, more positive stereotypes, leftist orientation, less exposure to violence, less influenced by Israeli leaders and less influenced by the view of Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.

The analysis of this regression on the younger Jewish segment shows very similar results as seen in Table 24 (see Appendix G), with the slight difference that this group's level of support is also affected by "openness to information from a Palestinian".

The analysis of the older Jewish respondents (See Table 25—see Appendix G) is almost identical to the analysis of Jews in general, while it only differs by not including "exposure to violence and conflict" as meaningful predictors.

Table 26 (see Appendix G) shows that the analysis of Israeli Arabs indicates that below trust, the following strongest predictors, also explain levels of support, in the following order (strongest to weakest): the view about how Israeli teachers present Palestinians, ethos of conflict, influence of the Israeli curriculum and the level of an individual's education.

The regression which measured answers by older Israeli Arabs, presented a very similar picture of predicting variables (from the strongest to the weakest): trust, the ethos of conflict, view about how the Israeli teachers present Palestinians, the level of the respondents' education and finally, the negative emotions felt towards Palestinians (see Table 27- see appendix G).

The regression conducted with young Israeli Arab's answers gave slightly different results, as for them the best predictor was found to be the Palestinian media, followed by: experience of violence, Palestinian curriculum, trust, education that the respondent's children received in school and finally exposure to violence and conflict (see Table 28- see Appendix G).

We performed two more regressions which turned out to be important to clarify different tendencies within the Israeli Jewish population, based on differences in political orientation. The first was carried on those holding a right winged political orientation, and the second was conducted on left and center winged oriented respondents, both out of the Jewish sample. **The former shows that for right winged Jews, the best predictors for low levels of support in peace are: adherence to ethos of conflict, negative stereotyping of the Palestinians, low trust**, exposure to violence and conflict and view of the Israeli leadership and lastly the respondents age (the younger the respondents is, the less he/she supports the peace process – (see Table 29 – See Appendix G).

The second regression, done with answers given by left and center politically oriented Jews combined, shows that support for peace is best predicted by: trust, low adherence to ethos of conflict, less negative emotions, low agreement with the view about Anti-Semitism (meaning it remains strong among the nations) and the Holocaust (meaning it cannot be forgotten and should serve as a lesson for Jews—(see Table 30- see Appendix G)

Discussion

The present study concerns one of the key elements in intergroup relations –namely trust and distrust. It determines to a large extent, the nature of the intergroup relationship: whether it is amicable, cooperative, competitive, conflictive, or hostile and so on. This socio-psychological construction can be considered as one dimension that extends from maximal trust to minimal distrust. Trust and distrust are related intimately to expectations about future behaviors of the other group. Expectations determine the level of risk that the group is ready to take. When there is maximal trust and minimal distrust in a group's expectations, it implies that the group can take risks and initiate actions with the other group in a way that deepens codependency between them, as for example peaceful relation. In contrast, when there is maximal distrust and minimal trust

towards another group, expectations imply that the one might not take risks and interact peacefully with another, nor rely on the other group. Expectations, thus, lead to specific courses of action and determine the level of vulnerability that one is ready to take in relations with the other.

The present study focuses on distrust between Israelis and Palestinians, who live for many decades in intractable conflict. This distrust stands as a major barrier in moving towards a peace building process. Thus, that goal of this study is to determine the antecedents of the developed distrust and its impact on support levels of the peace process.

The advanced hypotheses suggested the following:

- Daily harsh life experience will have a major effect of diminishing trust towards a rival group.
- Exposure to violence and conflict will have a major effect of diminishing trust towards a rival group.
- Negative presentation of the rival group in the educational system will have a major effect of diminishing trust toward a rival group.
- If an individual holds more trust towards a rival group, he will also be more supportive of a peace process with that group.

The first three hypotheses refer to the origin of distrust and the last one is concerned in the role of trust in the support of peace making. The findings of the survey provided limited support of the first three hypotheses, but strongly confirms the last one.

Distrust towards Palestinians

Israeli Jews

The analyses were used to find the impact different variables had on trust, held by Jews and Israeli Arabs towards Palestinians. The results for the entire Israeli Jewish sample as well as for older and younger Israeli Jews separately showed unequivocally that socio-psychological variables that represent the socio-psychological repertoire of the participants determine the levels of trust to a large extent. Specifically, the most important determinant of distrust is the **negative stereotyping** that Israeli Jews hold towards Palestinians. Thinking that Palestinians are violent and hostile leads

to high levels of distrust. The second most influencing variable on trust, is **open mindedness**. That is, closed minded individuals who are not ready to expose themselves and to exchange information with Palestinians also tend to distrust them. The next contributor to distrust is related to extreme negative stereotyping—i.e., **delegitimization** of Palestinians. Meaning that many respondents mentally deny Palestinians of their humanity, viewing them as an excluded group. The delegitimization variable appeared as the third most dominant factor in determining distrust among the Israeli Jewish population and the younger Israeli Jewish population. Among the older Jewish population, the third strongest determinant of distrust is **political orientation**, meaning the more right-wing a person is, the less trust he/she has towards Palestinians. Among Israeli Jews in general, only after **political orientation** comes the variable of **exposure to violence and conflict**, indicating that the more a person was exposed to conflict violence the less trust he has towards Palestinians. Then comes the variable of perception of the **Palestinian educational system**, indicating that the more this system is perceived as presenting Israelis negatively, the less trust Jews have towards Palestinians. Finally, comes **ethos of conflict**, **age,** and **negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli teachers in the Israeli schools**- All significantly predict lack of trust.

Israeli Arabs

The analyses of the Israeli Arabs' responses show a different picture. Looking at the general Israeli Arab population, the most important predictor of trust is **the influence of the Palestinian media**, indicating that the more the Palestinian media fosters trust, the more a person (Israeli Arabs) has trust towards Palestinians. Other predictors are: views about **Holocaust and Anti-Semitism**, **stereotyping** of the Palestinians, **political orientation**, **openness**, **negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli teachers in the Israeli schools** and **importance of religion**. We learn that the Israeli Arabs are affected surprisingly by their beliefs about **antisemitism and Holocaust**: The more they believe in the spread of the Anti-Semitism and the possibility of another Holocaust, the less they trust the Palestinians. Younger Israeli Arabs build their mistrust through stereotyping of Palestinians, the influence of the Palestinian media, views about Holocaust and Anti-Semitism and negative emotions towards the Palestinians.

Support of the Peace Process.

The analyses present one unequivocal finding. **Trust** has been found as the most important predictor of support for the peace process among all groups of Jews and among the general sample of Israeli Arabs and the older sample of Israeli Arabs. Unsurprisingly, additional socio-psychological variables such as **ethos of conflict and stereotyping** indicating that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative are the held stereotypes of the Palestinians, the more he or she supports the peace process. Also, **political orientation** predicts support for peace, where as expected, the more leftist is the person, the more he or she supports the peace process.

Israeli Jews-

Among Israeli Jews in general and younger Jews, in addition to the above presented variables, **exposure to violence** has a negative effect on Jewish support for peace. In addition, Jews' openness for peace is affected by the Israeli leadership and the perception of antisemitism and the Holocaust. Among younger Jews, it was also found that openness and experience of violence are significant predictors for support of the peace process.

Israeli Arabs-

The analysis for Israeli Arabs indicates that after trust, the most important factors for support of the peace process include variables concerning education. Among those are how **Israeli teachers present Palestinians**, then **Ethos of conflict**, influence of the **Israeli curricula** and the level of **Education** of the respondents. All these mean that the more trust a person has towards the Palestinians, the more positive is the presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli teachers, the less he or she adheres to ethos of conflict and the more positive is the presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli curricula, the more the person tends to support the peace process. The regression with the older Israeli Arabs presents very similar picture: The strongest predictor is **trust**, then **ethos of conflict**, views on how **Israeli teachers present Palestinians**, then the level of **Education** of the respondents, and finally, the **negative emotions felt towards the Palestinians**. The regression conducted for the younger Israeli Arabs differs. The result shows that the best predictor is the **Palestinian press**, then **experience of violence**, **Palestinian curricula**,

then **Trust**, following by **Education** that the respondent's children received in school, and finally **Exposure to violence** and conflict.

Implications

The present study unveils the roots of distrust in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. **The study shows that although the exposure to violence and experience of violence have some effect on trust, the primary determinants are the socio-psychological variables representing the repertoire that Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs are carrying.** This repertoire includes beliefs, attitudes and emotions. These beliefs and attitudes take the form of stereotypes, ethos of conflict, concerns about antisemitism and holocaust and political orientation. They lead also to cognitive closure, reflected in refusal to acquire information from a Palestinian. This socio-psychological repertoire influences what information receives attention and the way in which it is mentally coded and organized. Next, it functions as an interpretive framework, influencing evaluations, judgments, predictions and conclusions drawn by Israelis. This repertoire is the key determinant of trust. For example, Israeli Jews, who stereotype negatively Palestinians and even delegitimize them, while adhering to ethos of conflict as their ideology, do not trust Palestinians.

What should be of great concern is the well-established findings showing that this repertoire is acquired at the very early age. This is unavoidable, as children learn this repertoire from all agents of socialization, including parents, leaders, television, literature, teachers, social media and schoolbooks. Already in a kindergarten, children acquire negative stereotyping of Arabs/Palestinians and the foundations of the ethos of conflict. The beliefs and attitudes regarding the conflict learned by children at an early age remain in their socio-psychological repertoire and may have latent influence later on. These contents serve as fertile ground for the later development of conflict attitudes. They may constitute a part of children's general worldviews which remains relatively constant across time. Eventually, these will pose a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution.

The present study provides indirect confirmation to the forementioned process of socialization and its effects. Comparison of the two groups of the Israeli Jewish sample: younger Jews (18-29 years old) and older (30 years old and above) reveals that in all the indices of the socio-psychological repertoire, younger Israeli Jews are more rightist than older Israeli Jews. Specifically, younger Israeli Jews have less trust towards Palestinians, adhere more to beliefs of ethos of conflict, hold

a stronger negative stereotype of Palestinians, tend more to delegitimize them, are less interested in initiating contact with a Palestinian, express somewhat stronger negative emotions and less positive emotions towards Palestinians, and express stronger opposition regarding the two-state solution than older Jews.

Another interesting finding in the Jewish sample was that younger Israeli Jews, compared to the older sample, are less opened to receive information from a Palestinian about the conflict, worry more about the **future of the Jewish character of the state**, attribute to the Palestinians and the Palestinians Authority extreme violent aspirations and not surprisingly, they hold extreme rightist preferences for the future relations with the Palestinians

Finally, we see that while among younger Israeli Jewish respondents, 66% categorize their political orientation as right wing and only 8% as left wing. Examining the older sample shows a more moderate distribution, as 52% of them define themselves as right wing and only 15% as left-wing. When we examined the distribution of different religious groups among Israeli Jews. Not surprisingly, we found that younger Israeli Jewish respondents are "more religious" compared to older respondents. As the younger divide to 17.1% ultraorthodox and 15.6% religious, in comparison to the older generation which divide to 8.9% ultraorthodox and 12.1% religious.

The responses of Israeli Arab respondents were not too different from those of the Israeli Jewish population. Although one might expect in a study examining beliefs and attitudes towards Palestinians as a national category, which includes a majority of the Israeli Arab population, that there should be a distinguished difference in Jewish and Arab views. We found that Israeli Arabs did not differ much with regard to: trust in Palestinians, stereotyping, positive emotions and even with openness to listen to information about the conflict from a Palestinian.

The above, which might seem as confusing results, require further explanation, which we believe can be debunked by the following reasons. The first explanation is based on the notion that Israeli Arabs are going through a process, described in common literature as "Israelization". Studies find that Israeli Arabs became more and more integrated into Israeli society, especially the middle class and those with professions which require education. They come in contact with the Jewish population, and presumably they are exposed and influenced by their beliefs and attitudes regarding the conflict, and as a result accept some of them.

The second explanation is based on a sociological theory, which suggests that minorities tend to accept the views of the majority, to increase their acceptance by the last. Currently, we cannot conclude decisively which explanation is more prominent, and it is also possible that both explain simultaneously the findings presented.

Summarizing Notes

In conclusion, the wide and deep scope of our analysis presented in this study, shows an unequivocal picture. **The socio-psychological repertoire about Palestinians in the Israeli Jewish society is negative. It includes distrust, negative stereotypes, delegitimization, negative attitudes, negative emotions and negative behavioral intentions.** In other words, Palestinian's repertoire is very negative, as Jews perceive that they strive to wage an armed struggle against the occupation.

We suggest that some of the reasons for **such strong distrust**, lies in the cultural-societal-political climate of local society, as reflected in the information provided by leaders, mass-media, the imparted collective memory and existing dominant political ideologies. These formulate the shared beliefs which affect distrust, they can be found immediately in information conveyed through different channels and institutions regarding the conflict. Nevertheless, most members of society have been exposed to the collective memory through formal institutions of education, society and culture, which mostly embed within various ideologies and political views, where distrust constitutes a central concept. Although, sometimes it is being ascribed with various interpretations and meanings.

Recommendations

Change of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire is of crucial significance. After years of homogenous negative stereotyping, including delegitimization, prejudice, fear and hatred, we propose that on the cognitive-affective level, the change requires **legitimization, equalization, differentiation and personalization** of the rival group members. It requires major changes in perception on a macro level.

The success of such aspirations depends heavily on effective dissemination of new beliefs that could replace common social perception from their roots. It is an essential process, convincing the Israelis and Palestinians to change their socio-psychological intergroup repertoire, from delegitimizing the opponent to legitimization, equalization, differentiation and personalization which support the emergence of peaceful relations and reconciliation. In addition, it is important to help new norms to evolve, so new socio-psychological intergroup repertoire could be supported and survive the initial negative political atmosphere. These new norms require legislation which supports their existence, such legislation might even sanction racism and/or illegalize discrimination of the rival group.

Practically, successful changing of the socio-psychological repertoire requires well defined and planned policies on a national level, in which leaders, institutions and the media take an active part. It has to rely on both formal and none formal institutions, means of dissemination, which all should present positive interactions with members of the other group.
These policies cannot rely only on statements and speeches, they must be reflected in formal acts, which symbolically communicate changes in the groups relationship with it rival group. The formal acts should take place in various spheres, beginning with formal meetings between representatives of both groups, leaders, establishing formal relations, followed by political, economic and cultural common acts. These acts must be institutionalized and widened so that they can include as many society members, institutions and organizations, as possible.
Change in masses psychological perception can also be enhanced by middle-level leaders, such as prominent figures in ethnic, religious, economic academic, intellectual and humanitarian circles. In this process elites play a crucial role, they include those individuals who hold authoritative positions in powerful public and private organizations and influential movements. These individuals should take an important part in initiating and implementing such policies of change. As for the individuals' close circle, local leaders, businessmen, community developers, local health officials, and educators can play an important role in initiating and implementing the new policies of reconciliation.

Thus, the processes presented have to be implanted to different levels of society, from top to bottom by all types of social leaders. The leaders play an essential role in this process. They set

the climate of relations with the rival group, decisions, policies, and courses of actions, which are seen as instructional directions and models for the masses, especially when they are perceived as epistemic authorities.

It is important to note that the societal campaign for changing the socio-psychological intergroup repertoire, has difficulty in defining unitary objectives and policies and then implement them. This is because in democratic states there is no centralized control over groups, organizations, institutions, and channels of communication. They are free to formulate their own ideas and express them. In democratic societies, the societal campaign depends on the voluntary and free will of the societal institutions and channels of communication, which may decide that change of the socio-psychological repertoire should reflect important values for the society and, therefore, should be socially disseminated. Thus, in democratic societies the process of persuasion is of determinative importance.

A variety of methods to facilitate change of the socio-psychological repertoire have been proposed in social science literature. Some are part of formal policies and some are carried out voluntarily and informally. All however, serve as mechanisms to change society members' beliefs, attitudes, and emotions in the direction of peace making. They either directly or indirectly transmit information about the rival group and construct new and peaceful relations.

Education is one of the most important methods for changing the psychological repertoire, and for improving the other side's opinion. This mostly involves using the school system, since its institutions are often the only way for a society to make formal, intentional, and extensive methods to change the psychological repertoire of its members. In order to achieve this objective, schools must provide pupils with knowledge that is in line with principles of eliminating prejudice (for example: about the other group, about the course of the conflict, about future peaceful relations, about conflict resolution, etc.). This is a large-scale endeavor that requires setting educational objectives, preparing curricula, specifying textbook contents, developing instructional material, training teachers and constructing an educational climate that is conducive to the implementation of peace-loving thinking.

Appendixes

Appendix A

Survey Questions of the August 2020 study Used in the Trust project

1. Do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution? —**V4**

1-Certainly support, 2-support, 3-oppose, 4-certainly oppose, 5-Don't know/refuse to respond. (DK/NA)

2. Of the following four possibilities about what to do now about Israeli-Palestinian relations, which one you think is preferred most by the majority of the Palestinians? **V15**

a) Maintain the status quo
b) Wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation
c) Wage an unarmed struggle against the Israeli occupation
d) Reach a peace agreement with Israel
e) Other
f) DK/NA

3. Please tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements:

It is possible to trust Palestinians? V30

1-Certainly disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-Agree, 4- Certainly agree, 5-DK/NA4.

4. How often did the following happen to you?

1) Never 2) Once 4) Several times 5) Many times

4-1 How often have you taken part during your army service (compulsory, career military personnel, reserve) in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? **V32**

4-2 How often have any of your close family members taken part during their army service (compulsory, career military personnel, reserve) in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? **V34**

4-3 How often have you been hurt in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? **V36**

4-4 How often have any of your close family members hurt in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? **V37**

4-5 How often have you witnessed injuries or deaths related to the conflict? **V38**

5 When thinking about the education you or your children receive(d) at school, you would say it calls more for (one response only): V41

a. Seeing other side positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights.

b. Seeing other side indifferently

c. Seeing other side through negative stereotypes

d. DK/NA

6. Based on your best knowledge of Palestinian education system, you would say it calls more for (one response only): **V42**

a. Seeing other side positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights.

b. Seeing other side indifferently

c. Seeing other side through negative stereotypes

d. DK/NA

7. The following questions try to assess your feelings and concerns or fear regarding relations with Palestinians.

1) Never worried 2) Little worried 3) Much worried 4) Very much worried

7-1 I am worried being harmed by Palestinian terror attacks, rocket fire or war-V43-1

7-2 I worry about losing the Jewish majority in Israel and losing the Jewish character of the state V43-2

8. During the last year, how many times have you faced the following situation

1) Never 2) once 3) A few times 4) Many times

8-1 I heard about Palestinians taking action against Israel in international forums such as the ICC, UN, lobbying individual foreign governments against Israel or delegitimizing Israel in the media and colleges abroad? V44-2

8-2 I heard about a Palestinian terrorist harming Israeli soldiers or civilians, either in the media or from personal contacts and experience? V44-3

9. Tell us if you agree or disagree with the following sentences:

1-Certainly agree 2-Agree 3-Disgree 4-Certainly disagree 5- DK/NA

9-1 I believe in the peaceful intentions of Palestinians.

V 45-1)

9-2 It is impossible to reach a peace agreement with Palestinians because there is no partner on the other side. V45-2

9-3 Palestinians will never accept the existence of the state of /of the Palestinian people and will strive to annihilate it if they can. V45-3

10. If you think Palestinians/ are not trustworthy, why? V46 Because

1. I have had bad personal experiences with them
2. I do not trust their political aims in the conflict
3. Their religion and culture
4. Their leaders cannot be trusted
5. Their education incites against Israel and Jews
6. Other: _____

11. If Israel and the PA reached a peace agreement, do you think the Palestinian/ people would honor their commitment in that agreement?—V47

1-yes, 2- no' 3. DK/NA

12. And do you think Palestinian government would honor its commitment in that agreement? V48

1-yes, 2- no, 3. DK/NA

13. To what extent would you say each one of the following foster or diminish trust among the two peoples: V49

1) Foster trust 2) Diminish trust 3) Neither diminish nor foster trust 4) DK/NA

		1	2	3	4	5
13.1)	Israeli current government leadership					
13.2)	Palestinian current political leadership in the West Bank					
13.3)	Israeli media					
13.4)	Palestinian media					
13.5)	Israeli school curriculum					
13.6)	Palestinian school curriculum					
13.7)	Israeli social media					
13.8)	Palestinian social media					

14-And now after we went over the main proposed terms of the two-state solution of the Israeli Palestinian permanent settlement (demilitarization of the Palestinian state, Palestine and Israel will both be democratic states, equal territorial exchange, the family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, East Jerusalem the capital of Palestine and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel, the end of the conflict, guarantees of implementation by the US & Arab states,

and comprehensive regional peace with Arab states, please tell me the extent to which you support or oppose such a permanent settlement in general as one combined package V10-13

1. Certainly support 2. Support 3. Oppose 4. Certainly oppose, 5. DK/NA

Appendix B
Constructing Variables for the Study 1

Trust of the Palestinians V 30-(4 levels), V45-1,2,3, (4 levels) V47 (2 Levels)

Support for peace ---V4- (4 levels) , V10-13- 4 levels

Support for various options for the future by the Israeli Jews V15

Experiences of violence and conflict V32, V34, V36, V37, V38

Exposure to Palestinian violence V44-2,3 – (4 levels)

Education –View of the Israeli schools of the Palestinians V41 (3 levels)

Education –View of the Palestinian schools of the Israeli Jews V42 (3 levels)

Worrying about being harmed by Palestinians V 43 -1- (4 levels)

Worrying about losing Jewish nature V43-2 (4 levels)

Why cannot rely on the Palestinians –V 46

Sources promoting trust or distrust V 49 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,- (3 levels)

Appendix C

		1	2	3	4	5
4.1)	Despite Israelis will for peace, Palestinians forced on them again and again violence.					
4.2)	The Palestinians are just as much victims of the conflict as Jews are.					
4.3)	The need for a state for the Jews, which results from the fact that they were living in their homeland two thousand years ago, does not contradict the right of the Palestinian for their own state in part of this country					
4.4)	It is possible to find among the Palestinians a moderate segment that wants to end the conflict.					

Questionnaire used in the survey study
Joint Palestinian-Israeli Poll of Distrust

To what extent...
1) None **2)** To a small extent **3)** Neither small nor large extent **4)** To some extent **5)** To a Large extent

		1	2	3	4	5
1)	**Are you concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?**					
2)	**Do you think the peace or normalization agreement with the Emirates and with Bahrain contributes to reach an agreement with the Palestinians**					

3) Tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:

1) Certainly disagree **2)** Disagree **3)** Neither disagree nor agree **4)** Agree **5)** Certainly agree

		1	2	3	4	5
3.1)	The antisemitism remains strong among the nations of today.					
3.2)	Holocaust cannot be forgotten and should serve as a lesson for Jews.					
3.3)	Only powerful military Israel can assure the existence of Israel among surrounding hostile nations.					
3.4)	The ongoing Palestinian violence shows clearly that the Palestinians desire to exterminate Israel and not to stop the occupation.					

4) Tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements:

1) Certainly disagree **2)** Disagree **3)** Neither disagree nor agree **4)** Agree **5)** Certainly agree

5) The following questions try to assess your view regarding Palestinians / Israelis education:

1) Very negatively **2)** Little Negatively **3)** Neither negatively nor positively **4)** little positively **5)** very positively

		1	2	3	4	5
5.1)	When thinking about the education at school how in your view the Israeli teachers present the Palestinians.					
5.2)	Based on your best knowledge of Palestinian education system, how in your view the Palestinian curriculum and schoolbooks present the Israelis.					
5.3)	Based on your best knowledge of Palestinian education system, how in your view the Palestinian teachers present the Israelis.					

6) When thinking about the education you or your children receive(d) at school, you would say it calls more for (one response only):

1. Definitely seeing Palestinians positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights.

2. Somewhat seeing Palestinians positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights.

3. Seeing Palestinians indifferently.

4. Seeing Palestinians through negative stereotypes and labels.

5. Definitely seeing Palestinians through negative stereotypes and labels.

6. DK/NA

7) Based on your best knowledge of Palestinian education system, you would say it calls more for (one response only):

1. Definitely seeing Israelis positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights.

2. Seeing Israelis positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights.

3. Seeing Israelis indifferently.
4. Seeing Israelis through negative stereotypes and labels.
5. Definitely seeing Israelis through negative stereotypes and labels.
6. DK/NA

8) To what extent did any of the following influence your views about Palestinians:

1) None **2)** To a small extent **3)** Neither small nor large extent **4**) To some extent **5)** To a Large extent

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
8.1) Members of your family					
8.2) Teachers at school or university					
8.3) Textbooks you read at school or university					
8.4) Friends					
8.5) Newspapers and TV					
8.6) Social Media and Internet					
8.7) Political Leaders					
8.8) Religious leaders					

9) How true is this of Palestinians?

1)Not true at all **2)** Not true **3)** Neither true nor untrue **4)** Somewhat true **5)**Very true

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
9.1) …are peaceful.					
9.2) …are violent.					

10) Psychological studies show that individuals tend to attribute different levels of humaneness to people of different groups. The following scale represents the level of humaneness of the Palestinians. **0 represents lack of humanness and 100 represents very high level of humanness. Please choose one number that in your opinion represents the level of humanness of Palestinians: Please use all the numbers from 0 to 100**

100 ----------

---0

Much not at all

11) To what extent each of the following emotions expresses your feeling towards Palestinians:

1) None **2**) To a small extent **3)** Neither small nor large extent **4)** To some extent **5)** To a Large extent

		1	2	3	4	5
11.1)	Anger					
11.2)	Hatred					
11.3)	Fear					
11.4)	Empathy					
11.5)	Compassion					

12**) Tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements:**

1) Certainly disagree **2)** Disagree **3)** Neither disagree nor agree **4)** Agree **5)** Certainly agree

		1	2	3	4	5
12.1)	Groups that are characterized by violent tendencies will never change their ways.					
12.2)	Every group or nation has basic moral values and beliefs that can't be changed.					

13) The following questions try to assess your feelings and concerns or fear regarding relations with Palestinians.

1) Never worried **2)** Little worried **3)** Neither little nor much worried **4)** Much worried **5)** Very much worried

		1	2	3	4	5
13.1)	I am worried of being harmed by Palestinians.					
13.2)	I am worried about the future of the Jewish character of the state.					

14) Please tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is possible to trust Palestinians:

1) Certainly disagree **2)** Disagree **3)** Neither disagree nor agree **4)** Agree **5)** Certainly agree

15) If you think Palestinians are not trustworthy, why? Because …. [Select the most important factor]

7. I have had bad personal experiences with them
8. I do not trust their political aims in the conflict
9. Their religion and culture
10. Their leaders cannot be trusted
11. Their education incites against Israel and Jews
12. Their personality
13. Other: _____

63) Please tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements:

1) Certainly disagree **2)** Disagree **3)** Neither disagree nor agree **4)** Agree **5**) Certainly agree

		1	2	3	4	5
16.1)	It is possible to trust Palestinian leaders					
16.2)	I think that Palestinian and Israeli Jews can build trustful relationship in principle					

17) To what extent would you say each one of the following foster or diminish trust among the two peoples:

1) Greatly diminish trust **2)** Somewhat diminish trust **3)** Neither diminish nor foster trust **4)** Somewhat foster trust **5)** Greatly foster trust

		1	2	3	4	5
17.1)	Israeli current government leadership					
17.2)	Palestinian current political leadership in the West Bank					
17.3)	Israeli press					
17.4)	Palestinian press					
17.5)	Israeli school curriculum					

17.6)	Palestinian school curriculum					
17.7)	Israeli social media					
17.8)	Palestinian social media					

18) If Israel and the PA reached a peace agreement, do you think the Palestinian leadership would honor their commitment in that agreement?
1) Definitely no **2**) No **3)** Neither no nor yes **4)** Yes **5)** Definitely yes

19) Tell us if you agree or disagree with the following sentences:

1) Certainly disagree **2)** Disagree **3)** Neither disagree nor agree **4)** Agree **5)** Certainly agree

		1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
19.1)	I believe in the peaceful intentions of Palestinians.					
19.2)	It is impossible to reach a peace agreement with Palestinians because there is no partner on the other side.					
19.3)	Palestinians will never accept the existence of the state of Israel and will strive to annihilate it if they can.					

20) How strongly do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution?
1) Strongly oppose it **2)** Somewhat oppose it **3)** Neither support nor oppose it **4)** Somewhat support **5)** Strongly support it

21) What in your opinion are the long run aspirations of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO?
1) Regain some of the territories conquered in the 1967 war
2) Regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war
3) Conquer the State of Israel and regain control over the pre 1948 Palestine
4) Conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel
5) DK/NA

22)*) And What do you think is the long run aspiration of Israel?*
1) Withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security

2) Withdrawal from part of the territories it occupied after guaranteeing its security
3) Annexation of the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinian citizens
4) Extending the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expelling its Arab citizens
5) DK/NA

23) Tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statement:

Israel will have to choose between Apartheid state or to lose its Jewish nature if it will not choose the solution of two states to two nations.
1) Certainly disagree **2)** Disagree **3)** Neither disagree nor agree **4)** Agree **5)** Certainly agree

24) When you think about your life as an Israeli, how many times do you feel that you lose hope for the better future?
1) Never **2)** Rarely **3)** Sometimes **4)** Often **5)** Always

25) **The following four possibilities refer to your views about what to do now about Israeli-Palestinian relations, which one is the <u>most preferred to you</u>:**

1) Maintain the status quo
2) Annex the territories or parts of the territories
3) Wage a definitive war against the Palestinians in which Israel destroys their military capability
4) Reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians
5) Other
6) DK/NA

26) Of the following four possibilities about what to do now about Israeli-Palestinian relations, which one you think is preferred most by the <u>majority of the Palestinians</u>?

1) Maintain the status quo
2) Wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation
3) Wage an unarmed struggle against the Israeli occupation
4) Reach a peace agreement with Israel
5) Other
6) DK/NA

27) During the last few year, how many times have you faced the following situation?
1) Never **2)** Very few times **3)** A few times **4)** Many times **5)** Frequently

		1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

27.1)	I heard about anti-Israeli taking action against Israel in international forums such as the ICC, UN, lobbying individual foreign governments against Israel or delegitimizing Israel in the media and colleges abroad.					
27.2)	I heard about a Palestinian terrorist harming Israeli soldiers or civilians, either in the media or from personal contacts and experience.					
27.3)	My family home came under rocket attack, or incendiary balloons landed in our land, or you were asked to stay in a bomb shelter.					

28) How many people in your family, friends, or acquaintances have been killed in violence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:
1) No one **2)** One **3)** Two **4)** 3-5 people **5)** More than 5 people

29) How often did the following happen to you?
1) Never **2)** Once **3)** Twice **4)** 3-5 times **5)** More than 5 times

		1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
29.1)	How often have you taken part during your army service (compulsory, career military personnel, reserve) in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?					
29.2)	How often have any of your close family members taken part during their army service (compulsory, career military personnel, reserve) in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?					
29.3)	How often have you seen in the TV or in the mass media reports of a harm carried by the Palestinians?					
29.4)	How often have you witnessed injuries or deaths related to the conflict?					
29.5)	How often have you witnessed personally a harm carried by the Palestinians?					

30) To what extent are you willing to exchange views and information with Palestinian sources regarding the conflict?
1) None extent **2)** To a small extent **3**) Neither small nor large extent **4)** To some extent **5)** To a Large extent

31) To what extent are you ready to hear Palestinian sources and receive new information about the conflict?
1) None extent **2)** To a small extent **3**) Neither small nor large extent **4)** To some extent **5)** To a Large extent

32) Have you ever had a Palestinian friend or personal acquaintance (חבר, מכר, ידיד**) now or in the past?**
1) Yes
2) No

33) Would you like to have a Palestinian friend or personal acquaintance that you could meet in person or by phone/zoom to explain your positions and hear their ideas?

1) Very much want to **2)** Somewhat want to **3)** Neither want nor do not want to **4)** Do not really want to **5)** Strongly do not want to

34) I will read you some statements related to your household income. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your household income?
1) Our household income covers our expenses well and we are able to save.
2) Our household income covers our expenses without notable difficulties.
3) Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face some difficulties in meeting our needs.
4) Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face significant difficulties in meeting our needs.
5) DK/NA

35) In terms of political opinions, which of the following describes you best

1) Left
2) Moderate left
3) Center
4) Moderate right
5) Right

36) How interested are you in politics?

1) Very interested
2) Interested
3) Quite interested
4) Not quite interested
5) Not interested

37) To what extent do you trust information stemming from the Israeli media regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

1) None **2)** To a small extent **3**) Neither small nor large extent **4)** To some extent **5)** To a Large extent

38) How important is religion in your life?
1) Very important
2) Important
3) Not important
4) Not important at all
5) DK/NA

39) Generally, do you see yourself as:

1) Religious

2) Somewhat religious

3) Not religious

4) DK/NA

40) (*Israeli Arabs only*): **Are You?**

1) Moslem

2) Druze

3) Christian

4) Other

(*Israeli Jews Only*): **Are You?**

1) Haredi (ultra-orthodox)

2) Religious

3) Traditional

4) Secular

5) DK/NA

41) What is your Gender?

1) Male

2) Female

42) What is your age? _____

43) What is your place of Residence?

1)Major cities

2) Neighborhoods / cities of development

3) Kibbutzim/ Moshavim/ Moshavot

4) Jewish settlements in Yehuda and Shomron

43) What is your education?

1) 1-6 years of schooling

2) 7-9 years of schooling

3) 10-12 years of schooling

4) 13-14 years of schooling

5) 15-18 years of schooling

6) 19-21

7) 22-28

Appendix D

Phases of the analyses of the collected data

Phases 1: Construction of the variables

The first phase required constructing variables on the basis of the items used in the questionnaire in order to build scales that enable aggregation of the items that measure the same constructs. This construction required also an assessment of the reliability of the constructed variables, that is to measure whether the items constitute consistently the same variable. This assessment was done with the test called Cronbach alpha. The test indicated that while a variable was constructed with several questionnaire's items constituting a scale, in other cases two items constituted the same variable. in some cases, a single item was considered a variable.

Phase 2: Calculation of means and standard deviations.

On the basis of the constructed variables we were able to calculate means and standard deviation for each variable for the following populations:

Phase 3: Calculations of the differences among the groups

In the third phase we examined differences among the different populations of Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs (general population, older and younger) in the sample of the participants in the study. This phase compared the different groups with statistics of ANOVA test and then to find differences between the groups, a TUKEY test was performed. In case that a difference was examined between two groups T tests were carried.

Phase 4: Calculations of relationships between the variables

The fourth phase moved to simple statistics of calculating relationships (correlations) between different variables in different populations. When the data was not numerical we performed cross tabs in order to find relationship between the variables of interest.

Phase 5: Examination the variables that affect the trust.

The fifth phase was done to examine the major goal of the study: To determine **what kind of variables affect the trust of the Israelis towards Palestinians?** These analyses required more advanced statistical test, namely, hierarchical regression that indicates clearly which variables determine the trust, and even to what extent.

Hierarchical regression is a way to show if variables used in the survey explain a statistically significant amount of variance in the variables after accounting for all other variables. This is a framework for **model** comparison rather than a statistical **method**. **In other words, the hierarchical regression analysis** is a reliable **method** of identifying which variables have impact on trust. The process of performing a **regression** allows confidently determine which variables matter most, what is the strength of their influence and which variables can be ignored. We report only the significant results of the regressions. If the variable does not appear in the report, it means that its effect is not significant.

Phase 6: Examination of variables that affect the support of peace process.

The last phase was designed to examine the variables, including trust, that determine the support for the peace process. In this phase we also used hierarchical regression that selects the influencing variables.

Appendix E
Construction of the Variables of the Study

In order to carry the analyses, we had to construct the variables of the study. The following variables were constructed and we report only the ones that the test of reliability was high (above .70), indicating high consistency among the items, meaning that they belong to the same group. We also used 5-point scale with each of the variable.

Trust towards Palestinians. The main variable of the study, trust, was eventually constructed by combing items that measured trust towards Palestinian people and trust towards Palestinian leaders because Israeli Jews did not differentiate between these two entities. Thus, the variable included the following items

The ongoing Palestinian violence shows clearly that the Palestinians desire to exterminate Israel and not to stop the occupation.

I think that Palestinian and Israeli Jews can build trustful relationship in principle

I believe in the peaceful intentions of Palestinians.

It is impossible to reach a peace agreement with Palestinians because there is no partner on the other side.

Palestinians will never accept the existence of the state of Israel and will strive to annihilate it if they can.

It is possible to trust Palestinian leaders

If Israel and the PA reached a peace agreement, do you think the Palestinian leadership would honor their commitment in that agreement?

In addition, the questionnaire included a nominal question: **If you think Palestinians are not trustworthy, why? Because …. [Select the most important factor]**

14. I have had bad personal experiences with them
15. I do not trust their political aims in the conflict
16. Their religion and culture
17. Their leaders cannot be trusted
18. Their education incites against Israel and Jews
19. Their personality
20. Other: _____

Experience of violence. This variable included various items that referred to different kind of direct personal experiences –

My family home came under rocket attack, or incendiary balloons landed in our land, or you were asked to stay in a bomb shelter.

How many people in your family, friends, or acquaintances have been killed in violence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

How often have you taken part during your army service (compulsory, career military personnel, reserve) in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

How often have any of your close family members taken part during their army service

How often have you witnessed injuries or deaths related to the conflict?

How often have you witnessed personally a harm carried by the Palestinians?

Exposure to violence and to the conflict assembled items that indicated indirect either seeing or hearing about Palestinian violence.

I heard about anti-Israeli taking action against Israel in international forums such as the ICC, UN, lobbying individual foreign governments against Israel or delegitimizing Israel in the media and colleges abroad.

I heard about a Palestinian terrorist harming Israeli soldiers or civilians, either in the media or from personal contacts and experience.

How often have you seen in the TV or in the mass media reports of a harm carried by the Palestinians?

Perception of the effects of the education on the views of the other side

Items that measured the effect of education were of three kinds. a. An item that measured the perception of the presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli teachers (When thinking about the education at school how in your view the Israeli teachers present the Palestinians). b. an item that assessed presentation of Palestinians by the Israeli educational system as having legitimate needs and rights and c. three items that measured the view of the Israelis about the presentation of the Israelis in the Palestinian educational system (Based on your best knowledge of Palestinian education system, how in your view the Palestinian curriculum and schoolbooks present the Israelis; Based on your best knowledge of Palestinian education system, how in your view the Palestinian teachers present the Israelis; and assessed presentation of Israelis by the Palestinian educational system as having legitimate needs and rights).

The next item is problematic from the point of view of the Israeli Jews. It refers to the presentation of Palestinians by the Israeli educational system as **having legitimate needs and rights**. Legitimate rights and needs indicate justness of the Palestinian goals. Israeli Jews refrained from this recognition.

Then comes the variable that assesses the view of how the Palestinian educational system presents Israelis. Israeli Jews believe that the Palestinian educational system presents Israelis negatively (between very negatively and little negatively).

Influence of various sources on the views of the Palestinians

Then the questionnaire had a number of items that asked about the influence of various sources on views of the Palestinians but they did not provide the direction of the influence. Five sources were

noted: social environment (Family members and friends), educational system (teachers and textbooks): media (mass media and social media); political leaders and religious leaders.

The next eight items asked similar questions with the direction. To what extent would you say each one of the following fosters or diminishes trust among the two peoples**:** Each of the items referred to a different source of influence: Israeli leadership, Palestinian leadership, Israeli media, Palestinian media, Israeli curricula, Palestinian curricula, Israeli social networks and Palestinian social networks.

Psychological variables

The next part included a series of scales that assed psychological variables. These variables are of special importance because they provide the glasses through which individuals evaluate their experience and information. Every perception from the outside world is processed by mind that gives meaning and interpretation to what was saw. In addition, it is the mind that creates impressions and judgments on the basis of the stored knowledge, attitudes and values. The following variables were measured:

Two items about **the views about anti-Semitism and the Holocaust** (The antisemitism remains strong among the nations of today and Holocaust cannot be forgotten and should serve as a lesson for Jews).

Four items of **ethos of conflict**[10] **(**Despite Israelis will for peace, Palestinians forced on them again and again violence; The Palestinians are just as much victims of the conflict as Jews are; The need for a state for the Jews, which results from the fact that they were living in their homeland two thousand years ago, does not contradict the right of the Palestinian for their own state in part of this country; and It is possible to find among the Palestinians a moderate segment that wants to end the conflict). Support for ethos of conflict indicates an adherence to conflict supporting narratives that justify continuation of the conflict as kind of ideology.

[10] *Ethos of conflict* is defined as the configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society at present and for the future in the contexts of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007, 2013).

Two items measuring the **stereotypic perception** of the Palestinians: they are peaceful and they are violent. Changing the direction of the second time, the results showed that in general Jews have a negative view of the Palestinians. They rejected the perception that Palestinians are peaceful and non-violent

Measure of **delegitimization**[11]: Psychological studies show that individuals tend to attribute different levels of humaneness to people of different groups. The following scale represents the level of humaneness of the Palestinians. 0 represents lack of humanness and 100 represents very high level of humanness.

Social distance with one item assessed the readiness to have a Palestinian friend or acquaintance and share views about the conflict Jews are somewhat indifferent to the possibility of having a contact with a Palestinian.

Negative emotions towards the Palestinians were measured with three items: Anger, hatred and fear- on a scale of 5-points.

Positive emotions towards the Palestinians were measured with two items: Empathy and compassion.

The variable of **malleability**[12] assessed with two items the extent to which respondents believe that the group's characteristics are fixed (Groups that are characterized by violent tendencies will never change their ways; Every group or nation has basic moral values and beliefs that can't be changed).

The variable **openness** assessed the extent to which the respondent is opened to be exposed to Palestinian views (readiness to exchange views and information with Palestinian sources regarding the conflict and readiness to hear Palestinian sources and receive new information about the

[11] Delegitimization is defined as *"categorization of a group, or groups, into extremely negative social categories that exclude it, or them, from the sphere of human groups that act within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values, since these groups are viewed as violating basic human norms or values and therefore deserve maltreatment*" (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012, p. 30).

[12] People differ with their view about stability or malleability of characteristics of other groups. View of stability indicates that groups do not change their characteristics and therefore their evilness will remain (Levy, S. R., Stroessner, S. J., & Dweck, C. S. (1998). Stereotype formation and endorsement: The role of implicit theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1421–1436

conflict? This is an important variable that indicates the level of opens of the groups to hear information from Palestinian sources about the conflict.

Then the questionnaire included a number of variables that consisted of one item.

Concern with the Israeli Palestinian conflict (Are you concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?)

Measure of the **effect of normalization agreement with the Gulf's Arab States** with the item: Do you think the peace or normalization agreement with the Emirates and with Bahrain contributes to reach an agreement with the Palestinians?

Measure of **the assurance of Israel's existence** with the item -Only powerful military Israel can assure the existence of Israel among surrounding hostile nations.

Measure of **worrying about being harm by the Palestinians** was assessed with the item I am worried of being harmed by Palestinians.

Measure of **worrying about the future of the Jewish** character of the state was assessed with the item I am worried about the future of the Jewish character of the state. This measure is of special importance because it indicates the level of uncertainty a respondent feels about the future of the state as defined by Jews—Jewish state. Measured on a scale of 5 points from 1 indicating "never worried" and 5 indicating "very much worried".

Measure about **the choice of the nature of the state of Israel** was assessed with the item Israel will have to choose between Apartheid state or to lose its Jewish nature if it will not choose the solution of two states to two nations**.** The response was given on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 indicating "certainly disagree" to 5 indicating "certainly agree.

Measure of **support for the two-state solution** was assessed with the item How strongly do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution? The responses on a 5-point scale to this item are very revealing with the reference to the previous item. (1 indicates strong opposition, 3 indicates neither opposition nor support and 5 indicates strong support.

Hope was measured with the item: When you think about your life as an Israeli, how many times do you feel that you lose hope for the better future. Jews do not tend to lose hope. In different

comparative surveys Jews in Israel were found to be very happy with their life. For example, findings show that Israelis were in eleventh place in the World Happiness Survey of 2018.[13]

Two nominal items asked about the **perceived aspirations of the Palestinians**: the first one was: What in your opinion are the long run aspirations of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO (choose one)?

1) Regain some of the territories conquered in the 1967 war
2) Regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war
3) Conquer the State of Israel and regain control over the pre 1948 Palestine
4) Conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel.

The second one was: Of the following four possibilities about what to do now about Israeli-Palestinian relations, which one you think is preferred most by the majority of the Palestinians?

7) Maintain the status quo
8) Wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation
9) Wage an unarmed struggle against the Israeli occupation
10) Reach a peace agreement with Israel
11) Other
12) DK/NA

Two nominal items asked about the **aspirations of the Israelis.** The first one was: And What do you think is the long run **aspiration of Israel**?

1) Withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security
2) Withdrawal from part of the territories it occupied after guaranteeing its security
3) Annexation of the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinian citizens
4) Extending the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expelling its Arab citizens
5) DK/NA

The second one was: The following four possibilities refer to your views about what to do now about Israeli-Palestinian relations, which one is the most **preferred to you**:

7) Maintain the status quo

[13] https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5481839,00.html

8) Annex the territories or parts of the territories

9) Wage a definitive war against the Palestinians in which Israel destroys their military capability

10) Reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians

11) Other

12) DK/NA

Support for Peace-making

To construct this index, the following 4 items were selected:

1.I believe in the peaceful intentions of Palestinians.

2.It is impossible to reach a peace agreement with Palestinians because there is no partner on the other side. (The direction of this item was changed).

3.Palestinians will never accept the existence of the state of Israel and will strive to annihilate it if they can. (The direction of this item was changed).

4. How strongly do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution?

New trust measure

Since three first items were taken from the trust index, a new index for trust was constructed that relied on 5 following items:

The ongoing Palestinian violence shows clearly that the Palestinians desire to exterminate Israel and not to stop the occupation.

Please tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is possible to trust Palestinians:

It is possible to trust Palestinian leaders

I think that Palestinian and Israeli Jews can build trustful relationship in principle

If Israel and the PA reached a peace agreement, do you think the Palestinian leadership would honor their commitment in that agreement?

Appendix G

Tables of the Regressions

Table 17: The Effect of Variables on Trust Among Jews

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**1.260** (0.299)		4.220	0.000
Stereotypes	**0.454** (0.037)	**0.469**	12.141	0.000
Openness	**0.108** (0.020)	**0.162**	5.352	0.000
Delegitimization	**0.004** (0.001)	**0.142**	4.111	0.000
Political Orientation	**-0.098** (0.029)	**0.114**	-3.344	0.001
Exposure to Violence and Conflict	**-0.101** (0.031)	**0.098**	-3.232	0.001
Palestinian Educ. System	**0.078** (0.031)	**0.080**	2.563	0.011
Ethos of Conflict	**0.102** (0.042)	**0.076**	2.415	0.016
Age	**0.004** (0.001)	**0.070**	2.503	0.013
Level Education	**-0.065** (0.028)	**0.063**	-2.285	0.023
Importance of Religion	**0.042** (0.022)	**0.056**	1.895	0.059
Holocaust & Anti-Semitism	**-0.062** (0.037)	**0.052-**	-1.682	0.094

Table 18: The Effect of Variables on Trust Among Older Jewish respondents

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance

	(s.d)			
Constant	**1.553** (0.269)		5.778	0.000
Stereotypes	**0.452** (0.030)	0.469	15.313	0.000
Openness	**0.097** (0.018)	0.141	5.494	0.000
Political Orientation	**-0.104** (0.025)	-0.119	-4.238	0.000
Palestinian Edu System	**0.111** (0.045)	0.103	2.441	0.015
Age	**0.006** (0.001)	0.089	4.100	0.000
Ethos of Conflict	**0.117** (0.034)	0.088	3.400	0.001
Exposure to Violence and Conflict	**-0.075** (0.024)	-0.072	-3.122	0.002
Delegitimization	**0.002** (0.001)	0.069	2.620	0.009
Israeli Leadership	**-0.046** (0.020)	-0.055	-2.287	0.023

Table 19: The Effect of Variables on Trust Among Younger Jews

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**2.022** (0.361)		5.598	0.000
Stereotypes	**.0323** (0.040)	0.357	8.077	0.000
Openness	**0.099** (0.021)	0.162	4.787	0.000
Delegitimization	**0.004** (0.001)	0.146	3.707	0.000

Palestinian Education System	**0.103** (0.028)	0.124	3.702	0.000
Importance of Religion	**0.073** (0.021)	0.109	3.490	0.001
Level Education	**-0.102** (0.028)	-0.108	-3.653	0.000
Political Orientation	**-0.087** (0.030)	-0.103	-2.910	0.004
Experience of Violence	**-0.082** (0.028)	-0.089	-2.955	0.003
Exposure to Violence	**-0.070** (0.029)	-0.075	-2.370	0.018
Palestinian Curricula	**0.050** (0.024)	0.067	2.098	0.036

Table 20: The Effect of Variables on Trust Among Arabs

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**0.796** (0.302)		2.641	0.009
Palestinian Media	**0.187** (0.031)	0.365	6.030	0.000
Holocaust and Anti-Semitism	**0.167** (0.041)	0.290	4.087	0.000
Stereotypes	**0.204** (0.060)	0.238	3.399	0.001
Political Orientation	**-0.108** (0.038)	0.190	-2.797	0.006
Openness	**0.079** (0.033)	0.182	2.391	0.018
Level Education	**0.097** (0.035)	0.179	2.760	0.007
Importance of Religion	**0.071** (0.036)	0.129	2.000	0.048

Table 21: The Effect of Variables on Trust Among Older Arab respondents

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**1.429** (0.344)		4.152	0.000
Palestinian Media	**0.216** (0.033)	0.460	6.466	0.000
Holocaust and Anti-Semitism	**0.200** (0.043)	0.373	4.608	0.000
Political Orientation	**-0.170** (0.042)	-0.311	-4.024	0.000
Level Education 1	**0.077** (0.038)	0.159	2.019	0.046

Table 22: The Effect of Variables on Trust Among Young Arabs

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**0.737** (0.577)		1.276	0.206
Stereotypes	**0.410** (0.093)	0.446	4.417	0.000
Palestinian Media	**0.196** (0.052)	0.349	3.779	0.000
Holocaust and Anti-Semitism	**0.127** (0.053)	0.216	2.379	0.020
Negative Emotions	**-0.141** (0.068)	-0.206	-2.079	0.041

Table 23: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Jews

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**1.353** (0.326)		4.152	0.000
Trust	**0.344** (0.051)	0.282	6.781	0.000
Ethos of Conflict	**0.271** (0.039)	0.245	6.944	0.000
Stereotypes	**-0.211** (0.042)	0.185	5.083	0.000
Political Orientation	**-0.100** (0.030)	-0.100	-3.368	0.001
Exposure to Violence	**-0.098** (0.028)	-0.083	-3.483	0.001
Israeli Leadership	**-0.080** (0.024)	-0.082	-3.259	0.001
Holocaust and Anti-Semitism	**-0.074** (0.034)	-0.054	-2.165	0.031
Age	**-0.003** (0.001)	0.052	2.224	0.026

Table 24: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Younger Jews

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**1.447** (0.416)		3.474	0.001
Trust	**0.413** (0.065)	0.342	6.306	0.000
Ethos of Conflict	**0.191** (0.053)	0.174	3.616	0.000
Stereotypes	**0.140** (0.052)	0.129	2.705	0.007

Exposure to Violence	**-0.124** (0.038)	-0.113	-3.263	0.001
Education	**0.088** (0.033)	0.091	2.684	0.008
Experience of Violence	**-0.098** (0.037)	-0.089	-2.643	0.009
Openness	**0.064** (0.028)	0.088	2.272	0.024
Political Orientation	**0.069** (0.029)	0.085	2.405	0.017

Table 25: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Older Jewish Respondents

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**1.235** (0.336)		3.673	0.000
Trust	**0.360** (0.057)	0.295	6.297	0.000
Ethos of Conflict	**0.277** (0.043)	0.247	6.424	0.000
Stereotypes	**0.196** (0.046)	0.173	4.242	0.000
Political Orientation	**-0.103** (0.033)	-0.100	-3.108	0.002
Israeli Leadership	**-0.088** (0.026)	-0.09	-3.338	0.001
Holocaust and Anti-Semitism	**-0.118** (0.038)	-0.082	-3.109	0.002
Age	**0.005** (0.002)	0.074	3.008	0.003

Table 26: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Arabs

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**2.940** (0.409)		7.195	0.000
Trust	**0.396** (0.064)	0.444	6.185	0.000
Education 1 (Israeli Education)	**-0.187** (0.050)	-0.273	-3.715	0.000
Ethos	**0.215** (0.064)	0.243	3.352	0.001
Israeli Curricula	**-0.129** (0.043)	-0.205	-3.008	0.003
Education	**-0.110** (0.039)	-0.184	-2.852	0.005

Table 27: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Older Israeli Arab Respondents

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**2.349** (0.480)		4.889	0.000
Trust	**0.383** (0.073)	0.406	5.277	0.000
Ethos of Conflict	**0.287** (0.074)	0.313	3.885	0.000
Israeli Education	**-0.191** (0.047)	-0.269	-4.049	0.000
Education	**-0.082** (0.039)	-0.139	-2.090	0.039
Negative Emotions	**-0.122** (0.061)	-0.133	-1.994	0.049

Table 28: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Younger Israeli Arabs

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**2.341** (0.783)		2.991	0.004
Palestinian Media	**0.272** (0.104)	0.461	2.621	0.011
Experience of Violence	**-0.355** (0.098)	-0.438	-3.615	0.001
Palestinian Curricula	**-0.251** (0.100)	-0.412	-2.497	0.015
Trust	**0.304** (0.095)	0.344	3.210	0.002
Israeli Education (Q6)	**0.119** (0.043)	0.280	2.726	0.008
Exposure to Violence	**0.178** (0.085)	0.252	2.081	0.041

Table 29: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Right-Oriented Jews

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**0.858** (0.287)		2.986	0.003
Ethos of Conflict	**0.257** (0.052)	0.239	4.916	0.000
Stereotypes	**0.251** (0.054)	0.234	4.625	0.000
Trust	**0.228** (0.069)	0.183	3.287	0.001

Exposure to Violence	**-0.128** (0.036)	-0.143	-3.544	0.000
Israeli Leadership	**-0.106** (0.033)	-0.124	-3.193	0.002
Age	**0.004** (0.002)	0.085	2.103	0.036

Table 30: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Left & Center-Oriented Jews

	Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stat	Significance
Constant	**0.670** (0.361)		1.858	0.064
Trust	**0.508** (0.066)	0.423	7.690	0.000
Ethos	**0.321** (0.060)	0.282	5.368	0.000
Negative Emotions	**-0.109** (0.039)	-0.11	-2.803	0.005
Holocaust and Anti-Semitism	**-0.108** (0.048)	-0.08	-2.260	0.025
Openness	**0.065** (0.031)	0.078	2.060	0.040



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